

Journal of Cyprus Studies

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi

European Financial Crisis, Energy Cooperation, Natural Gas,
Disenfranchisement, Geo-politics, Self-determination,
Privatization, Welfare Loss, Cyprus Turkish Airlines,
Wage Equation, Conflict, Migration, Diaspora,
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The Journal of Cyprus Studies is a publication of EMU-CCS (Centre for Cyprus Studies) which was launched in 1995. It is a multi-disciplinary, refereed and bilingual journal (both in English and Turkish) published biannually. *The Journal of Cyprus Studies* is dedicated to the scholarly study of all aspects of Cyprus issues at a global level. It plays an active role in the development of an authoritative archive and bibliography of sources and the provision of a scholarly, academic forum for the analysis, exchange and critique of ideas on social, cultural, historical, environmental, political and legal matters relevant to the past, present or future of Cyprus.

Papers submitted for consideration are expected to focus on subject matter specifically related to the island of Cyprus and may include (but are not restricted to) the following areas of interest: art, history, literature, linguistics, music, theater, architecture, archaeology, cultural studies, communication, education, psychology, sociology, geography, folklore, gender studies, politics, international relations, law, business, management, finance, economics, tourism, medicine, environment, engineering as well as book reviews on recent publications, historical sources, abstracts of recent theses on Cyprus and news and reports on important recent scientific events.

Material published in the JCS may include original critical essays or studies, statements of reasoned opinion, sustained critical responses relevant to published material, book reviews, translations, photographs, reproductions of works of art or cultural artefacts, interviews, official documents, transcripts of media broadcasts, or reprints of significant texts.

The Journal of Cyprus Studies does not discriminate against contributions on the basis of the nationality, race, ethnicity, religion or gender of the contributors; nor on the basis of their points of view or conclusions, provided that they are conveyed by careful, reasoned argument and discussion. Submissions are sent by the editor-in-chief anonymously for review to experts whose identities also remain confidential. The editor-in-

chief may, where complex issues are concerned, invite other contributors to submit critical evaluations and responses to an article, or alternative perspectives; and these may be published simultaneously.

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi'nin Amaçları ve Hedefleri

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi, - Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi - Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi'nin yayın organı olup, disiplinler arası Kıbrıs ile ilgili Türkçe veya İngilizce özgün ve evrensel boyutta çalışmalara yer veren hakemli bir dergi olup yılda iki kez yayımlanmaktadır. Yayın hayatına 1995'de başlayan *Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi* (JCS), Kıbrıs ile ilgili bilimsel özgün makalelerin yanısıra, tanıtım yazıları, güncel bilimsel etkinlikler ile ilgili haberler, raporlar ve arşiv belgelerine yer vermektedir. JCS, İngilizce ve Türkçe olarak iki dilde yayımlanmaktadır.

*Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi'*nde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirilecek olan çalışmaların Kıbrıs adası ile ilgili konular çerçevesinde sanat, tarih, edebiyat, dilbilimi, müzik, tiyatro, mimarlık, arkeoloji, kültürel çalışmalar, iletişim, eğitim, psikoloji, sosyoloji, coğrafya, halkbilim, cinsiyet çalışmaları, siyaset, uluslararası ilişkiler, hukuk, işletme, işletme yönetimi, finans, ekonomi, turizm, tıp, çevre, mühendislik ve bu gibi alanlardan özgün makaleler, kitap, tarihi kaynaklar ve filmlere ait tanıtımlar yanında yeni tamamlanmış yüksek lisans ve doktora tezi özetleri, güncel bilimsel etkinlik haberleri ve raporlar olması beklenir.

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi, milliyet, ırk, etnik köken, din veya cinsiyet farkı gözetmeksizin, bakış açıları veya vardıkları sonuçlar itibarı ile, itinalı ve mantıklı tartışma içeren yazılara açıktır. JCS'e gönderilen bütün yazılar, değerlendirilmek üzere incelenirken yazarın olduğu kadar hakemin de kimlikleri gizli tutulur. Tartışmaya açık konular söz konusu olduğunda, editör herhangi bir makaleye ilişkin eleştirel değerlendirmeler, yanıtlar veya alternatif yaklaşımlar için başka araştırmacılarдан görüş isteyebilir ve bu konudaki bütün görüşler JCS'nin aynı sayısında yer alır.

Editorial

Readers of the 43rd issue of the Journal of Cyprus Studies (JCS) find a rich collection of five scholarly articles and one book review contributing knowledge and cultural awareness of Cyprus to the world. This issue's articles broadly address the prevailing circumstances of Cyprus in regards to economics, natural resources, migration, disenfranchisement, privatization, and urban landmarks.

These days, while discussions of a political resolution for the island continue, the power struggle between Turks and Greeks has hot topics, especially one directed at natural resource management and its associated political and economic dimensions. In this issue of JCS, Bahadır Kaynak points to the importance of these new circumstances as a strong incentive for Turks, Greeks, and Cypriots to cooperate and realize full potential in the energy game. Similarly, in Hasan Devci's article, the author indicates export of energy from the region to Europe via Turkey is economically the most viable option and relates his findings to the two feasible political alternatives for the island. Tangentially, a third article questions the current socio-economic circumstances of North Cyprus by highlighting the dramatic termination of Cyprus Turkish Airlines, which was a national airline and one of few legendary institutions of Turkish Cypriots. In this article, Fatma Güven Lisaniler, Fehiman Eminer, and Hasan Rüstemoğlu focus on the effects of privatization of companies on employment and monetary welfare loss to their workers.

Also, in JCS 43, two articles direct attention to the challenging topic of the tangible and intangible cultural heritage of Cyprus. The article written by Devrim Yücel Besim and Ayer Kaşif deals with physical artefacts produced, maintained, and intergenerationally transferred within the Turkish Cypriot community. In their article, they select and present fourteen monuments as distinctive urban components of the built environment of North Nicosia. These monuments, from during and after the 1960s, are documented and reported as forms of public art. In the other article covering cultural heritage, Hanife Aliefendioğlu and

Béla Vizvári write about the life of İsmail Cemal, a Turkish Cypriot who immigrated to Australia and then returned to Cyprus. Within his life story, the recent socio-political history of the island is crisscrossed and conveyed. The article stimulatingly demonstrates how people can transform their native environments with life experiences gained abroad, and it is a valuable contribution to the intangible cultural heritage of the island. Appropriately, JCS 43 also introduces a book written by Janine Teerling, which is about the experiences of Britain-born Cypriots whose parents had migrated from Cyprus. Here, Netice Yıldız comprehensively introduces and reviews this book that is based on an ethnographic study.

JCS 43 is prepared for publication with the invaluable efforts of these devoted persons. The tremendous effort, everlasting patience, and scholarly austerity of the authors and referees makes this journal thrive and well-regarded in the international arena. At this point, I would like to thank all the authors, referees, and the book reviewer for their generosity, tolerance and dignity. And, I hope you enjoy reading the articles in JCS 43, as much as we enjoy sharing the current issues from Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean Region. We truly hope that readers who have benefited intellectually or in their cultural awareness from JCS 43 will continue their connections with Journal for Cyprus Studies more than ever.

With gratitude,
Prof. Dr. Hıfsiye Pulhan
Editor-in-Chief

Journal of Cyprus Studies

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The Outlook for Peace in Cyprus after the Financial Crisis and Gas Discoveries

Finansal Kriz ve Doğalgaz Keşifleri Sonrası Kıbrıs'ta Barış için Görünüm

Akif Bahadır Kaynak

Abstract

The end of Cold War eased political tensions in many corners of the World however the conflicts arising from regional dynamics were carried on to the new century. The Greek-Turkish power struggle on Cyprus is among those hot spots where a political settlement has not been reached yet even though the root of disagreement lies in Cold War years. The rejection of Annan Plan by the South in 2004 created a frustration in the Northern Cyprus and Turkey breaking hopes for reconciliation. This status quo was fundamentally altered when the economic model of Cyprus collapsed as a consequence of contagion from European financial crisis. Almost simultaneously significant reserves of natural gas deposits were discovered in Eastern Mediterranean some of which were located to the south of the island. Aphrodite natural gas reserve promised the recovery of economic glimmer of the island provided that legal and technical issues on the extraction and transfer of this resource to European markets are resolved. Turkey has the means to increase transaction costs for Cyprus and energy companies if left out of this deal but can alternatively provide a transit route to European markets for Cyprus' natural gas. The demise of Cyprus as an off-shore financial center and the prospects for becoming and energy supplier to European markets changed the payoffs of this deadlocked game considerably. In this new setting Turkey, Greece and Cypriots have a strong incentive to cooperate in order to realize the potential in the energy game.

Keywords: Cyprus, European financial crisis, energy cooperation, natural gas, Eastern Mediterranean

Özet

Soğuk Savaş'ın sonu dünyanın birçok köşesindeki politik gerilimlerin azalmasına sahne olsa da bölgesel dinamiklerden kaynaklanan çatışmalar yeni yüzyıla taşınmıştır. Kıbrıs üzerindeki Türk-Yunan güç mücadelesi de henüz bir siyasi çözüme ulaşılamayan bu sıcak noktalardan biridir. 2004 yılında Annan Planı'nın Güney'de reddi Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta ve Türkiye'de hayal kırıklığı yaratmış, çözüm umutlarının kaybolmasına yol açmıştır. Bu durum, Kıbrıs'ın ekonomik kalkınma modelinin Avrupa ekonomik krizinin bir uzantısı olarak çökmesiyle temelden değişecektir. Neredeyse eş zamanlı olarak da bir kısmı adanın güneyinde olan doğalgaz rezervleri Doğu Akdeniz'de keşfedilmiştir. Afrodite doğalgaz sahası, gazın çıkarma ve transferine ilişkin hukuki ve teknik sorunların çözülmesi kaydıyla adanın kaybolmakta olan ıslatısını geri kazandırma umudunu taşımaktadır. Kıbrıs'ın bir off-shore finansal merkez olarak çöküşü ile beraber Avrupa pazarlarına enerji ihracatçısı haline gelme ihtimali bu kilitlenmiş siyasi oyundaki muhtemel getirileri değiştirmiştir. Bu yeni durumda, Türkiye, Yunanistan ve Kıbrıslılar'ın enerji oyunundaki potansiyeli gerçekleştirebilmek için işbirliği yapmalarına güçlü bir gerekeç çıkmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Avrupa mali krizi, enerji işbirliği, doğal gaz, Doğu Akdeniz

Introduction

The ongoing political stalemate in Cyprus is a relic from Cold War years and it continues to occupy a significant space in Turkey's relations with Greece and the West. Two British military bases are still active due to strategic location of the island at the crossroads of Eastern Mediterranean maritime routes. Cyprus is located right to the north of Suez Channel and is in direct control of all maritime traffic in the region making those bases strategically important for dominance of Eastern Mediterranean. As a result of its geographical value, Turkey and Greece as well as Turkish and Greek communities of the island are unwilling to make compromises from their political position.

The decision to admit Republic of Cyprus into EU a decade ago and Turkey's acceptance as a candidate country for membership seemed to be able to break the ongoing deadlock in negotiations (Michael 2011, 164-169). Turkey, in return for a prospective membership in EU, would be more willing to soften its stance on the question. AKP government that started its first term in 2003 was the most enthusiastic party to reach an agreement on Cyprus stalemate. When UN General Secretary Annan and his staff prepared a plan for unification of the island, despite opposition from die-hard groups within the Military and Foreign Office, Turkish government supported the solution. The plan was separately voted in a referendum in the North and the South of the island and the Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly supported the deal. For Turkish Cypriots, the plan was going to end decades of isolation from the World and at the same time guarantee the identity and rights of Turkish community (Kızılyürek 2005, 384-390). Nevertheless the fate on the island was not solely going to be decided on the North.

In the South, neither Greece nor Republic of Cyprus had enough incentives to make any compromises for a solution (Michael 2011, 181-184). Greece was not only a member of European Union but managed to bring her economy into the Euro-zone which brought a temporary but illusive feeling of prosperity.

Republic of Cyprus had already guaranteed accession to EU by 2004 and was in no mood to fall behind the 1974 status. The result of the referendum was understandably a solid "no" for unification from the Greek side in which Turkish side achieved important concessions¹. The failure of referendum on Greek side buried the plan for some time but important external shocks would shift the payoffs considerably within a decade.

Collapse of Cyprus as an Offshore Financial Center

Southern European economies benefited considerably from the launch of Euro as capital flux created an atmosphere of optimism while the interest rates converged to North European levels in the first decade of 2000s. Euro-zone was a project designed to bring member states together under a single monetary policy; a step of enormous importance on the road to create a single European market. Nevertheless, from the beginning there were warnings that the current state of Europe did not allow for the creation of a single currency zone. A single currency zone should allow for labor mobility, price and wage flexibility that is necessary for adjustment of macroeconomic imbalances, a fiscal authority that will proactively engage in counter-cyclical policies in diverging zones and convergence of economic cycles over the entire zone (Mundell 1961). Apparently by the launch of Europe, neither of those conditions was perfectly met in member countries. As a result of the disappearance of national currencies Northern European economies started to gain competitiveness while the Southern Europe enjoyed a false spring that would last until the tide turned.

The situation of Cyprus was further complicated thanks to its singular positioning as an off-shore tax haven within Europe. Authorities encouraged the inflow of capital by a low 10% tax rate for international companies in order to compete with other EU tax havens like Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Gibraltar and British Isles. After the collapse of Beirut in the 1980s as a financial center, Cyprus was well poised to benefit

from its proximity to Middle Eastern and East European capital and bilateral double taxation agreements well served this purpose. Primarily the Russian investors chose to park their funds in the island's financial system (Pelto, Vahtra, & Liuhto 2004) encouraged by the tacit guarantee of European Union on their deposits. The size of bank assets ballooned to reach eight times that of GDP when the crisis hit and the deposits of Russian citizens were well over 30 billion dollars (Hanke 2013). An off-shore financial center under EU's protective umbrella seemed to be a perfect shelter for oligarchs' treasures. However there has never been an implicit underwriting of member states financial liabilities neither in the form of bank deposits nor sovereign bonds. It was only an assumption by the investors that EU would never allow member states to default, fearing the loss of credibility of European Union and the risk of a contagion to other countries. A similar reasoning was applied to Eurobond markets where spreads on Southern European bonds stayed unsurprisingly low for nearly a decade despite an obvious loss of competitiveness in their economies and the unsustainable path of current account deficits.

The investors' confidence in a tacit European guarantee seemed to be justified in the case of Italy, Spain and Portugal when ECB committed to buy their bonds in order to avoid a sovereign default contagion. However for Greek bond holders a restructuring took place and the bondholders suffered from haircuts on their principal payments and interests. Cypriot banks were also among the major losers of Greek restructuring (Oehker-Sincai 2013) and they had to book losses on their exposure to Greek risk. Already the breakneck speed expansion in Cypriot banking balance sheets was drawing attention. The assets of banks were eight times larger than South Cyprus' GDP and this was a clear indication that the financial sector was completely cut off from real sector and the government could in no way support banking industry if needed.

The Cypriot government had ran out of tools to rescue its banks by itself, primarily because a Euro-

zone country had already given up its function as a lender of last resort in the absence of a national central bank. Providing liquidity to distressed financial institutions could no longer be achieved singlehandedly. It was the European Union and ECB who could pull Cypriot banks from an inevitable meltdown but they would also not throw money in an off-shore tax haven where Russian oligarchs laundered their money. Help would be conditional and the Cyprus economy would have to be under custody of major European powers henceforth. European taxpayers' money could not be wasted to save the deposits of the ultra-rich, especially the Russian oligarchs, who ventured into the off-shore financial markets to evade taxation at home. Desperately, the Cypriot government even waited for a bail-out from Russian government but that would also come on conditions of gas extraction rights for offshore resources in the Mediterranean. The least bad choice for Cyprus was to let the bank depositors and especially the big ones into the fray. Deposits under 100.000 Euro was guaranteed by the government but bigger bank customers had to endure the consequences of bank defaults and debt consolidations. Furthermore a limit of 300 Euros per day was imposed upon withdrawals from bank deposits in order to forestall a bank run. Although those measures were required to prevent a full scale collapse of the financial system, they also melted the confidence towards banking system. Once considered a safe haven for big money, the economy of Cyprus collapsed bringing down the sandcastle that the Greek Cypriots depended for their prosperity. The authorities played with the idea of leaving Euro-zone for some time but fears of contagion to other European markets (Eichengreen 2010) convinced policy makers to drop this plan.

In 2013, the economy shrank by 5% while the unemployment rates climbed up to 17%. The figures in Table 1 illustrate clearly how the Cypriot economy overheated in the first decade of the millennium and show why this model could not be sustained.

Table 1: Key Economic Indicators of Republic of Cyprus:

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Growth											
Rate	4,2	3,9	4,1	5,1	3,6	-1,9	1,3	0,4	-2,4	-5,4	-2,3
CAB*/											
GDP**	-5,0	-5,9	-7,0	-11,8	-15,6	-10,7	-9,8	-3,4	-6,9	-3,0	-5,1
Inflation											
Rate	2,3	2,6	2,5	2,4	4,7	0,3	2,4	3,3	2,4	-0,4	-1,4

Capital flows well in excess of the economy's capacity to absorb, resulted in extremely high levels of current account deficits. Growth and inflation rates picked up but when the global crisis hit and Cyprus lost its status as an off-shore tax haven, the economy went into an ice age in terms of business activity. While the economy is contracting heavily, the Cypriot economy is still giving current account deficits, although at a much moderate pace. Adoption of Euro removed the possibility that the exchange rate be used as an adjustment mechanism. Worst of all, still the real estate markets are in decline and there seems to be no end to the economic hardship. In that case, as in many other parts of southern Europe, Cypriot economy has to endure long and hard periods of wage and price deflation. This means significant amount of production losses ahead in the coming years. One should not wonder why the Cypriot government is so anxious to utilize any resource that can provide a boost to its economy.

Although the economic collapse brought significant hardship for ordinary Cypriots, it can also provide an opportunity to establish a sustainable economic model right from its foundations. That would take years and even decades to come out but can also create incentives for the reunification in the island. Cyprus as an off-shore tax haven submerged under the waters of Mediterranean but energy companies are starting to drill out natural gas from underneath the basin of the same sea.

Turkey's Role as a Transit Route between Energy Suppliers and Markets in Europe

Turkey has become the main transit route for Europe that wanted to establish a Silk Road of natural gas in order to diversify its suppliers (Tagliapietra 2014). The policy was in effect since the 1990s with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project but its urgency and necessity became more obvious after the energy crisis of 2006 when Ukraine intercepted Russian natural gas deliveries to Europe as a result of disagreement on gas prices between these two countries. The crisis was repeated in 2009 and supplies to Europe was once again cut off albeit for a longer period this time, convincing European policy makers of the urgency to find alternative routes for energy. The blockage scrapped the assumptions that oil and gas are exclusively economic goods rather than strategic ones (Umbach 2010, 1230). According to this logic, Russia was also mutually dependent on European markets and could not risk antagonizing its best customer, namely EU. Moreover disruptions could be dealt with as alternatives existed, so energy security should not be a factor of high importance. Those double energy crises terminated those unjustified claims.

Considering the fact that Turkey is surrounded by countries that supply 73% of World's proven oil reserves and 72% of proven gas reserves² and links those resources to the gigantic European market one could easily understand the significance of a transit strategy (Bilgin 2015). Turkey's position may stay as being a mere energy corridor or may progress towards becoming an energy hub or at best an energy center,

depending on the success of policies implemented. In the case of an energy corridor Turkey would host a variety of oil and gas pipelines from the supplying countries to Europe and accrue transfer fees. An energy hub, on the other hand, will bring in the possibility of affecting terms and conditions of energy trade. There are at the same time various obstacles in front of Turkey's desire to become a hub as well as major rewards if succeeded. Turkish desire to become a main energy lifeline needs the commitment of European policy makers to its role as a energy hub for the region, otherwise it may well antagonize Russia by pursuing the strategy. In economic terms, aggressive policies may cause Turkish market to be oversupplied if markets necessary for those resources are not developed as planned (Shaffer 2006, 103). Besides further investments are needed to cope with political and natural contingencies such as war, earthquake etc.

The most ambitious of those plans, the prospect of becoming an energy center, will require massive investment on infrastructure and complete dedication to this goal. This would also allow Turkey to project political influence thanks to its dominant position. Nevertheless, the fact that Turkey's current contracts with supplying countries does not allow significant influence on terms or conditions of sales, nor is the infrastructure sufficient for a sophisticated policy (Bilgin 2010, 127-128). Hence Turkey currently seems rather concerned with diversifying energy supplies in order to divest its dependence to Russian energy and improve its terms of purchase. In the long run with the completion of nuclear power plants and gas storage facilities, in parallel with more favorable and sustainable agreements with energy producers may help Turkey become an energy hub as well.

Turkey's unique geographical position linking producers with Europe provided it with an advantage in establishing a key position in this commerce (Tekin & Williams 2011, 145-146; Özdemir, Yavuz, Tokgöz 2015: 100). Except for White Stream and AGRI all the projects envisioned carrying the natural gas over Turkish territory³. Despite failure of Nabucco project that aimed to supply gas from Shah Deniz II in

Azerbaijan to Central Europe passing through Turkey, Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) projects will target consumers in southern Europe. Until 2020-2025 Turkey will only transit the 10bcm/year Shah Deniz II gas through its territory (Fackrell 2013, 70-71) as other projects are still in premature stages. This figure will only constitute 3% of EU's natural gas demand. However this initial step may open the gates for further investments and extensions on gas through Turkish territory.

Southern Gas corridor may also eventually bring gas from fields in Turkmenistan as well (Özkan 2015) when issues related to transit through Caspian is resolved. A possible solution proposed by ENI is the compressed natural gas (CNG) project that will liquidify Turkmen gas and transport to regasification. However economically and strategically this project does not seem justified. Nabucco project that targeted consumers in Central Europe via Southern Corridor had the potential to undermine Russian strategy to control all energy supplies directed to this region. So its failure was a relief to Gazprom and Russia but Southern corridor still exists through TAP and TANAP only to serve customers in southern Europe instead (Güney 2015). Having in mind the fact that Southern European markets are already saturating after the economic crisis resulted in the freezing of demand, one could argue that abandoning Nabucco was a strategic blindness. Nevertheless, the financial and strategic difficulties in bringing about Nabucco convinced supplier countries to look for alternatives. The shale revolution in US cut down the demand for LNG imports putting a pressure on its prices but still as the costs of liquidification and regasification make LNG an expensive alternative for pipeline projects. That is why countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are content to reach southern European markets as the second best option. Turkey, on the other hand, is happy to connect supplying countries to its pipeline network irrespective of final destinations in Europe (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. Pipeline Map into Europe (Source: Review of Environment, Energy and Economics)

Southern corridor offers an array of benefits to the regions countries not only in economic terms but also political aspects. First of all, Caspian region countries will have the opportunity to diversify their export routes and will not be bound neither by northern route and nor sales to Asia any more. Second, the route is not controlled by Gazprom and this is good news taking into account the fact that European Commission is promoting competition in energy markets. Gazprom is the vehicle for Russian policy makers' strategy to become an energy super-state and the most importance premise of this scheme is to control energy resources supplying European market (Kazantsev 2010; Belyi & Goldthau 2015). Apparently European Union's priorities are directly in conflict with Russia's and Gazprom's motives. Third, despite a temporary slump because of European crisis, the market is expected to grow and due to huge price drops in US market as a consequence of shale revolution, Europeans are also anxious to improve their buying terms as their natural gas costs are already triple the cost in US. This seriously compromises competitiveness in energy intensive sectors in Europe. Bringing in more suppliers in order to enhance competition is the key to achieve this target. Finally, it will allow further strengthening of political ties between Europe, Turkey and especially supplier countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, a much needed contribution to maintain political stability (Koranyi 2014, 3-4).

Increasing the number of supplier countries, combined with a buyer's market in Europe can bring down energy costs of Turkey in the coming years. This

is increasingly becoming important considering the fact that Turkey's energy bill is the main reason underlying its burgeoning current account deficit and Turkish gas imports are illustrating a continuous upward trend in the last 10 years. In fact, it can also be claimed that Turkey's primary concern in conducting its energy policy is securing its supplies whereas a transit route to Europe is a secondary perspective (Winrow 2013, 146), (Table 2).

Southern corridor also has significant benefits for energy producers such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan basically for the fact that there seems to be no other route to reach Western markets and heavy investments on downstream can only be justified if and only if the gas can be brought to the market. Iraq also has the potential to export through Turkish pipeline system as much as 10bcm/year by 2020 (Tunçalp 2015: 73). Turkey's relations especially with Kurdistan Regional Government involve substantial cooperation in the field of energy. Genel Energy of Turkey in partnership with Norwegian partner DNO is exploring and producing oil in energy sector (Bilgin 2010, 89). The only reliable route to market for Kurdish gas is through Turkey and Turkish policy makers are intending to exploit it in order to strengthen their hand against other suppliers as well. The more pragmatic approach of AKP government to the Kurdish entity in the north of Iraq enabled a room for maneuver in the energy game (Mills 2013, 62).

However the biggest potential is coming from Iran that has not been exploited mainly as a result of political reasons (Tagliapietra 2014, 9-18). The recent nuclear deal reached between Iranian administration and P5+1 opens the possibility of bringing in immense underground resources of the country to global markets. Years of neglect as a result of wars and embargos left Iran's energy industry in a poor condition and it will require massive capital expenditures and time to uplift production. Yet in the long run, Anatolian peninsula seems to be the only conduit to Europe to lay pipelines. Iran may divert a major part of its natural gas resources to Eastern markets and may also use liquidification option for its reserves in the Gulf (Omidvar 2015) however Turkish corridor still needs to be a part of Iranian export strategy for diversification.

Table 2. Turkey's Natural Gas Consumption in Billion Cubic Meters

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
17.4	20.9	22.1	26.9	30.5	36.1	37.5	35.7	39.0	44.7	45.3	45.6	48.6

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015.

Mediterranean and the Cypriot Gas

The consumption of natural gas is expected to rise in the Mediterranean region from 114 Mtoe in 2009 to 239 Mtoe in 2030. Significant growth is expected in the regions' demand for energy which is mostly coming from the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. Nevertheless, gas production in the region is also expected to show an increase in parallel, protecting current surplus levels (Table 3).

We should also note that northern Mediterranean countries are net importers of natural gas while Algeria, Egypt and Libya are countries supplying the market. In the Levantine basin the potential was left untapped for a long time but recent research is indicating a world class hydrocarbon province⁴. Whereas the offshore field Leviathan with estimated reserves of 453 bcm by 2010 is discovered in Israeli Exclusive Economic Zone, Cyprus is also blessed with energy resources. The Cypriot government investigated plans to establish a LNG plant near Vassilikos on the southern coast along with Noble Energy and Israel's Delek group (Hafner, Tagliapietra, & El Elandalousi 2012, 10). Those reserves can be utilized to meet the burgeoning energy demand in the region but at the same time be transferred to European markets.

The possibility of bringing in gas from Eastern Mediterranean offshore fields has come out after the recent explorations in the region. In 2009, Noble energy discovered gas reserves in Tamar offshore field and this finding was followed by further discoveries in Leviathan Field in offshore Israel and Aphrodite field south of Cyprus in 2011. While the fields in off-shore Israel are estimated to hold 800 bcm of natural gas and when they become operational they are expected to produce 10bcm gas

per year, Aphrodite field in off-shore Cyprus may contain 140-220 bcm gas reserves⁵ according to estimates. At a very conservative price estimate of 200 \$ / bcm, current value of reserves can top 40 billion dollars in total. For an island of approximately 1 million inhabitants, it is not hard to see the significance of recent explorations. Republic of Cyprus has a GDP of 24 billion US dollars and the public debt of the country is slightly above 18 billion dollars. Noble Energy and Republic of Cyprus have made a 65/35 split agreement on profits from natural gas fields in Aphrodite area. So with the assumption that the revenues will be spread through a period of 20 years and the government will receive 50% of the revenues after deduction of costs, net revenue of close to 1 billion dollars can be expected (Emerson 2013, 167). That could be a considerable sum assuming that total government revenues in Cyprus is slightly over 10 billion dollars (Fig. 2).



Figure 2. Cyprus Natural Gas Reserves Map (Source: Cyprus Gas News)

Table 3. Rise of the Consumption of Natural Gas in the Mediterranean Region

Mtoe	2009	2015	2020	2025	2030	Annual
Avg Growth						
Gas Production	150	184	227	261	294	3,2%
Gas Consumption	114	154	177	207	239	3,6%
Net Imports / Exports	-36	-30	-50	-54	-55	1,8%

The discovery of gas in offshore Cyprus fields once again increased tensions on the issue a settlement on the island's future. Under current conditions Turkish population in the north of the island has no word in those agreements and will not benefit from the riches of the region (Öğütçü 2012). Republic of Cyprus signed delimitation agreements with Egypt, Israel and Lebanon to define its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Mediterranean but Turkey does not recognize these arrangements. When Cyprus started exploration agreement to the south of island Turkey authorized Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) for oil exploration in the zone between Cyprus and Turkey.

The delimitation agreements were based on UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) but this convention has not been signed by Turkey. The current dispute between Turkey and Greece on the Aegean Sea is the major reason behind Turkish rejection of the Convention but the fact that this is a widely accepted agreement by the international community weakens Turkish position (Emerson 2013, 168-170). Furthermore, powerful economic incentives behind the exploitation of these resources reduce the power of Turkey's objection. While Turkish government claimed that a final agreement was necessary before those resources could be exploited, Republic of Cyprus already considers Russia's Novatek, Italy's ENI, France's Total, Malaysia's Petronas, Korea's Kogas, Israel's Delek, US Marathon Oil and Australia's Woodside Energy Holdings as potential candidates for further exploration (Tagliapietra 2014, 22). Under these circumstances it is unlikely that Turkey will be able to block exploration activities singlehandedly.

Although Turkish objections on exploration and drilling of natural gas resources went unheeded, transportation of those resources dominated the

agenda. Turkey could well offer an access to Eastern Mediterranean gas to European markets (Winrow 2013, 157). Turkey has already covered a considerable distance in linking East West corridor but for these recent natural gas reserves political problems still prevail. In order to overcome the necessity of using Turkish infrastructure, Cypriot government started to investigate LNG option. A proposed LNG plant could be located in Vassilikos port that could be operational as early as 2019 (IAE, 2013). The liquification plant is proposed to be constructed will have an initial export capacity of 5 million tones and will be expandable to 15 million tones when necessary. Noble Energy, Delek Drilling and Total have already signed a memorandum of understanding with the government for the LNG plant but still the commercial viability of the project is dubious. The liquification plant will have a cost of 6 billion \$ plus 3 billion \$ for a train⁶. The next two trains will also have additional cost of 3 billion \$ each, making the total investment cost to 15 billion \$. As the estimated gas reserves are being downsized already, it will be harder to go for LNG strategy as a potential export route to Europe. There is the possibility of bringing in Israeli gas from Leviathan and Tamar fields to increase the supply of resources. The ongoing Israeli-Turkish tensions could have induced Israel to opt for an LNG option to bypass Southern corridor but recent signs show that behind the doors, rational calculations can dominate sentiments and both countries can come to an agreement to transfer gas via the pipeline system going through Turkish territory. Taking into consideration the upstream, liquification and transportation costs, selling Eastern Mediterranean gas to European market does not look profitable but thanks to high prices in Asian markets that option looks feasible (Henderson

2013, 5). Considering the fact that European policy makers are already concerned with energy dependence to foreign sources, the discoveries in Eastern Mediterranean is extremely good news. Rather than bringing in the gas to European markets, liquefying it to sell in Asian markets sounds running counter to basic needs of Europe.

On the other side of the table, Russia also has stakes in this new scheme and makes sure its influence is felt by a combination of carrot and stick policies. Russia does not wish to see Eastern Mediterranean gas to give boost to Southern Corridor hence their plan is to transport and sell it in LNG form in European markets using Gazprom's capabilities. Turkey threatened to blacklisting companies working with Cyprus on a number of occasions. However this warning is unlikely to work in Gazprom's case because of the important leverage that Russians have in Turkish market (Ögütçü 2012, 5).

Another major rival to trans-Turkey pipeline projects is the Eastern Mediterranean gas corridor that links off-shore gas resources between Israel, Cyprus and Egypt to southern Europe via submarine pipelines. This option has been reevaluated in a recent tripartite meeting between Israel, Greek and Cyprus leaders in January 2016 in order to bring unexploited gas reserves to markets. However the feasibility of this project is also questionable especially after Noble Energy downgraded the potential gas reserves in Aphrodite fields off Cyprus shores. The depth of sea does not allow for large diameter pipes because of high pressure. Consequently there should be five to six pipes to be laid in order to carry desired amounts of gas to the mainland but that also makes to project uneconomic (Henderson 2013, 12) The search for a route to by-pass Turkish territories has much to do with the political problems that Greece, Cyprus and Israel are having with Turkey for the moment. Despite the fact that Southern Corridor is the most economically sensible route to reach markets, those political issues trigger outpouring of alternatives for the producing nations. The relations between Turkey and Israel deteriorated sharply after Operation

Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009 and reached a nadir after Mavi Marmara incident where Israeli commandos ambushed a Turkish ship and killed 9 civilians. Turkish government reacted with rancor to the attack asking for a formal apology, compensation for the families of the victims and lifting of the embargo and Gaza. Although Israeli government issued an apology and offered payments to families, still a full normalization has not been achieved as of today.

For Cyprus, the presence of Turkish troops on the island is a major problem and Greece has ongoing issues to be solved with Turkey. That is why Israel-Cyprus and Greece were in search of forming a net to overcome their problems with Turkey (Stavris, 2012) and they are also supported by Gazprom who seems willing to undertake the task of transferring the gas in Levant Basin to European markets. On the other hand, the détente between Turkey and Greece in the last decade should also be mentioned in order not to overemphasize the solidity of this net around Turkey. Greece also has few stakes to push forward a costly and risky submarine pipeline project under the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, the relations between Turkey and Greece has improved significantly for a while (Öniş & Yılmaz 2008) and Turkey offers Greece the possibility of becoming a partner in its network via TAP and TANAP pipelines (Tagliapietra & Zachmann 2015, 6).

Israel is also showing signs of finding a common ground with Turkey once again in order to fully exploit their natural gas potential. They are considering options for the sale of its gas and a scenario including a floating LNG terminal and a submarine pipeline to be connected to Southern Corridor. Moreover Israel is also probing the possibility of selling its gas to Palestinian Authority, Jordan and to Asian markets from Eliat Port. Turkey also is a major natural gas market in which the consumption is expected to reach 70 bcm in 2020 (IEA 2014). This demand is almost completely supplied by imports so Turkish policy makers' fundamental concern is to diversify sources in order to reduce risks. On the other hand Turkey is also trying to develop nuclear energy to reduce its reliance in natural gas.

It is also necessary to briefly mention Russia's position as an energy super-state on the recent energy findings in the region. Although Russia was heavily engaged in the region during Cold War supporting Arab countries against Israel, she decided to withdraw in the 1990s. Only after Putin came into power did Russia once again made her bid to become a key player in the region (Delanoë 2013). In 2013 Russia conducted large scale naval drills in the region both as a response to increasing Western attention to Syrian crisis and also because of Turkey's intervention to oil and gas research in the area. The relations between Russia and Cyprus had already improved considerably since 2000s as oligarchs parked their wealth in off-shore accounts. The corporate tax rates were as low as 10% while the Russian citizens enjoyed a bilateral tax treaty as well as %5 tax on dividends (Delanoë 2013, 86). Furthermore, those Russian citizens who have invested a minimum 300.000 € on property were granted a permanent residence thus made the island a backdoor to Europe. As explained previously, cooperation on financial issues between Russian capital and Cyprus was shattered by the financial crisis.

Starting with 1996 Cyprus and Russia have also invested in military cooperation and especially when Republic of Cyprus tried to purchase Russian S-300 surface to air missile system Ankara objected vigorously. Those systems with eventually deployed in Crete rather than Cyprus as a result of US pressure (Delanoë 2013, 89). Those two countries would also cooperate during the Syrian War. When the closure of Tartus base in Syria was discussed, which is the unique naval Russian base in Mediterranean, Cyprus was indicated as an alternative to Tartus.

Conclusion

There still remain important pockets of resistance for an eventual settlement in Cyprus problem and those groups on both sides of the table can bring the negotiations to a deadlock by insisting on maximalist positions. Nevertheless, the financial crisis and the prospects of natural gas findings have transformed the

payoffs that all parties have in this context.

First of all, Republic of Cyprus is the party that is most affected by the stream of events. Obviously, energy income is the most likely candidate to replace the lost wealth from financial flows. This will ensure that the population of the island will carry their prosperity to next generations. The most economically sensible route to market for Cypriot gas is to connect with Turkish pipeline system by an underwater pipeline. The distance between the island and mainland is short but the gas will also have to compete with energy from Caspian and Iraq (Henderson 2013, 13). Furthermore, a settlement may also provide a boost to income from tourism sector by ending the division of the island. Concerns about a military conflict seem to be diminished already after membership to EU has been achieved. Nevertheless, a final settlement will nullify the risks associated with an armed confrontation reducing the need for defense spending. In Presidential elections of 2013, candidate of DISY, the party who favored a yes vote to Annan Plan in 2004, Nicos Anastasiades was elected. In Northern Cyprus electoral victory of Akıncı, brought a new enthusiasm to negotiations bringing hope to international community about a final agreement. Nevertheless, Anastasiades also has to deal with the ongoing economic crisis and takes unpleasant measures under pressure from European Union. The costs and compromises needed to close a deal remain at their place so the President has less room to ask for patience and understanding from his constituency. Material benefits associated with a political settlement have significantly increased but political and psychological factors may still block the road to peace

For Greece, economic troubles constitute the single most concern in the last years and there is no sign that these problems will dissipate. Greek government will welcome any development that will reduce the economic pressure as a peace dividend or increased cooperation between the states in the region. Enmity with Turkey has few benefits to offer, while a continuation of easing tensions will allow Greece

to save on defense costs. Turkey has also started to offer a potential source of income as more Turkish citizens prefer Greece for touristic purposes. Resolution of Cyprus issue will open the gates for a final settlement and all Turco-Greek disagreements such as Aegean Sea dispute.

Turkish Cypriots are for the last decade been the most pro-unification group in this scheme while the dreams of EU integration became a reality for the southern part of the island. Becoming part of Europe induced Turkish Cypriots to vote overwhelmingly for unification in 2004. The rejection of Annan Plan in the South created disappointment and consternation in the north and today we witness a declining support for unification among Turkish Cypriots⁷. This may also be triggered by the ongoing economic crisis in Europe and in Southern Cyprus, yet there are still positive benefits entailed with a political settlement and public opinion may again shift towards unification in the north. Furthermore, leaving aside the fluctuations in public mood, we aim to analyze the changes in the payoff structure that policy makers are facing within the context of this paper.

Turkey also has also considerable gains to make from an eventual solution to the stalemate in Cyprus. After Turkish intervention in the island, Turkey endured serious economic sanctions and political pressures by the international community. The failure to reach an agreement on the issue constrained foreign policy options as well as creating a burden on finances of the government who found herself in the obligation to support the economy of Northern Cyprus. The Turkish part of the island could not stand by itself because of its isolation from the world and the inhabitants looked over to the southern part of their home to see in envy the increasing prosperity of the Greek side. Hence Turkey made important sacrifices to support living standards in the North and maintained a considerable military force in the island. More importantly, the presence of Turkish troops on the island strained the relations with the West and has been used as a pretext to block negotiations of adhesion with Turkey.

Turkey's desire to become an energy corridor or better an energy hub can only be achieved if the resources

of neighboring countries can be directed to the Turkish pipeline network. Turkey has to diversify its resources not only in order to improve its buying conditions but also to show Europe that it can serve as a reliable route to market. If Turkey can prove its importance as an energy lifeline to EU's decision makers, it can increase its leverage and enhance its chances of becoming a EU member in the future.

European Union's aim to diversify its energy resources will also be well served if the resources in the Eastern Mediterranean can be brought to the continent (Umbach 2010, 1237-1238). Currently, Europe is heavily dependent on energy supplies from Russia (Tekin & Williams 2011, 73-82) and this fragility may increase as the production in North Sea and Norway will fall in the next decade. A host of pipeline projects are hoped to give European Union alternatives if push comes to the shove. The task of reducing energy dependency seems more urgent as Russians are also finding alternatives to their gas in Asia. Finalization of a gas deal with China underlines the fact that now the Russians have more room of maneuver against the Europeans. While Russia is diversifying its export markets, Europe feels the pressure to find alternative suppliers more than ever.

There are positive signs that inspire optimism for the future of negotiations on Cyprus issue. Turkish and Greek Cypriots are negotiating directly first time since 1963 without the interference of intermediaries. Both parties in the island, seem to be closer to the idea of a loose federation more than ever, where the decisions affecting everyday life will be taken at the level of constituent states. On the other hand, there will be a single international personality and single foreign policy for the united Republic of Cyprus. This kind of a resolution will entail scrapping of trade restrictions imposed on North Cyprus and bring an end to difficulties faced by Turkey on EU accession process because of the situation on the island. The support given by US and EU point out to the fact that finally a large coalition of powers are in favor of a solution to the stalemate in Cyprus. This brings further hope for a final settlement on the fate of the island where all parties may finally see their concerns are met.

Notes

1. Annan Plan met the expectations of Turkish side by limiting the right to return of Greek Cypriots to the federal state in the North. A bicameral legislature in which the Senate was equally shared by Greek and Turkish communities was also hoped to overcome the anxiety of the Turkish side that feared being overwhelmed by the Greek majority.
2. Those figures may change as shale revolution is making more resources accessible especially in the United States. Nevertheless Turkey's southern neighbor Iraq also has the potential of increasing its supply and Turkey's position in the midst of resources and markets will continue in the future.
3. White Stream is a submarine pipeline Project in Black Sea linking Georgia to Romania and Ukraine while AGRI is the name of the Project to cover the same distance by LNG facilities and sea transport.
4. Israel's Ministry of Energy and Water resources estimate that reserves could increase up to 1,3 tcm within a few years. See <http://energy.gov.il/English>
5. LNG intelligence
6. LNG plants consists of typically one kilometer long series of industrial processes. In the trains the gas is cooled down to minus 160 centigrades allowing for the reduction of size up to 600 times.
7. Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE) report launched in November 2015 finds out that only 28% of Turkish Cypriots are willg to vote "yes" in a referendum for unification whereas 32% declare that they are undecided. Web: <http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/research/score/reports/item/105-reflections-paper-on-the-2015-score-index-for-cyprus-turkish.html> (Accessed: March 2, 2016).

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Biographic Sketch

Akif Bahadır Kaynak received his BA degree from Boğaziçi University Economics Department. Kaynak completed his PhD in Istanbul University International Relations Department in 2012. The same year he started as a Faculty Member in Istanbul Kemerburgaz University International Relations Department. Kaynak is currently working as an Assistant Professor in the same department and is also the Director of Social Sciences Institute. His work is mainly focused on energy issues and their implications on political relations.

Otobiografik Öz

Akif Bahadır Kaynak lisans derecesini Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Ekonomi Bölümü’nden aldı. Kaynak, doktorasını İstanbul Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü’nde 2012 yılında tamamladı. Aynı yıl İstanbul Kemerburgaz Üniversitesi’nde Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü’nde Öğretim Üyesi olarak göreve başladı. Kaynak, aynı bölümde Yardımcı Doçent olarak çalışmaya devam etmekte olup aynı zamanda Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürü olarak görev yapmaktadır. Çalışmaları ağırlıklı olarak enerji konuları ve siyaset bağlantısı üzerinde sürdürmektedir.

Cyprus: A federal or two-state solution?

Kıbrıs: Federal yoksa İki-Devletli Çözüm

Hasan A. Deveci

Abstract

The Republic of Cyprus came into existence in 1960 as a Greek-Turkish bi-communal partnership. Intercommunal strife and the ultimate coup against the first president prompted Turkey's intervention in 1974 which quelled the violence since but partitioned the island. Despite repeated and often encouraging promises, endeavours to reunite the island have so far been in vain. In the context of the accumulative respect for human rights sanctioning secession as the exercise of the right of self-determination, the potential contribution which political dynamism in the Eastern Mediterranean and the discovery of energy reserves in the Levant can make to a future settlement, this article reconciles statehood with the status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC;) analyses the question of secession as it relates to Northern Cyprus; and discusses the prospect for a federal or a two-state solution. It concludes that exporting Levant energy to Europe via Turkey is economically the most viable option and that a unified Federal Republic of Cyprus, with a constitutional right of secession, or two fully independent states within the supra-national framework of the European Union (EU) are viable alternatives.

Keywords: Cyprus, disenfranchisement, energy, geo-politics, self-determination

Özet

Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti 1960'da Rum-Türk ortaklığı olarak İngiltere, Yunanistan ve Türkiye garantisi altında kuruldu. Kuruluşundan 3 yıl sonra başlayan halklar arası mücadele, 1974'de zamanın cumhurbaşkanına karşı darbeye ve can güvenini sağlayan ama aynı zamanda adayı bölen Türkiye'nin müdahalesine yol açmış. Bu güne dek sulh korunmuş olsa da, ümit verici birçok görüşmelere rağmen, bölünen adada federe devlet kurulamamıştır. Konu edilen araştırma uluslararası gelişmekte olan insan haklarını, Doğu Akdeniz'de keşfedilen enerji kaynaklarını ve siyasi gelişmeleri konu eder ve Kıbrıs'ın iki bölümlü federe devlet olanağını veya Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin (KKTC'nin) tanımını inceler. Araştırma Doğu Akdeniz Bilâdü'sh-Şâm (Levant) bölgesinde keşfedilen enerjinin Karpaz-Türkiye boru hattı üzerinden Avrupa'ya dağıtımını en uygun seçenek olduğunu ve Kıbrıs Federe Devletinin kuruluşu veya iki özgür devletli Kıbrıs'ın Avrupa Birliği'ne (AB) üye olabileceğini savunur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs, temsil-dışlanması, enerji, küresel-siyaset, özgür-yönetim

Cyprus and Statehood

Given that the notion of a Federal Republic of Cyprus has dominated the agenda for more than 40 years and that only Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), pertinent questions are: what underlies the struggle in Cyprus; what are the requirements of statehood and; is “Northern Cyprus” a state?

The Cyprus Problem

Cyprus, the third largest island and located 600 miles from mainland Greece but 44 miles off the coast of Turkey, attracted traders and settlers from different suzerains since the 9th millennium BC, from the Phoenicians to the Venetians from whom the Ottoman Turks took over in 1571. Mainland Greek-Turkish hostilities started when in 1814 a secret society established under the patronage of Tsar Nicholas I avowed to secure the independence of Greece, and sow the seeds for future expansion. Since Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus was a founding member of the secret society, he advocated union of Cyprus with Greece –enosis. The Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey with respect to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, 1878 June 4, transferred the island from the Ottoman Turks to Great Britain in order to enhance her interests in Egypt and help defend the Asiatic possessions of the Sultan against Russia. In 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus, and in 1925 the island became a Crown colony.

Greek Cypriot demands for union with Greece during the colonial rule spurred violence, initially against the British but later both against the British and Turkish Cypriots. The 1960 Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance (London and Zurich multilateral treaties) established the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) as a Greek-Turkish bicomunal partnership guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The republic born out of violence lasted only 3 years; nationalistic aspirations of Greek Cypriot (enosis) and Turkish Cypriot (taksim –

partition) translated into intercommunal hostilities (U.S Library of Congress, n.d.), was made worst by the power struggle within the Greek community in Cyprus and the Junta taking control in Greece in 1967, culminated in the 1974 coup intended to hasten the union of Cyprus with Greece. Relying on Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey intervened in 1964, 1967 and finally in 1974. Turkey’s intervention in 1974 secured the peace but divided the island. Whereas Greek Cypriots in the South continue to represent the RoC, after experimenting with different modalities, Turkish Cypriots formed the breakaway TRNC in 1983. Hence, the time has come to consider the future of the island.

Requirements of Statehood

The criteria for statehood have been formulated in different ways, but all share the common premise of independent and sovereign governmental control. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 describes “the state” as a person of international law should possess a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) a government; and d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Though there is no legal hierarchy amongst them, the four pre-requisites are inseparably interrelated.

A “permanent population” simply denotes the presence of a group of people who have an appreciable association with a specific geographical locality, but does not exclude migratory or fluctuating population. For instance, Sudan, Iraq and Syria, to name but a few, have all experienced significant refugee crises and shifts in their respective population without losing their status as states. Moreover, there is no prescriptive number of individuals that make up a population. The Pacific island of Nauru has a population of 10,000 and the city-state of San-Marino a population of 24,000; the Vatican consists of a city with a small and essentially “professional, non-permanent -transitory” population, yet all three

are and functions as states. Save the usual migration common to all countries across the globe, Northern Cyprus has had a permanent population within its borders since 1975.

The requirement of a “defined territory” is satisfied so long as the people can demonstrate habitation over a specific region no matter how amorphous, even if an entity has no rigidly demarcated boundaries and has a boundary dispute with a neighbour. North and South Korea have been battling their boundaries for decades; the borders of Israel are disputed by its Arab neighbours, and the areas of Gaza and West Bank constitute the Palestinian state notwithstanding Israel’s presence in the region. Although Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been negotiating where the boundary should lie in the event of a settlement, together with a small cluster of Greek Cypriots and Maronites, Turkish Cypriots inhabit the territory lying north of the Green Line.

In context, “a government” suggests the presence of an executive body having control over a population within a defined territory. Some writers add independence to the criteria required for statehood, but effective governmental authority is closely related to the notions of independence and sovereignty. That said, entities with collapsed governments have continued to be states. Afghanistan had no stable government throughout the 1990s but retained her seat in all major international organisations. Somalia is recognised as a state despite the anarchy and lack of a functioning government. By contrast, Taiwan which exerts control over its territory and appears to be a functioning state is not recognised as a state under international law. It is universally accepted that the RoC has no writ over Northern Cyprus thus confirming that, as the successor of the autonomous and later the elected federal government, the TRNC has had control over its territory for nearly half a century.

Finally, irrespective of the entity’s ability in practice, possessing the theoretical “legal capacity” to conduct international relations autonomously free

from the sovereign authority of another state meets the requirement of capacity (Dixon, 2000: 109). The capacity of a state to enter into relations with other states is a function of effective government combined with independence. State practice suggests that customary international law allows states to be substantially dependent on external bodies. The Dayton Agreement granting governmental power in Palestine to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which was neither a state nor a government-in-exile yet recognized by over 100 states and represented in all activities of the UN, are a perfect example demonstrating first, that capacity to enter into relations with other states or organisations is no longer the exclusive domain of a state and, second, that independence and capacity are essentially two sides of the same coin (Crawford, 2006: 62). Likewise, Turkey is the only country to recognise the TRNC, and the TRNC has representative offices in many capitals including London and New York. Moreover, though by itself not implying recognition, in *Emin v Yeldağ*, [2002] 1 Family Law Reports, 956, English courts acknowledged the validity of a divorce effected under TRNC laws; and Northern Cyprus is an observer member of the Organisation of Islamic Countries and of the Economic Cooperation Organisation under the name “Turkish Cypriot State.”

Is “Northern Cyprus” a State?

Somalia, Taiwan, Palestine and others illustrate that the legal criteria for statehood as enshrined in the Montevideo Convention, exhibits the essential characteristics but does not prescribe the definitive requirements of a state. The century old test that a political entity able to establish itself “safely and permanently” and to exclude the authority of the territorial State has a claim to be accepted as a State remains valid (Oppenheim, 1905: 112-3). If so, with reference to the fundamental connection between independence and statehood clarified by Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas Case

(Netherlands v. U.S) (R.I.A.A., 1928: 829, 838) the TRNC possesses the pre-requisites of the Convention and therefore the attributes which bestows “the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.”

That said the question is not whether Northern Cyprus satisfies the Montevideo Convention and is therefore a state, but whether it can exercise the right of self-determination and be the subject of recognition.

The Position of Turkish Cypriots

Whether the TRNC is a state or violates the integrity of the RoC depends on one’s understanding of the legitimacy of a state created as a bi-communal partnership, but the partnership has since come to exclusively represent only one of the two communities. Hence, the undertaking recorded (Hansard, 19 December 1956 col 1272 & 1276), “the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, in the special circumstances of Cyprus be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status;” and reading of the UN Charter reinforced by international support for human rights makes secession more likely (Horowitz, 2006: 10).¹

The United Nations Charter

The modern right of self-determination rests on the UN Charter, which itself derived from President Woodrow Wilson’s proposal for the political independence and territorial integrity of states. The Wilsonian principles embodied in a speech to Congress in 1918, that took the form of Article 10 of The Covenant of the League of Nations, hinged on external (territorial integrity) and internal (political unity:) the ideas that there (a) is a right of people to be free from foreign domination –external self-determination; (b) should be a right of people to choose its own form of government –internal self-determination; and, (c) should be a continuous

consent of the governed by way of a representative democratic government –an aspect of human rights.

Replacing the League of Nations, at the 1945 San Francisco formulating Articles 1 & 2 of the Charter, conference members declared one of UN’s purposes as the development of friendly relations among nations “based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and resolved to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” By the 1960s the Wilsonian “principle” of allowing people with shared attributes as ethnicity, culture and religion to self-determine their affiliation and status on the World stage evolved into a “right.” Accordingly, with the (former) colonies in mind, the UN General Assembly declared that “[A]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (UNGAR, 1960: 1514(15), Clause 6). Clearly, the 1960 Declaration preserved the “national unity” of a state, and by inference exhausted the right of the people. However, the problem was that in some instances there were different communities but not a “nation” as anticipated by the Declaration. Minority groups in these territories found themselves trapped and subjugated by the majority within the newly created states. Thus, separatist groups challenged the concept of territorial integrity, which historically derived from having a representative government validated by the consent of the governed, designed to “to maintain international peace and security” but now conflicted with the nascent “fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (UN Charter, Article 1). The individual’s fundamental right to participate in a democratic process formed the basis for ethnic groups able to determine their social, cultural, political and economic future. The struggle for freedom by ethnic groups exemplified in case law like The Aaland Islands Question, Report by the

Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7 [C] 21/68/106 (1921) and that of the Canadian Supreme Court in *re Secession of Quebec* (1998) 2 S.C.R. 217) prompted scholars to distinguish between internal and external self-determination (Hannum, 1996; Musgrave, 2000). It came to be accepted that where the people are oppressed, “the right of the victims to defend themselves voids the state’s claim to the territory and this makes it morally permissible for them to join together to secede” (Buchanan, 2004: 354). Indeed, Wellman (2005: 3) further suggests that ‘all separatist groups that can adequately perform the requisite political functions (and would leave their remainder states politically viable) have a primary right to secede’.

Whilst both liberal and reluctant theorists see secession as an answer to problems of ethnic conflict and violence, others argued that articulating a right to secede will undermine attempts to achieve interethnic accommodation within states. In due course, the international community came to place a number of conditions on the affirmation of territorial integrity. Since the emergence of self-determination derived from the movement for decolonisation during the 1960s, the legal right to self-determination favoured the idea of freedom from subjugation. Hence, the 1960 Declaration asserted that “[t]he subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights” affirming that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of their right they freely determine their political status” (1960 Declaration, Clauses 1 & 2). Six years later, the General Assembly stressed that “All peoples have the right of self-determination. ... minorities shall not be denied the right” of self-determination (1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 1 & 2). In 1970, the Appendix to Resolution 2625 justified the right to succession where there is a systematic violation of human rights; an unfair representation within the encompassing state; or a violation of the right to internal self-determination; added that “every state has the duty to

respect this right in accordance with the provision of the Charter” and, in a “safeguard clause,” implicitly authorised the violation of territorial integrity where a state is not “in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour” (1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations -UNGAR 2625, Clause 5(7)).²

Although each international instrument was written for a different audience, for instance the 1960 Declaration intended for the former colonies, it is generally accepted that today the legal right to self-determination articulated in each document applies beyond their context (Gareu, 2005: 505 cf. Van den Driest, 2015:335) and embraces the “whole people belonging to the territory –emphasis added” in question. Declarations and Conventions reveal a common objective; namely, respect for fundamental human rights, the freedom of the people to determine their political status, and power to govern themselves. Even though Declarations do not have the same binding authority, read together the different instruments confirm the right of oppressed people to exercise their right of self-determination through secession as an aspect of human rights (Brilmayer, 1991: 177; Saul, 2011: 626). Predictably, while the international community has consistently emphasised the significance of internal self-determination (respect for human rights,) the reality of minorities within their own state compelled it to pursue shared self-interest and thus resist the public endorsement of external self-determination as a right. Instead, governments preferred the politics of recognition as a means of accepting or rejecting unilateral declaration of independence, where the “Great Powers” deemed that serious and persistent injustices “oppressed” the people. With politics of recognition in mind, Sterio (2010: 138) traces the evolution of internal

and external self-determination and the claim to independence in Bangladesh (1970), Eritrea (1991), East Timor (2002), Kosovo (2008) as well as the failed attempts in Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Demonstrably, the right of self-determination is not static, and by definition is evolutionary (ICJ Reports, 1971: 16, 31 para.53). Whereas internal self-determination is available to all people, external self-determination applies only restrictively and in circumstances as yet debated. If so, are Turkish Cypriots “oppressed” enough to constitute the “self” in self-determination?

Self in Self-Determination

It is worth remembering that, as the colonial power, the United Kingdom affirmed the right of self-determination of both Greek and Turkish communities, which was ultimately granted to and jointly exercised by them. Yet, notwithstanding its bi-communal character, Turkish Cypriots have been denied representation in the RoC since 1963. Moreover, the *de facto* partition of the island and the existence of two administrations cannot be disputed; nor can the relationship between fundamental freedoms, external self-determination, and humanitarian intervention in international law. While granting that the 1970 instrument is a mere Declaration and that the empirical evidence is thin on the ground, in their written Statements in April 2009 Albania, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Switzerland submitted that the independence of Kosovo could be justified on the basis of remedial secession. Amongst others, Buchheit (1978: 220-223), Frank (1993: 13) and Dugard & Raič (2012:109) maintain that a unilateral right of “remedial secession” (external self-determination) trumps territorial integrity where there are a “people” –in the ethnographic sense; which though a minority in relation to the parent State, forms a majority within a part of the territory of that State; the state has seriously denied the right to participate

or be represented in the democratic process (internal self-determination) through, for instance, a pattern of discrimination, or subjected the minority to widespread violations of fundamental human rights; and there are no other realistic and effective remedies for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, under either domestic law or international law.

Whilst according to constitutive theorists a new state is created only when recognised as such by other states, declaratory theorists maintain that an entity becomes a state merely by declaring itself as a state, thus recognition does not create statehood but rather gives an international effect to its consequences. Crawford (2006: 21-22) argues that constitutive theory of statehood where a political entity is a State in relation to those States that recognized it but not in relation to other States is ‘a violation of common sense;’ hence, if the inconsistency cannot be explained ‘the position itself must be flawed,’ in which case it is reasonable to conclude that “[A]n entity is not a State because it is recognized; it is recognized because it is a State” (Crawford, 2011: para.44). Nevertheless, conceding that remedial secession is not firmly established and that the constitutive (status-creating) and declaratory (status-confirming) theories of statehood are much debated, but accepting the primacy of human rights, the issues are whether Turkish Cypriots are an organised segment of a population who had been persistently and systematically oppressed by a central government and therefore entitled to secede, thus making the TRNC the subject of recognition. Hence:

Are Turkish Cypriots a “People?”

While there is no generally accepted definition of the “peoples” entitled to exercise the right of self-determination, before a community may legitimately claim to be a “self” and therefore entitled to the process of “determination,” there must exist a group identity distinct from the ambient population. One possibility is that, unless the state

defines itself as constituted by a plurality of peoples, “people” denotes only one “people” within a territory wherein the minority form part of the majority of people. Gudeleviciute (2005: 49) suggests that that definition applies only in cases of non-self-governing peoples, such as colonies or occupied territories. However, whilst every international pronouncement on the subject refers to a “people” no instrument since the 1960 Declaration restricted the term to the colonies. By contrast, for example, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 refers to “all peoples ... including those of [colonial] territories,” and indeed, Germany and Netherlands strongly objected to India’s suggestion that the term did not apply “to sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or nation.” Since “all peoples” in the plural signifies a reference to more than one community, and since “all States parties to the Covenant should take positive action to facilitate realization of and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination” (McCorquodale, 1994: 860), “people” cannot logically refer to one people within a territory. Instead, it must define a community with shared culture, religion and a traditional territorial connection, forming the majority within a part of a state, such as the Welsh or Scots in Britain. In the Greco-Bulgarian Communities case, 1920 PCIJ, ser. B. No.17, 19, the Permanent Court of International Justice identified the objective and subjective characteristics of a community as “a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own, and united by the identity of such a race, religion, language and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity.” In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) para.124, concerning the right of the province of Quebec to secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that a right to secession may arise under the principle of self-determination “where a people is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part.” Admittedly, the Supreme Court noted that “it remains unclear

whether [this right] actually reflects an established international law standard.” However, given the progression regarding the right of self-determination and its affiliation to human rights, it is reasonable to conclude that “today” many “peoples” may exist within the territory of a single state, and that the juxtaposition of “nation” and “state” is indicative that the reference to “people” does not necessarily mean the entirety of a state’s population. Indeed, this interpretation of the Canadian Supreme Court’s opinion appears to be reinforced by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in respect of the 2008 Kosovo Declaration of Independence confirming that the term no longer represents a complete ethnic nation but merely defines a *homogenous group*.³

Another way of defining “self” is to consider an objective and subjective assessment. Objectively, the group must have certain common characteristics such as ethnicity, language, religion and like attributes (Hannum, 1993: 35), which had been the case since Ottoman times when the two communities “remained separate and distinct ethnic groups divided along linguistic, religious, cultural, and political lines” as well as in their system of education (Joseph, 1985: 41-42). Subjectively, a “people” may exist “if the group perceives itself as existing, or because outsiders define the group as distinct from them, or some mixture of internal and external identification” (Roethke, 2011: 42). Notwithstanding centuries of coexistence and physical intermingling, “[T]he Greeks and Turks of Cyprus had never accepted themselves as part of an imagined ‘Cypriot nation’” (Reddaway, 1950: 8 para. 13). The Prosecutor v. Jelicic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 1999 December 14, para 70, found that ‘it is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or racial group from the point of view of those persons who wish to single that group out from the rest of the community.’ In this context, Turkish Cypriots both consider themselves and are considered in Articles 1 and 2 of the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus; for instance UN documents

including UNSG' Rept. S/12323, 1977, para.5; as well as by politicians and academics as a distinct group. Clearly, as *Cyprus Mail*, 28 March 1963, citing Makarios reminded us “[T]he Agreements of 1960 have created a state but not a nation.”

Turkish Cypriots are of a different ethnic origin from Greek Cypriots; they share a history and culture with mainland Turks, speak Turkish as opposed to Greek and are Muslims not Orthodox Christians. Accordingly, Turkish Cypriots fulfil the UN definition as well as the subjective and objective sense of identity of a “people” who exercised their separate right of self-determination in the formation the partnership state in 1960.

Were there Serious Human Rights Violations or Denial of Representation?

The 1960 bi-communal republic was based on an unamendable constitution meeting the dual aims of self-determination and human rights protection, and provided for a Greek President and Turkish Vice-President, each having a right of veto. The President, Vice-President and members of the two House of Representatives were to be elected by their respective communities. Whereas the Legislature and the Judiciary were functions of central government, in matters relating to religion, education, family affairs and the like each community exercised autonomy in separate municipalities through their respective Communal Chamber. Effectively, the Constitution established a functional federation; it contained checks and balances in order to ensure coexistence in harmony with divergent ideologies and philosophies, without one community dominating or encroaching on the rights of the other. The then Prime Minister of Greece, Konstantinos Karamanlis believed the 1960 Agreements offered “the best solution because its main function (was) co-operation between Greeks and Turks in the island” (Cmnd.680 –HMSO, 1959). Nevertheless, true to his oath at his enthronement as Archbishop on 20 October 1950, “never to waiver from the

policy of uniting Cyprus with mother Greece,” the first President, Archbishop Makarios, adopted a strategy to eliminate all the constitutional rights of the Turkish community and then Turkish presence over time (Reddaway, 1987: 126). The Akritas Plan drawn up “by the Greek Cypriot minister of the interior,” set out first, to convince the World that the constitution of Cyprus was unjust and had to be re-written and, second, to secure the revocation of the Treaty of Guarantee, but if the Turks objected then they should be violently subjugated before foreign powers could intervene (U.S. Library of Congress, n.d.). “When in fact unworkability (of the Constitution) could not be established” (Clerides, 1989: Vol. 1, 130), on 30 November 1963, Makarios presented to the Turkish Vice-president Dr. Küçük with his thirteen point revision to the constitution designed to transform the republic from a bi-communal partnership into a Greek Cypriot unitary state with Turkish Cypriot minority rights. Rejection of the proposals by Turkish Cypriots immediately unleashed the bloody Christmas of 1963. In Nicosia and Morphou, “correspondents watched Greek arsonists burn Turkish houses under the eyes of the local Greek police” (*The Observer*, 1964) elsewhere, the “slaughter” of Turkish Cypriots was “too frightful to be described in print” (*Daily Express*, 1963). The terror unleashed led George Ball from the US State Department to conclude that the Greeks’ “only desire is to liquidate the Turkish Cypriot population” (United Kingdom Foreign Office Doc. 371/174747/Cc 1015/577). The crises brought restrictions on the movement of and forced 25,000 Turkish Cypriots to become refugees (UNSG Rept.’ S/5959, 1964, para.189).

In October 1964, the Greek side declared that it no longer recognised the office of the Turkish Vice-President; posted only Greek diplomats to a number of capitals; made the participation in government by Turkish Members of the House of Representatives conditional on acceptance of the constitutional amendment unilaterally implemented by Greek Cypriots (UNSG’ Rept. S/6569, 1965,

paras.7-11); refused to pay the salaries of Turkish civil servants (UNSG' Rept. S/5950, 1964 September 10, para.108) and contrary to Article 3 of the Constitution removed Turkish from the official language. By 1966, a substantial number of "Greek officers and other categories of military personnel from Greece" integrated into the (Greek) National Guard (UNSG' Rept. S/7350, 1966, para.19). Meanwhile, the plight of Turkish Cypriots refugees progressively worsened because of the Greek authorities' policy of "establishing military presence in the Turkish Cypriot areas" (UNSG' Rept. S/7001, 1965, para.73), and prohibiting access to row material in order "to prevent them from building permanent accommodation for the 20,000 or so Turkish Cypriot refugees" (UNSG' Rept. S/8286, 1967, para.114).

Intercommunal strife was hardly one sided, but there is "little doubt that much of the violence was either directly inspired by, or certainly connived at by the Greek Cypriot leadership" (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 1987 July 2). In the words of a former president of the RoC, "If, during the period 1968-70, the government and opposition had made a realistic evaluation of what constituted a feasible solution, the situation in Cyprus today would have been different" (Clerides, 1989: (3)105). Admittedly, the extent of human rights violations justifying secession is unclear, but the reality of intercommunal strife dating back to the 1950s, the non-representation of Turkish Cypriots in the de jure RoC since 1963, and more than 40 years of de facto partition of the island sufficiently demonstrate "serious" human rights violations. Seymour (2007: 410) argues that the right of people to 'choose its own favoured constitutional, institutional and administrative arrangements within the encompassing state' confers a primary general right to self-determination even in the absence of past injustices, without the need to invoke any remedial considerations. That said, do renewed negotiations project a ray of hope or will they once again end in a deadlock?

Are there No Credible and Effective Remedies?

Several attempts to re-unite the island had been punctuated by worsening Greek-Turkish relations,⁴ the shifting of alliances,⁵ and the progressive intransigence of the parties. Nevertheless, to assert that a resolution is unlikely is to admit defeat, but in looking forward it is important to recall the past and outline the stance taken by the interlocutors throughout the copious negotiations. The imminent issue for Turkish Cypriots was and is "their ejection by force of arms from all the organs of the RoC, the takeover of the Republic by the Greek Cypriot side, the pretention of that side to represent the RoC" (Necatigil, 1993: 75).

July 1975 witnessed the voluntary transfer of Greek Cypriots from the north to the south and Turkish Cypriots from the south to the north. On 1977 February 27, Denktas and Makarios agreed four guidelines for the resumption of negotiations:

- We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.
- The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity of land ownership.
- Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.
- The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State (UNSG' Rept. S/12323, 1977, para.5).

Focusing on key post-1974 dialogue, in November 1978, a twelve clause American plan was forwarded to the parties through the offices of the Secretary General. The plan met the Turkish demands for bi-zonal federation and bi-cameral legislature, with equal representation at the upper chamber and proportional representation at the lower chamber. It addressed the demands of the Greek

side by offering significant territorial adjustments and envisaging a federal state which allowed for freedom of movement, settlement and property ownership. It came to pass. On 1979 May 19, a Denktaş-Kyprianou summit under the auspices of the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim confirmed that “[T]he basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 1977 February 12 ... (and give priority) to reaching an agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices ...” (UNSG’ Rept. S/13369, 1979, para. 51:5). Their ten-point agreement included the progressive demilitarisation of the island and support for “the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects” (UNSG’ Res.649 1990, para. 3.) but Greeks and Turks had and continue to have different understanding of concepts fundamental to a settlement. For Greek Cypriots “unity” is the operative word; they persist on having one sovereignty, one territory meaning no boundaries and one citizenship, encompassing the so-called three freedoms of movement, settlement and property ownership as a central plank of a settlement. Turkish Cypriots resist the concept of “one sovereignty” on the basis that, since no “unitary federation” is possible, by definition a federation excludes a unitary state. Moreover, they argue that “a bi-zonal solution” challenges the Greek Cypriot understanding of “one territory;” and that whereas “land” as used in private law refers to an area or a plot of property, “territory” as used in public law includes land, sea and air space of a given geographic region. Therefore, “territory under the administration of each community” can only denote “a bi-zonal solution” with boundaries for each component of the federation. An equally obstinate issue was and still is the sovereignty of the future federation. Greek Cypriots rejected all but a “strong” central government with powers to override its constituent parts, born out of the re-styling of the RoC. Turkish Cypriots pursue a “loose” federation, but leave the door open for co-operation particularly

in areas of economic development.

With yet another opportunity lost, 1983 February 28, President Kyprianou avowed to further internationalize the Cyprus problem as part of the Greek-Greek Cypriot “strategy to be followed for the national struggle” (Cyprus Weekly, 1981 October 30- November 5). On March 12, Kyprianou secured the support of the Non-aligned and on 1 November, at a debate from which the Turkish Cypriots were denied access and Turkey’s delegates walked out in protest, the Assembly affirmed the sovereignty and control of the RoC over the territory of Cyprus; called for the voluntary return of refugees; and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces (UNGAR A/37/253, 1983, paras. 2, 8). By so doing, the international community disregarded the joint assertion regarding the existence of “two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community” (Geneva Declaration of three Guarantors on 1974 July 30). In effect, the international community denied not merely their political representation, the enjoyment of their culture or use of their language (Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Article 27), but the very existence of the Turkish Cypriot people. The inevitable followed; the TRNC was declared on 1983 November 13. Lacher and Kaymak (2005: 153) suggest that “the true aim of the Turkish Cypriot negotiation strategy has been to prevent any settlement short of the legalization of the status quo.”

Two further attempts failed: In March 1986, Secretary General Javier de Cuéllar presented the two sides with a Draft Framework Agreement which envisaged the creation of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal state. In August 1992, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted his Set of Ideas encompassing a solution based on “two politically equal communities ... in a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation” (UNSC’ Res. 774/92, 1992, para.2), enhanced in 1993 by a number of confidence-building-measures. That negotiations continued suggested at least

the potential for a settlement. Hence, the most promising Annan Plan and beyond.

Annan Plan and Beyond

Regrettably, in Cyprus, just as violence and blame had not been one sided, “neither side had openly refused to keep talking, but both realise that if negotiations were to produce results, then they would have to make concessions - territorial ones on the Turkish side, and constitutional ones on the Greek side” (Hale, n.d.). Accordingly, in close consultation with the two parties in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey the Annan Plan proposed “a bi-communal, bizonal, federal system, a state of Cyprus with a single international legal personality, sovereignty, and citizenship ... (as) the only opportunity the Cypriots have to see their island reunited within the European Union” (UNSG’s Special Advisor on Cyprus briefing to the Security Council on 2004 April 2). The loose federation was to be the Greek Cypriot constituent state covering 71.5% of the south and the Turkish Cypriot constituent state reduced to about 28.5% of the north of the island. Moreover, the plan aimed to return all properties in Güzelyurt (Morphu) and Maraş (Varosha) and accommodate former Greek occupants of Girne (Kyrenia) and Karpaz Peninsular, and resettle Turks living in areas to be transferred to Greek Cypriots. It provided for executive power vested in a presidential council having a rotating chairman and, much like the 1960 agreement granted each community a right of veto within a bicameral parliament. Despite strong opposition from both sides, 75.83% of Greek Cypriots voted “no” while 64.90% voted in favour of the plan.

The first concrete post-Annan commitment to a Federal Government with a single international personality, as well as Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State came in September 2006, between Talat and Papadopoulos. Next, in 2008, Talat and Christofias advocated a bizonal, bicomunal federation but Christofias bowed to harsh criticism from Papadopoulos

and held “back in fear that an agreement baring provisions reminiscent of the Annan Plan might be demonized and rejected” (Pericleous, 2012: 93). In April 2010 the rightist Eroğlu with an entrenched vision of a sovereign Turkish Cypriot mono-ethnic state was elected as the President of the Turkish side and equally rightist Anastasiades became the President in the south 2013. Mutual mistrust of the other resulted in both parties tolerated talks punctuated by a series of fruitless negotiations. In April 2015 Mustafa Akinci, a leftist and passionate supporter of a unified Cyprus, had been elected as the President of the TRNC. Is there finally a settlement in sight? Perhaps, but so far there are no outward signs of sacrifice or even compromise promising a settlement anytime soon. For instance, Greeks demand and the Turks are receptive to the opening of Maraş (Varosha) for Greek settlement as part of the confidence building measures, but Greeks refuse to reciprocate by resuming services at the abandoned airport of Nicosia or sanction an international status for the Turkish airport of Ercan. Nevertheless, the 18 month UN sponsored negotiations remained optimistic; the parties travelled to Mont Pèlerin in Switzerland expecting to produce a map of the internal boundaries and a structure for a future federation on Cyprus. The two-day session broke up without progress because the Greek side vowed to abolish Turkey’s guarantee, insisted on charting an internal map and stipulated the number of Greek Cypriots to be allowed to settle in the north, but refused to discuss a revolving presidency that acknowledges political equality.

“In short, the Constitution was put aside in favour of de facto tyranny of Greek over Turk” (Scruton, 1993) “The republic broke down in 1963, when the Greek Cypriots drove the Turkish Cypriots out of government amid more intercommunal violence ... between 1963 and 1974, the Greek Cypriots monopolised the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriots lived in ghettos or isolated villages” (International Crisis Group, 2009:1). Despite the drumbeat of expert

opinion urging Greek Cypriots to consider outcomes beyond the apparently discredited federal goal, their membership of the EU and unconstitutional usurpation of the RoC reinforce their intransigence. “In the view of most Greek Cypriots, an ideally just solution to the Cyprus problem - a solution that, so to speak, deserves to last - would be one in which they are able to establish their domination over a unified state embracing the whole of the island and its people” (Stavrinides, 1999: 34). By contrast, notwithstanding the strong public and Presidential backing for a unified Cyprus, the violence, disenfranchisement and EU betrayal following the 2004 referendum infused in Turkish Cypriots a sense of security in the presence of the Turkish army, moral objection to Greek domination and an innate urge for self-government. In step with Turkish Cypriot’s rationale, along with the UN Special Advisor and the EU Commissioner, Lord Hannay, the United Kingdom’s former Special Representative for Cyprus, addressing the House of Lords, 2004 May 22 added that Greek Cypriots “can expect no support for their case and should get none.” Consequently, while Turkish Cypriots insist on Turkey’s guarantee, if only for the Turkish North,⁶ the Greek side reject outright any form of guarantee or self-governance. The problem of Cyprus cannot “be resolved by attempting to restore the situation which existed before December 1963” (UN Mediator Dr. Plaza’s Report, UN Doc. S/6252, 1965 March 26), because the intervening years “abrogated and buried the Zurich and London Agreements ... [in a way that] no power can breathe life into them” (Makarios, 1966 February 1, Philefteros). “Whenever there are developments in the Cyprus issue, dark and extremist forces immediately take action and try to create difficulties and impede progress ... to propagate for the rejection of the (Turkish) proposals and to instigate the people against any agreement” (1978 February 6, Greek Cypriot weekly *Alithia*). In the words of a former negotiator and two term President of the RoC, the impasse persisted because “[J]ust as the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was that Cyprus

should be a Greek Cypriot state, with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish preoccupation was to defeat any such effort and to maintain the partnership concepts ... The same principle is still in conflict, even though a federal solution has been accepted and though a federation is nothing more than a constitutional partnership –emphasis added” (Clerides, 1989: Vol.3, 105). The talks in Mont Pèlerin were not make-or-break; reportedly, a meeting between Greece’s premier Alexis Tsipras and Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been set for 4th December to discuss a way forward. Numerous earlier attempts have failed, but this time round the parties negotiate against the background of potential shale and off-shore energy in the US; geo-political implications of Russia’s efforts to access the Mediterranean; departure of the UN General Secretary; the Trump presidency in the US; the presidential election campaigns on the Greek Cypriot side by mid-2017 and the fact that the expected commencement of exploration for gas in early 2017 is unlikely to proceed. Hence, the status of the TRNC and the question of what possible scenarios await Cyprus will inevitably stalk or even dominate future discourse.

A Unified Republic or a Two-State Solution?

It is hardly worth restating that Turkish Cypriots constitute a “people” and that the RoC does not represent the “whole of the people” in Cyprus, but neither side has the monopoly of truth or justice. Moreover, international law suggests the requirements of statehood and in practice regulates the recognition of states, but whether a state constitutes itself as a unitary, federal, confederal, or any other form of a state is determined by the people populating the relevant territory.⁷ Accordingly, if indeed “the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands” (Boutros, 1992/93: 88), it is necessary to jettison past xenophobic sentiments, assess the consociation agreements of 1960 and debate the potential of a

confederation endowed with a constitutional right of secession, or the creation of two independent states.

The Standing of the TRNC

In Cyprus, the consociation arrangement of 1960 creating a strange mixture of a protectorate, condominium, and qualified independent statehood did not work. Today, Greek Cypriots genuinely fear that the Turkish army will one day advance and take the rest of (their) Cyprus. On the other hand, given the intervening history, Turkish Cypriots will not accept minority status in a centralised (Greek) Cypriot state. Furthermore, after failed promises following the rejection of the Annan Plan, they fear that without the protection of the Turkish army Turkish Cypriots will once again be at the mercy of Greek nationalism. Whether well founded or not, the fear and mistrust of the other means that “future attempts to re-enact that [1960] constitution would be destined to fail” (Meier, 2001: 479). On the other hand, bicomunal and bizonal federation incorporating both the Turkish Cypriots’ elastic “confederation” and the Greek Cypriots’ freedoms of movement, settlement and property ownership is possible; more so if the right and circumstances of secession is written into the constitution. Of course, a constitutional right of secession could equally fail as did the secession of South Sudan from Sudan and Montenegro from Serbia, where the respective constitutions provided for the right and mechanism for effectuating secession. Arguably, constitutional right of secession could harden the lines between the two communities making it no more likely to succeed than the 1960 consociation arrangement, or similar constitutional arrangements that failed. However, given the right of the people to determine their own political structures, it is effectively no different from the creative consociation arrangement across the globe or any consensual secession. Moreover, unlike the 1960s, the North-South divide ensures greater security of life and the accumulated governmental experience on both sides

might enhance their capacity for power sharing. After all, the circumstances justifying secession could be part of the political negotiation, sponsored by the UN, and be the subject of a referendum, as was the Annan Plan. If such proposal were implemented, it might one day generate mutual trust as to enable the federation to evolve into a democratic unitary state. For that to happen, the negotiators will need to take account of the fact that the south shares the euro, but the Turkish Lira is the currency of the north; and that the assets, economies and national debts of the two administrations are at different levels. The EU will have to lift the isolation of the north and ensure fair representation of Turkish Cypriots within the EU institutions; the UN will need to adopt an even handed approach and, possibly, be part of negotiations setting the terms of right of secession; Greece and Greek Cypriots must pro-actively support the Annan Plan as the basis of a solution; and Turkey and Turkish Cypriots must make territorial concessions, address the outstanding property claims and strengthen the rights of Orthodox communities in the Karpaz peninsula. While resolving property claims and agreeing the staged withdrawal of Turkish troops in line with the Annan Plan will allay Greek Cypriot concerns, lifting of the embargo will revive the economy and a right of secession will advance the security of Turkish Cypriot. Regrettably, “THE HISTORY of the Cyprus problem has taught the same thing over the years – namely it teaches us nothing. Our insistence on not seeing ... the painful realities ... has contributed to our problem remaining unsolved for over 50 years” (Charalambous, 2015). If so, the important question is whether a Cyprus federation offers an appropriate solution.

Turkish Cypriots might contend that as the United States of America (US), Canada, Germany, Switzerland and others exemplify, Cyprus lacks the criteria for a successful federation. In Cyprus, a separation of opposing groups into demographically defensible enclaves within which people are able to control their own destiny through regional autonomy already exists. However, crosscutting of cleavages,

strong political commitment and the existence of numerous composite states are further requirements of a successful federation. Officially, while Greek Cypriots call for a united Cyprus federation with a strong central government, Turkish Cypriots insist on political equality and reject majority rule. Admittedly, vesting the central government with substantial powers and decision making strengthens the sovereignty of the federal state, but Turkish Cypriots are concerned that a rigid centripetal structure weakens the democratic ethos of citizens, erodes the autonomy of composite units and vitiates the balance necessary for a successful federation. Unlike, for instance, Switzerland where the language, religion and socio-economic character of the cantons overlap, in Cyprus, Orthodox Greek Cypriots populate the south while Muslim Turkish Cypriots inhabit the north. Nor are there the cross cutting of cleavages needed to reduce conflict and enhance cooperation. The lack of multiple constitutive entities means that the conflict between the two parts is institutionally reinforced because it diminishes the opportunity to affect coalitions between several composite units. Numerous false starts and failed attempts make it clear that there is not the political commitment for a federal solution; nor is there a balanced population, shared national identity, common vision, or indeed trust and cooperation from either side. As instances of US and Switzerland compared with USSR and Yugoslavia shows, whereas federations that have grown organically survived the test of time, those artificially created failed the democratic challenges of our times and crumbled. Additionally, whereas as former UN resident representative states “partition can be a civilised way to finish ethnic struggles ... unification in Cyprus go against the grain of contemporary history” (Gobbi, 1998). Though the complexities of a federal solution are not insurmountable, at least on face value, “without the presence of a shared identity and trust between the two communities, there is no reason to expect that a bicomunal federation would fare any better than the power-sharing experiment of 1960” (Solomonides, 2008: 73).

“In the light of historical realities and continued intransigence by Greek Cypriots, the establishment of federation or confederation in Cyprus is neither possible nor feasible” (Ahmad, 2000: 59). If a bizonal, bicomunal federation is just whistling in the wind, then it is time to “try another model” (Downer, A –Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General, speech to the House of Lords, 2012 June 13. “The time has come to at least consider other options, including a mutually agreed separation” (Pope, 2014). That is, as UK Secretary of State for Justice states “if ‘political equality’ cannot be achieved within one state, then it could with two states” – north and south (Straw, 2010); “both within the European Union” (International Crisis Group, 2014: 23-24). For a two (fully independent) state solution Turkish Cypriots would have to procure Greek Cypriot approval, or justify a claim to remedial secession (as people oppressed by the RoC, or reclaiming territory over which they share sovereignty), thereby overcome UN Security Council resolution which opposed the unilateral declaration of independence of 1983. “If Greek Cypriots support the idea of consensual separation, nobody else in the EU can really object, since the whole island is already theoretically in the union and most Turkish Cypriots already have EU passports” (Pope, 2014). Greek Cypriots might view this as rewarding aggression, but given the post-independence history of Cyprus, the fact that there already exists a de facto separation and two autonomous authorities, a two-state or confederal solution is not rewarding one side or another. Dr. Christian, H (1986: 3) suggests that since a federation envisages the political unity of two or more ‘existing’ states, by discussing a federal solution Greek Cypriots implicitly accept the existence of the TRNC as a state. Significantly, a two-state solution could limit Turkey’s guarantee to the territory controlled by the TRNC, which could end if and when Greece demilitarizes the Aegean islands, purge the problematic structure of 1960 and with it the allegedly awkward right of veto.

The political environment today is not the same as it was in 2004 when Greek Cypriots were looking forward to joining the EU and felt safe in rejecting the Annan plan. Yet, if Greek Cypriots cannot be persuaded, they will have the UN Security Council resolution 541 (1983) of 1983 November 18 on their side. A number of observations are pertinent. First, the Treaty of Establishment of 1960 endowed Greek and Turkish Cypriots as partners of the RoC, but that RoC has since malformed into “two autonomous authorities.” “The Turkish intervention could not and did not alter the equal legal status of the two communities, which derived from the earlier treaties and Constitution” (Leigh, 1990). Second, to date, “the contacts and negotiations taking place [are] on an equal footing” (UNGAR 3212 (XXIX), 1974; UNSC Res. 774/92, 1992; UNSC Res. 2168, 2014), and aims a federal solution acceptable to “the people of Cyprus as a whole.” Third, neither the unilateral declaration of independence itself nor its acceptance by other states is *per se* illegal under international law. With reference to the Kosovo case (2010: para.79), though the ICJ had not applied itself to the issue of secession, having surveyed State practice concerning declarations of independence often strenuously opposed by the State from which independence was being declared concluded that “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence.” The ICJ opined that the declaration of independence would have been illegal if it ‘were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law,’ but being in conformity with the Treaty of Guarantee Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus was not unlawful. Moreover, as with Greek aggression against Turkish Cypriots, “... a party which disowns or does not fulfil its obligations cannot be recognised as retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship” (Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1971). Indeed, given that the right of self-determination was attributed to and exercised by both communities, as with the

Baltic Republics’ secession from the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkish Cypriots could maintain to be merely reclaiming territory over which they had “shared” sovereign but which had unjustly been taken from them. Yet, contradicting the findings of the ICJ, *inter alia*, resolution 541 “... consider[ed] the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and call[ed] for its withdrawal.” The UN regarded the TRNC to be incompatible with the Treaty of Establishment, but did not attribute the same incompatibility to the RoC, which prevented the Turkish Cypriots participation in government. Interestingly, in 1975, the UN merely “regret[ed] the unilateral decision” bringing into existence the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, but called for “negotiations between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing ... to reach ... a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement” (UNSC Res. 367, 1975). Logically, the transformation from the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to a TRNC was a change of name but nothing else. The range of language used suggests that UN resolutions were “tainted by such a degree of selectivity and incompleteness as to render them arbitrary and discriminatory, and thus not well founded in law. ... the Security Council express[ed] legal opinions more suited to a judicial body than a political body” (Lauterpacht, 1990).

The fact remains that while declaring the TRNC illegal, the UN has consistently affirmed the right of Turkish Cypriots to determine their political future in conjunction or on an equal footing with Greek Cypriot. Accordingly, the declaration of November 1983 did not violate the territorial integrity of the RoC; instead, the TRNC was an “interim” exercise of democratic choice of political and economic structures by the Turkish people of Cyprus (UN Doc. A/38/586/16148, 1983 November 16). A rational explanation of resolution 541 is that the UN was “making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time” (Kosovo Case, 2010: para. 81), which must now be viewed in the context of reviving nationalism as the Kurdish

struggle in Iraq and Turkey, Catalanian calls for independence in Spain as well as the re-emergence of the Cold War.

Regional Politico-Economic Perspective

The background to the stalemate in Cyprus is much more complex than the one portrayed thus far, suffice to say that it is inextricable from the subtle interplay of Western and Russian interests with consequences for recognition, and discovery of energy reserves in the region. Recent economic crises in the West levelled the playing fields with the East, thereby, as the Iraq, Ukraine and Syria proxy wars suggests, facilitated the revival of the Cold War that appeared to have ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1992. In response, the US and Russia are focusing their attention on the Middle East that commands access to the Mediterranean and beyond; the US and NATO supporting Iraq, coaxing Egypt and renewing relations with Iran, who is a strong supporter of the Assad regime but equally strong opponent of the ISIS; Russia holding on to Ukraine, gesturing Estonia, and prizing away Syria. Furthermore, recognition of new states, which used to be subject to a relatively concise and clear-cut fact based normative framework, has since the dissolution of former Yugoslavia given way to a new set of moral norms and a high level of uncertainty. How the strategic location or discovery of energy reserves in Cyprus, will play out in the realignment of superpowers remains to be seen, but a brief look to ethnic conflicts and recognition of emerging states elsewhere might be instructive.

Arguably, France's willingness to support secessionists in 1967 may have aimed to weaken the United Kingdom's influence in Nigeria and, possibly, provide access to oil fields in Biafra (Bon & Mingst, 1980: 13-14). In 1975, the West acquiesced to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in order to stop the Communist Party of Indonesia in its track. Yet, political dynamics of the 1990s led to East Timor's independence in 1999. When

the former Soviet Federal Republic of Yugoslavia finally dissolved in 1992, the Albanian community in Kosovo favored greater autonomy, but the Serbs favored closer ties with the rest of Serbia. After the displacement of nearly half a million of people and NATO bombing, in March 2007, the UN General Secretary advised that for the previous eight years, Serbia had "not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. ... Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition" (SC Doc. S/2007/168, para.7). In February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence; the international community accepted the independence of Kosovo not because Kosovars constituted a nation, but because of the "unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation -- including ... the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo (US Secretary Condoleezza Rice, 2008), which co-existence with Serbia was no longer a realistic option. By contrast, Chechenia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia where the people have been routinely oppressed by their mother states were denied any form of self-determination. Other instances include the breakaway of Baltic States from the Soviet Union which were considered to be re-establishing their independence, and Croatia and Slovenia secession from Yugoslavia which has been characterised as dissolution. The list is endless and the analogy might appear inappropriate but, as with other hotspots around the world, in Cyprus too are the energy reserves estimated to be in the region of 3.7 billion barrels of oil and 3,450 billion cubic meters of natural gas; the RoC has no writ in the north; and there is a large communist party in the south --at the time of his presidency Christofias being the only communist leader in the EU. What practice suggests is that states "switch from a theory of constrained power to unlimited power, from the creation of a new state to the acknowledgement of a pre-existing state, to justify desired political outcomes" (Worster, 2009: 169). This is because, "the sovereignty of particular states, in the sense of their freedom of action, is often greatly limited by political

realities” (Koskenniemi, 1994: 28), which cannot be divorced from the re-emergence of Cold War, trade, or energy reserves.

Strategically, the United Kingdom retained her military presence in Cyprus; the US has bases in Turkey and wants to use facilities in Cyprus and Russia is keen to establish a foothold in Cyprus. More recently, Britain extended her military operations from Iraq to Syria; France and Germany obtained permission to use Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Syria (ISIS); Turkey soured relations with Israel since 2010 and downed a Russian fighter jet in 2015. By contrast, the RoC renewed a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Russia and held joint military exercises with Israel in August 2015. At least for a time, Turkey appeared isolated, excluded from the Syrian equation and seemed to have received a blow to her presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Economically, Greece and Greek Cypriots expect to benefit from the vast energy resources in the Levant, but the banking crises collapsed their economies forcing both to rely on EU bailouts. Snap elections in September 2015 returned the same anti-austerity Syriza party to power, with little prospect for her economy. With Russian money accounting up to 57% of foreign money in Greek Cypriot banks at the end of the first trimester (Cohen & Ben, 2013), the €10 billion bailout of Greek Cypriot banks, subject to Cyprus taxing account holders to the tune of €5.8 billion, angered the largely Russian investors. In Turkey, the economy boosted by President Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party victory in November general elections is in decline threatened by internal resignations, Russian economic sanctions and Western displeasure of her purge against alleged perpetrators of July 2016 coup.

Whether and how the economies of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey or discord in the Balkans, the Shia-Sunni conflict in the Middle East and search for dwindling energy reserves will influence the politics of recognition is unclear. However, a study of recent literature may suggest three possible scenarios for the Levant energy reserves, with potential consequences for

the TRNC. Since on the face of it support for a bizonal, bicomunal federal solution is receding on both sides, the first option would be for Greek Cypriots to fortify support from Israel and Russia in order to deny Turkey the benefits of energy reserves and isolate Turkey’s role in the region. This would mean exporting energy in liquid form which would involve liquidization installations in Cyprus and deliquidization installations at the country of destination in Europe. Apart from being costly, thus decreasing competitiveness, this method cannot rationally manage large quantities. The second would be to build a pipeline from southern Cyprus to Rhodes, and from there to Europe through mainland Greece. The depth of the sea between Southern Cyprus and Rhodes, the risks of a possible disaster owing to seismic activity of the seabed, and the fact that the pipeline will have to pass through the Exclusive Economic Zone of Turkey challenges the viability of this option. A third scenario would be to build a pipeline from the shallow waters of the Karpaz peninsula in North Cyprus to Ceyhan in southern Turkey and follow the Nabucco pipeline, stalled for inadequate supplies to justify construction, through to Europe. The Karpaz-Ceyhan line is both cost effective and able to direct all Eastern Mediterranean energy reserves to the Nabucco line thus reduce European dependence on Russia. Cyprus does not currently have enough funds to finance either the first or second project but, although the most profitable route for Israel is also through Turkey, Israel seems willing to build a pipeline from the Israeli Levantine fields across Cyprus waters onto Greece, and Russian Gazprom looks eager to finance a Liquefied Natural Gas plant either in Cyprus, Greece or Israel (Morely, 2013). A Greek-Israel-Russian partnership would see Greece and Cyprus slip further out of the grasp of Europe to the detriment of US-Israel-Turkey alliance; risk a split in NATO; strain US relations in the eastern Mediterranean, and anger both the EU and Arab states. That said the potential of as much as 30 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves at the Zohr field off the coast of Egypt and strategic activity in the region could easily change the picture in the Mediterranean (BBC News, 2015). Egypt’s gas production may

surpass its consumption by 2020 leaving a surplus for export in which case ENI and British gas might make use of dormant liquefied natural gas terminals at Damietta and in Idku, Egypt (The Economist, 2015). The discovery of gas might so stimulate economic revival as to free Egypt of financial dependency on Saudi funding, secure political stability, help improve Egypt-Israel relations and loosen ties with Russia. Clearly, discovered oil reserves may be in the south, but economic viability of routes to export that oil lies in the north. Although Turkey's policy vis-à-vis the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus in particular are opaque, Turkey is simultaneously the Eastern bastion of NATO and still the biggest importer of Russian natural gas. At the time of writing, Russia-Turkey rapprochement appears imminent; Israel and Turkey have had talks on a possible natural gas pipeline (Liebermann & Labott, 2016) and; in a change of policy, Turkish forces joined the anti-ISIS war in Syria. At least for now, the Greek-Israel-Russia partnership is suspect, but Turkey's position is far from clear. Turkey might keep aligned to the West, but equally the West might still shun Turkey's purge against the July coup's alleged perpetrators or thwart Turkey's efforts to stop Kurdish YPG progress in northern Syria, in which case Turkey might default to the Russian side.

Essentially, events in Syria and energy reserves in the Levant are likely to dominate geopolitics causing shifts in regional alliances with consequences for the politics of recognition. Like Egypt and Syria which once formed part of the United Arab Republic, or East Timor's independence after Indonesian invasion, and dissolution of Yugoslavia, Cyprus appears to be and likely to remain one of former unions that failed. In the absence of settlement for a united federal republic, recognition of the TRNC may come about when the politico-economic situation existing in the Eastern Mediterranean sanctions recognition because the international community accepts the TRNC as the exercise of remedial secession, or the reclaimed exclusive sovereignty over territory which they would have had but for the "shared sovereignty" of the 1960 Agreements.

Conclusion

"The rejection of such (Annan) plan by the Greek Cypriot electorate is a major setback. What was rejected was the solution itself" (UNSG' Rept. 2004/437, 2014, para.83). High-blown rhetoric backed by business oligarchies keen to cash in on the prospective energy bonanza continues to inflate Greek-Turkish animosity etched on the national psyche of both people. Greek Cypriots have the advantage of being recognised as the legitimate representatives of the RoC but are concerned about the presence of Turkish troops. By contrast, the fear of being dominated by Greek Cypriots has made territorial integrity and political equality a central pillar of Turkish Cypriot demands. While Russia envisages access to the Mediterranean; the US endeavours to impede the spread of communism; Europe covets influence over the Middle East, Greece and South Cyprus strives to exploit their EU membership; Turkey whose refugee management program and war against ISIS have both compromised and furthered her geopolitical status appears determined to cautiously protect her southern flank, along the Syrian border and in Cyprus.

Whether by design or default, "the Cyprus problem has become overlain with legalistic abstractions and artificial labels, which are more and more difficult to disentangle and which would appear increasingly removed from the actual needs of both communities" (UNSG' Rept. S/1999/707, 1999, para.7). It is time both communities cease nationalistic blowhard posturing and engage the geopolitical dynamics in the eastern Mediterranean. A federal solution is attainable particularly if backed by constitutional right of secession, or limited guarantee by Turkey. Despite failure of the Mont Pèlerin talks, there still remains the most residual optimism but a federal solution seems to recede by the day. Realities may soon suggest "another model" vindicating the UK's submission to ICJ on the advisory opinion on Kosovo not to pressure "estranged spouses to continue in a broken marriage." Ultimately, a two state solution might come about because Turkish Cypriots lay claim to secession either as the "oppressed people"

or as “people” who share the de jure sovereignty over the territory which they claim for themselves, or because the de facto TRNC is recognized as a state. The reality is that a “de facto situation which is perpetuated for many years inevitably leads to international recognition and in the case of Cyprus to partition” (Clerides, 1989: Vol.3, 365). Many Greek Cypriots might struggle with the idea but, given the potential of new sources of energy, and the Trump presidency ostensibly distancing the US from Eastern Mediterranean geo-politics a two-state solution highlights “anew the painful and hard decisions which will in the end have to be made for a Cyprus solution to come about” (1998, February 26, Cyprus Mail).

Notes

1. ‘Secession’ is the act of a group unilaterally withdrawing from the state in order to create a new state on part of the territory of which it belongs. It is different from devolution or grant of independence where the new state results from a bilateral and consensual process.
2. ‘Secession’ is the act of a group unilaterally withdrawing from the state in order to create a new state on part of the territory of which it belongs. It is different from devolution or grant of independence where the new state results from a bilateral and consensual process.
3. The question in Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, 403 posed to the by the General Assembly for the non-binding opinion of the ICJ was: *‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?’*
4. Post-1974, to the Cyprus problem appended such disputes as the legal status and illegal militarisation of some island, the continental shelf, Greece’s threatened extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, claims over Exclusive Economic Zone and presently dormant but potentially explosive subject of Flight

Information Region.

Heraclides, Alexis, *The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity*, concludes that Greece is ‘attempting to grab the whole of Cyprus ... and to expand piecemeal in the Aegean by using legalistic stratagems.’

5. Greeks of Greece and Cyprus have a spiritual bond with their Orthodox brethren in the Slavic world, but their racial and cultural ties with Protestant and Catholic Europe has historically made Christian Greece a natural choice against their common enemy the Muslim Turks. Hence, the revolving regional loyalties to protect self-interests: the West allying with Greece against Turkey and with Turkey against Russia, and Greece swaying between Russia and Europe as the circumstances demand.

6. The call for Turkey’s guarantee is because Turkey and Turkish Cypriots are wary of Greek disregard for international obligations such as the militarisation of some Aegean islands contrary to Articles 13 & 14 of the Lausanne Treaty 1923, the clandestine posting of troops to Cyprus, the continued violation of human rights of Turks living in Greece, the pre-1974 attempted annihilation of Turkish Cypriots and the 1997-8 bid to install air defence missiles in Cyprus, which would have jeopardised the security of the region.

7. A ‘unitary’ system is one where the central government holds all the power and state functions. A ‘confederation’ denotes a loose relationship where state governments retain all internal and external powers of an independent state, but agree to act in common over defined area. In between is a ‘federation’ where the central government trumps local governments over defence and foreign policy, such as signing of treaties.

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Biographic Sketch

Born in Balalan, Kıbrıs in 1945, Hasan Deveci graduated from Nicosia Turkish Lyceum in 1963. He was called to the Bar at Gray's Inn in 1971; studied for the Graduate Certificate in Education at Southlands College –University of London in 1972; completed an MA (Law) at London Metropolitan University in 1976; Diploma in Intellectual Property at Queens Mary College –University of London, in 1985; and an LLM at Kings College –University of London, in 1986. He joined South West London College as a Lecturer in Law in 1972, from where he moved to London Southbank University until his retirement in 2002. The author's other article dealing with Greek-Turkish relations, 'An equitable solution to the Aegean Sea Dispute,' is available at (2014), 20 Journal of International Maritime Law, 365.

Otobiyografik Öz

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Özelleştirmenin İstihdam ve Çalışanların Refahı Üzerindeki Etkisi: Kıbrıs Türk Hava Yolları Örneği

Impact of Privatization on Employment and Workers' Monetary Welfare: Case of Cyprus Turkish Airlines

Fatma Güven Lisaniler, Fehiman Eminer, Hasan Rüstemoğlu

Özet

Çalışma Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta özelleştirmenin çalışanların parasal refahı üzerindeki etkisini özelleştirme kapsamında tasfiye edilen ulusal havayolu şirketi Kıbrıs Türk Hava Yolları (KTHY) örneği üzerinden analiz etmektedir. Çalışmada 303 KTHY çalışanına ait mikro veriler kullanılmıştır. Özelleştirmenin çalışanların parasal refahı üzerindeki etkisini ve boyutunu belirleyen faktörlerin tespitinde betimsel analiz yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Parasal refahtaki değişimin boyutunu belirleyen faktörlerin etkinliği özelleştirme öncesi ve sonrası ücret fonksiyonları çoklu regresyon yöntemiyle tabmin edilerek analiz edilmiştir. Çalışanlar ortalama yüzde elli refah kaybına uğramışlardır. Eğitim düzeyi daha düşük, hizmet yılları daha yüksek, eski işlerinde sektöre özel beceri gerektiren işlerde ve yönetici pozisyonunda çalışanlar daha yüksek refah kaybına uğramışlardır. Refah kaybının en etkin belirleyeni yapılan işin niteliğinde meydana gelen değişim olarak tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: özelleştirme, refah kaybı, Kıbrıs Türk Hava Yolları, ücret fonksiyonu, Kuzey Kıbrıs.

Abstract

This study investigates the effects of privatization of companies on employment and monetary welfare loss to their workers. As a case study, it considers the Turkish Cypriot national airline, Cyprus Turkish Airlines (CTA), and 258 of its employees when the company was liquidated and privatized. These employees, who CTA dismissed and the government re-employed, amount to 74 percent of the total North Cyprus-based staff. The CTA union provided the data for the analysis, including tenure (years of employment with CTA), CTA positions, and characteristics of the individual workers. Descriptive statistical analysis measures the monetary welfare loss and identifies the loss determinants for each worker. Multiple regression analysis estimates the pre- and post-privatization wages and determines the significance of the loss. The results show average monetary welfare loss of dismissed CTA workers is 50 percent. In evaluating the worker characteristics, those with less education, longer tenure, higher positions, and sector-specific skills incurred higher monetary welfare loss. Moreover, the change in quality of the employment is the most significant determinant of the monetary welfare loss of workers.

Keywords: privatization, welfare loss, Cyprus Turkish Airlines, wage equation, North Cyprus.

Giriş

Bu çalışma Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta özelleştirmenin çalışanların parasal refahı üzerindeki etkisini inceleyen ilk çalışmadır. Çalışmada veri olarak özelleştirme sürecinde tasfiye edilen Kıbrıs Türk Hava Yolları (KTHY) çalışanlarının özelleştirme öncesi ve sonrası aylık brüt ücret, eğitim, yaş, cinsiyet, yapılan işin niteliği ve tecrübe gibi kişisel bilgileri kullanılmıştır. Parasal refahta meydana gelen değişimin analizinde karşılaştırmalı betimsel analiz yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Çoklu regresyon yöntemiyle özelleştirme öncesi ve sonrası ücret fonksiyonları tahmin edilerek değişimin belirleyicileri tahmin edilmiştir.

Bulgular çalışanların yeni işlerinde eski işlerine oranla ortalama yüzde 50 daha az aylık ücret aldıklarını göstermektedir. Bu oran eğitim düzeyi daha düşük, hizmet yılları daha yüksek ve eski işlerinde sektöre özel beceri gerektiren işlerde ve yönetici pozisyonunda çalışanlarda daha yüksektir. Özelleştirmenin istihdam ve çalışanların refahı üzerindeki etkisini araştıran çalışmalar özelleştirmenin kısa vadede etkisinin olumsuz olduğunu göstermektedir (MacCuish, 2003; Gupta et al., 1999; Rama, 1999; Chong ve Lopes-de-Silanes, 2002; Kikeri ve Nellis, 2004; Barnett, 2000). Özelleştirme sonrası özelleştirilen kamu iktisadi teşebbüslerinde (KİT) çalışan sayısında meydana gelen düşüş ve çalışanların ücret düzeyi, ücret yapısı, çalışma koşulları ve özlük haklarında meydana gelen değişiklikler istihdam ve çalışanların refahını kısa vadede olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir (Gupta et al., 1999). Uzun vadede ise kaynak israfına yol açan KİT'lerin özelleştirilmesi kaynak dağılımını etkinleştirerek makro değişkenlerin olumlu yönde değişimiyle istihdam ve çalışanların refahını artırması öngörülmektedir. Ancak bu alandaki bazı çalışmalar bu etkinin makro düzeyde, ülkelerin özgün koşulları ve özelleştirmenin gerçekleştirildiği dönemin koşullarına (MacCuish, 2003; Kikeri, 1998; Islam ve Monsalve, 2001) ve mikro düzeyde ise özelleştirmenin gerçekleştiği piyasanın rekabet yapısı ve özelleştirme yapılan alanın büyüme kapasitesine bağlı olarak değişiklik gösterdiğini savunmaktadır. Her ne kadar mülkiyetin özel sektöre geçmesinin firma motivasyonunu değiştirerek kar

hedefiyle etkin üretim sağlayacağı düşünülse de bu beklenti ancak özelleştirmenin piyasanın daha rekabetçi bir yapıya kavuşması (Ramamurti, 1999) ve sektörün büyüme kapasitesinin yüksek olması (Nellis, 2006: 10) ile işlevsel olmaktadır. Özelleştirmenin öngörülen istihdam ve refah artışı sağlaması ancak ekonominin genelinde tam rekabet koşullarının ve özelleştirme sonrası ortaya çıkabilecek kişisel refah kaybını telafi edecek sosyal güvenlik mekanizmalarının oluşturulması ile olasıdır (Kikeri 1998; Chong & Lopes-de-Silanes, 2002; Fretwell, 2004).

Bu alandaki çalışmaların vurgu yaptığı bir başka nokta ise özelleştirmenin kadın istihdamını erkeğe oranla daha olumsuz etkilediğidir. Çalışmalara göre özelleştirme sonrası ücret düzeyi ve yapısı, çalışma koşulları, özlük hakları gibi nitelik açısından ortaya çıkan değişiklikler ve yeniden istihdam edilme olanakları kadın için daha olumsuzdur. Bu nedenle kadın istihdamı ve kadın çalışanların refahı özelleştirmeden daha olumsuz etkilenmektedir (Geldstein, 1997; Rama, 2002; Prizzia, 2005).

Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta özelleştirmenin çalışanların refahı üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmek araştırmacılar açısından üç nedenden dolayı önemlidir. Birincisi, ülkenin uzun süreden beri kriz ortamında olması ve özelleştirmenin krizden çıkmak için yerel ve yabancı uzmanlar tarafından önerilen ekonomi politikaları ve özellikle kredi sağlayıcı ülke konumundaki Türkiye tarafından sağlanan kredilerin serbest bırakılması için "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti-Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Ekonomik İşbirliği Protokolleri"nde yer alan koşullardan biri olması. İkincisi, KTHY'nın ilk özelleştirilen Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsü (KİT) olmamasına rağmen, yakın zamanda özelleştirilen en büyük KİT olması ve yoğun protesto gösterilerine neden olmasıyla ülkenin ihtiyaç duyduğu reform çalışmalarını engelleme potansiyeline sahip olması. Üçüncüsü ise bu örnek vakanın, özelleştirme programında yer alan elektrik, su ve telekomünikasyon gibi kamu tekeli konumundaki hizmetlerin özelleştirilmesinde örnek teşkil etme durumunda olmasıdır. Bu araştırma bu konuda yapılmış ilk akademik çalışmanın yanı sıra göreceli olarak büyük ölçekli tekel konumundaki bir

devlet kuruluşunun özelleştirilmesinin çalışanların refahı üzerindeki etkisini değerlendirerek gelecekte yapılacak benzer konum ve büyüklükteki KİT ve kamu hizmetlerinin özelleştirilmesine ışık tutması bakımından önemlidir.

Çalışmanın devamında Kuzey Kıbrıs'taki özelleştirme uygulamaları ve KTHY'nın tasfiye süreci aktarılmaktadır. Bu bölümü özelleştirmenin çalışanların refahı üzerindeki etkisinin analiz edildiği bölüm takip etmektedir. Son bölümde ise elde edilen sonuçlar değerlendirilmekte, özelleştirme ve yeniden istihdam süreçleri ile ilgili gözlem ve öneriler sunulmaktadır.

Kuzey Kıbrısta Özelleştirme Uygulamalarının Tarihsel Arkapları

Küreselleşen ekonomi ve Türkiye'de 1980 yılında başlayan ekonomiyi serbestleştirme ve dışa açılma politikalarının uygulanmaya başlaması Kuzey Kıbrıs'ı da etkilemiş 1986 yılında serbest piyasa ekonomisiyle birlikte dışa açılma yönündeki ekonomi politikaları uygulanmaya başlanmıştır. Kalkınma modeli olarak 1977 yılından beri benimsenen korumacılık ve devletçilik anlayışı terk edilerek ihracata dayalı, yabancı sermaye girişini destekleyici faaliyetler ve küresel ekonomiye entegre olmayı sağlayacak ihracata dayalı dışa açık büyüme politikalarına geçilmiştir. 1986-1990 dönemi mal ve sermaye hareketlerinin tam olarak serbestleşmesine yönelik politikaların uygulanmaya başladığı ve hız kazandığı dönem olmuştur. Bu dönem aynı zamanda devlet tekelinde olan hava ve deniz ulaşımı, eğitim sektörü, tarımsal ürünlerin pazarlanması ve temel gıda ithalatının özel sektöre açıldığı, ve KİT'lerinin özelleştirme çalışmalarının başladığı dönemdir. Devlet tekelinde olan sektörlerin ve faaliyetlerin özel sektöre açılması bu alanlarda işyeri sayısını artırmış istihdam ve ücretler üzerinde olumlu etki yapmıştır. Bu dönemde yıllık ortalama büyüme yüzde 6.7 olarak gerçekleşmiş, istihdam edilenlerin sayısı yüzde 22.4 oranında artmış, kişi başına düşen milli gelir 1305 Amerikan dolarından 3447'ye yükselmiştir (DPÖ, 2014). Takip eden 10 yıllık dönem (1991-2000) mal ve sermaye hareketlerinin tam olarak serbestleştiği ve özelleştirmelerin gerçekleştiği

dönemdir. Ekonomik büyüme bir önceki döneme kıyasla daha düşük oranlarda (yıllık ortalama %5.4) gerçekleşse de istihdam edilenlerin sayısı (%24.2 oranında) ve kişi başına düşen milli gelir artmaya devam etmiştir. 2000 yılına gelindiğinde kişi başına düşen milli gelir 4978 dolara ulaşmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra artan işyeri sayısı ve yarattığı istihdam aynı dönemde gerçekleşen özelleştirmeler nedeniyle meydana gelen iş kayıplarının da telafisine olanak sağlamıştır. Bu dönemde kamudaki tecrübeli kadroların daha yüksek ücretlerle özel sektöre geçtiği bilinmektedir. Bu zaman diliminde hayata geçen ve birinci dalga özelleştirmeler olarak adlandırabileceğimiz özelleştirme uygulamaları serbest piyasaya geçiş uygulamalarının bir uzantısı olmaktan çok Türkiye'de 1990 yılında başlayan özelleştirme uygulamalarının bir sonucu olarak gerçekleşmiştir.

Birinci dalga özelleştirmeler Türkiye'de özelleştirilen KİT'lerden bazılarının Kuzey Kıbrıs KİT'lerinin ortaklarından olması nedeniyle Kuzey Kıbrıs KİT'lerine ait hisselerin özelleştirilmesi sonucu gerçekleşmiştir. Satış/devir işlemleri ekonomik işbirliği protokolleri çerçevesinde kurulmuş Türkiye özelleştirme birimi koordinasyonu ve yönlendirmesi altında çalışan KKTC özelleştirme birimi tarafından gerçekleştirilmiştir (İsmail, 2001). Kimi işletmelerde sadece Türkiye KİT'lerine ait hisseler özele devredilirken bazılarında hisselerin tümü özel sektöre devredilmiştir. Özelleştirmelerde yabancı sermayenin yanı sıra yerli sermaye de yer almıştır. İkinci dalga özelleştirmeler ise kredi sağlayan ülke konumundaki Türkiye ile Kuzey Kıbrıs arasında imzalanan ekonomik işbirliği protokollerinde bu kurumların özelleştirmesinin koşullar arasında yer alması sonucu gerçekleşen özelleştirmelerdir (Eminer ve Güven-Lisaniler, 2014).

Her ne kadar özelleştirme 1990'lı yıllardan itibaren kalkınma programlarında yer almaya ve uygulanmaya başlanmış olsa da özelleştirmenin istihdam ve özellikle çalışanların refahı üzerindeki etkisinin görünür hale gelmesi ve tartışılmaya başladığı dönem özelleştirme uygulamalarının bir program çerçevesinde hayata geçirilmeye başladığı (2003) ikinci dalga özelleştirmeler dönemidir. Özelleştirme uygulamalarının hız kazandığı 2009-2014 yılları ise bu tartışmaların yoğunlaşarak geniş

tabanlı protesto mitinglerine ve genel grevlere taşındığı yıllar olmuştur.

Birinci ve İkinci Dalga Özelleştirmeler

KKTC’de özelleştirilen ve özelleştirilmesi gündemde olan KİT’lerin kuruluşu 1974 yılına, Kıbrıslı Türkler’in ekonomik ve sosyo-mekânsal yeniden inşa sürecine dayanmaktadır. 1974’te ada, kuzeyinde Kıbrıslı Türk nüfus, güneyinde de Kıbrıslı Rum nüfus çoğunlukta olmak üzere ikiye ayrılmıştır. Bu bölünme, daha önce adanın geneline yayılmış olan, Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rum nüfusun mekânsal değişimini getirmiştir. Bu mekânsal değişim adanın kuzeyinde ve güneyinde Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rumlara ait bazı üretim tesislerini atıl duruma düşürmüştür. Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti’nin (KTFD)

kurulması ile (1975) yeniden yapılanma sürecine giren Kıbrıslı Türkler bir yandan devlet kurumlarını oluştururken diğer yandan atıl durumdaki üretim tesislerini faaliyete geçirerek ekonomik varlıklarını sürdürmeyi ve geliştirmeyi hedeflemişlerdir (Güven, 1984). Atıl durumdaki üretim tesislerini faaliyete geçirmek için ihtiyaç duyulan sermaye, teknik ve idari bilginin Türkiye tarafından sağlanması ve yerli sermayenin yetersiz olması bu üretim tesislerinin KİT olarak faaliyete geçirilmesinde etkili olmuştur. Bunun sonucunda sanayi, ulaştırma, ticaret ve turizm alanlarında 10 farklı KİT kurulmuştur. O dönemde KİT’indeki istihdam toplam istihdamın %5’ine karşılık gelmekteydi (Güven, 1984). Tablo 1’de birinci ve ikinci dalga özelleştirme uygulamaları sonucu özelleştirilen KİT’ler yer almaktadır.

Tablo 1. Özelleştirilen Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri

Birinci Dalga Özelleştirmeler	Tarih	Yöntem
1. Kıbrıs Türk Turizm İşletmeleri: 17 Otel, 67 apartman, 26 işyeri, bir gece kulübü ve plaj	1996, 1997	yurt dışı varlık satışı
2. Kıbrıs Türk Sanayi İşletmeleri Holding : 46 imalat sanayi üretim tesisi	1996, 1998	varlık satışı (yabancı ve yerli), tasfiye
İkinci Dalga Özelleştirmeler		
3. Kıbrıs Türk Vakıflar İdaresi: 3 Hotel	2007, 2008, 2009	kiralama, işletme hakkı devri
4. Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi: Üniversite öncesi eğitim kurumları, Doğu Akdeniz İlkokulu ve Koleji	2009	kiralama (yabancı)
5. Kıbrıs Türk Hava Yolları	2008, 2010	gelir ortaklığı & tasfiye
6. Kıbrıs Türk Petrolleri	1997, 2010	blok satış (yerli)
7. Türk Alkollü İçki ve Şarap Endüstrisi	2003, 2010	varlık satışı (yerli),
8. Kıbrıs Türk Tütün Endüstrisi Kurumu		blok satış (ihale aşamasında) tasfiye edilebilir
9. Ercan Havalimanı	2012	işletme hakkı devri (yabancı ve yerli)
10. Endüstri, Ticaret, ve İşletmecilik Teşebbüsleri	11.2012	2012
11. Koop Süt	2013	varlık satışı (yerli)

*Kaynak: Yazarlar tarafından meclis tutanakları ve yerel gazeteler taranarak derlenmiştir.

Sonuç olarak Türkiye KİT'lerinin Kuzey Kıbrıs KİT'lerinin ortaklarından olması nedeni ile Türkiye'de özelleştirme politikalarının hayata geçirilmesinin (1990) bir uzantısı olarak Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta başlayan özelleştirme süreci, Kuzey Kıbrıs ekonomisinin liberalizasyonu ve TC-KKTC işbirliği protokolleri aracılığıyla içselleştirilmiş, kredilerin serbest bırakılması koşuluna bağlanmasıyla yeni bir boyut kazanmış ve bu yeni boyutu ile uygulanmaya devam etmektedir. Özelleştirmenin işbirliği protokollerinin bir koşulu olarak içselleştirilmiş bir politika kapsamında uygulanması aşamasında hava limanı, havayolu ulaşımı, eğitim, imalat sanayi ve turizm alanlarında 8 özelleştirme gerçekleştirilmiştir. Telekomünikasyon, elektrik üretimi, su kaynaklarının dağıtım ve yönetimi ve enerji alanlarında faaliyet gösteren işletme ve kurumların özelleştirme çalışmaları ise halen devam etmektedir.

Gerek birinci gerekse ikinci dalga özelleştirmeler sürecinde özelleştirmenin, özelleştirilen işletme çalışanlarının refahı üzerindeki etkisi en az tartışılan ve incelenen konu olmuş, bu kuruluşlarda çalışanların refah kaybına uğramaması için herhangi bir tedbir öngörülmemiştir. Kıbrıs Türk Hava Yolları'nın özelleştirme kapsamında tasfiye edilmesinin ardından özelleştirmenin çalışanların refahı üzerindeki etkisi toplum gündemine taşınmış ve iş kaybına uğrayan KTHY çalışanlarının 'mağduriyeti' bağlamında tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. 2012 yılına kadar özelleştirmenin ulusal bir program dahilinde ve düzenleyici bir yasa altında hayata geçirilmemesi ve buna bağlı olarak verilere ulaşımın mümkün olmaması bu alanda akademik çalışmaların yapılmasını engellemiştir. Takip eden bölümde özelleştirme kapsamında tasfiye edilen KTHY çalışanlarına ait makro ve mikro veriler kullanarak özelleştirme sonrası çalışanların istihdam durumu, refahta meydana gelen değişim ve değişimi belirleyen etmenler tespit edilmektedir.

Veriler ve Yöntem

Çalışmada kullanılan veriler işyeri sendikası Hava-Sen ve KKTC Başbakanlığı Personel Dairesi tarafından sağlanmıştır. Hava-Sen tarafından sağlanan makro veriler

tasfiye öncesi ve sonrası çalışan sayısı ve yapılan işe göre dağılımını kapsamaktadır. Mikro veriler ise tasfiye sonrası işkaybına uğrayan 418 KTHY eski çalışanına ait yapılan işin niteliği, aylık brüt ücret ve kişisel bilgileri içermektedir. Personel Dairesi tarafından sağlanan veriler ise tasfiye sonrası kamuda yeniden istihdam edilen 303 KTHY eski çalışanın istihdam edildikleri kamu birimi, statüsü ve brüt maaşını içermektedir.

Çalışanların parasal refah kaybı eski ve yeni işteki brüt aylık maaş ve ücret yapısındaki değişim kullanılarak betimsel karşılaştırmalı analiz yöntemi ve eski ve yeni işteki ücret fonksiyonları tahmin edilerek incelenmiştir.

Özelleştirmenin Çalışanların İstihdam Durumu Üzerindeki Etkisi: KTHY Örneği

KKTC'nin ulusal havayolu şirketi olan KTHY'nin özelleştirilmesi hissedarlarından olan Türk Hava Yolları'nın (THY) 1994 yılında T.C. Başbakanlık Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı'na bağlanarak iktisadi devlet teşekkülü statüsüne geçirilmesiyle gündeme gelmiştir. KTHY'nin satışa sunulan THY'na ait hisseleri KKTC tarafından satın alınmıştır (2005). Tüm hisselerinin KKTC'ye geçmesinin ardından şirketin mali yapısının düzeltilmesi amacıyla 2006 yılında reorganizasyon çalışmaları başlatılmıştır. Reorganizasyon çalışmaları KTHY'nin uçuş hizmetlerinin dışındaki hizmetlerinin (yer hizmetleri, teknik bakım, ikram, kargo, antrepo, bilet satış) kamu-yerli/yabancı özel sektör ortaklığıyla özelleştirilmesini öngörmekteydi (KTHY, 2010). 2007 yılında yer hizmetleri kamu-özel sektör ortaklığıyla kurulan bir şirkete (Cyprus Airport Services) devredilerek özelleştirilmiştir. KTHY'da yer hizmetlerinde çalışanlar (129 kişi) bu şirket tarafında yeniden istihdam edilmişler ve herhangi bir iş kaybı yaşanmamıştır.

Örgütlü sendikanın direnci ve erken seçim sonucu iktidar değişimi nedeniyle reorganizasyon ve diğer hizmetlerin özelleştirilmesi çalışmaları daha ileriye götürülemedi. 2009 yılında yeni iktidar, reorganizasyon çalışmalarını iptal ederek KTHY'nin bu yapıyla satışına karar vermiştir. Yapılan ihaleler sonuç vermemiş, bu süreçte şirketin acze düşerek borçlarını ödeyememesi sonucunda uçuşları durdurulmuş ve 2010

yılında KTHY özelleştirme sürecinde tasfiye edilmiştir.

Tasfiye kararının alındığı tarihte KTHY'da, yurt içinde 347, Türkiye'de 51 ve İngiltere'de 20 çalışan olmak üzere toplam 418 kişi çalışmaktaydı. Tasfiye sonrası 418 çalışan iş kaybına uğramış ancak 2012 yılında yürürlüğe giren 'Özelleştirme Yasası'nda yer alan KKTC vatandaşı KTHY çalışanlarının yeniden istihdamına yönelik geçici madde (ÖY, 2012: 39) ¹ uyarınca KTHY'nın tasfiyesinden birbuçuk yıl sonra bu madde kapsamında başvuru yapan 303 KKTC vatandaşı KTHY eski çalışanı kamunun çeşitli birimlerinde yeniden istihdam edilmişlerdir. Başvuru için Yasanın yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren 6 aylık bir süre tanınmıştır. Analizde bu süre içinde istihdam edilmek için başvurmayanların emekli oldukları ya da özel sektörde yeniden istihdam edildikleri varsayımından yola çıkarak özelleştirmenin örnek vakada KKTC vatandaşı olan çalışanların istihdam durumunu olumsuz etkilemediği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Özelleştirmenin Çalışanların Parasal Refahı Üzerindeki Etkisi

Parasal refah kaybı çalışmada brüt aylık ücrette meydana gelen değişim olarak tanımlanmıştır. Refah kaybının büyüklüğünü belirleyen olası değişkenler özelleştirme (tasfiye) öncesi ve sonrası ücret fonksiyonları tahmin edilerek analiz edilmiştir. Aylık kazanç kaybı ve ücret yapısının belirleyici faktörlerinin analizinde tasfiye sırasında yurt içinde istihdam edilen 347 KTHY çalışanından tasfiye sonrasında kamuda istihdam edilen

ve bilgisine ulaşılabilen, 258 kişiyi kapsayan mikro veriler kullanılmıştır. Kullanılan örneklem yurt içinde istihdam edilen toplam KTHY personelinin %75'ini oluşturmaktadır.

Refah kaybının hesaplanmasında özelleştirme öncesi (KTHY) ve özelleştirme sonrası (kamu istihdamı) aylık ortalama brüt ücrette meydana gelen değişim kullanılmıştır. KTHY bünyesinde verilen aylık ücret dışı ödenekler (bayram ödeneği, düzensiz mesai ödeneği ve fazla mesai ödeneği) gerekli bilgiye ulaşılmadığından hesaplama dışı bırakılmıştır. Yapılan hesaplamalar aylık ortalama ücret kaybının %50 oranında gerçekleştiğini göstermektedir (Tablo 2). Kadınlar göreceli olarak daha az kayba uğramışlardır. Kadınların erkeklere oranla parasal kaybı 1.3 yüzde puanı daha azdır. Bu farkın nedenleri çalışmanın devam eden bölümünde tartışılmaktadır.

Kaybın Büyüklüğünü Belirleyen Faktörler

Çalışanların emekleri dışında işyerine getirdiği, işçilerin niteliğine özgü; eğitim, yaş, deneyim, ustalık derecesi, işte gösterdiği çaba vb. katkılar vardır. Bu katkılar ücretin belirlenmesinde etkili olmaktadır. Parasal refah kaybının işçilerin bu niteliklerine bağlı olarak farklılık gösterdiği düşünülmüştür. Refah kaybı bu özellikler göz önüne alınarak incelendiğinde kaybın büyüklüğünün yapılan işin niteliği, işteki pozisyon, deneyim, ve eğitime göre farklılık gösterdiği saptanmıştır.

Tablo2. Kamuda İstihdam Edilen KTHY Çalışanlarının Aylık Ortalama Ücret Kaybı

	KTHY (2010) ortalama aylık ücret (TL)	Kamu (2012) ortalama aylık ücret (TL)	Fark (eski-yeni ücret) (TL)	Oransal kayıp (%)
Toplam	4734,4	2373,9	2360,4	49,9
Kadın	4763,0	2408,6	2354,4	49,4
Erkek	4678,7	2306,5	2372,2	50,7

*Kaynak: HAVA-SEN ve KKTC Personel Dairesi. Yazarlar tarafından mikro veriler kullanılarak hesaplanmıştır.

Yapılan İşin Niteliği ve Özelleştirme Öncesi ve Sonrası Ücretlerin Karşılaştırılması

Tablo 3’de yapılan işin niteliğine ve işteki pozisyona göre eski ve yeni ücretler verilmektedir. Ücretler karşılaştırma yapmayı kolaylaştırmak amacıyla kamudaki (özelleştirme sonrası) ücretin KTHY (özelleştirme öncesi) ücretine oranı olarak verilmiştir. Örneğin özelleştirme öncesi işçi kategorisinde çalışan bir kişinin özelleştirme sonrası aldığı ücret özelleştirme öncesi aldığı ücretin % 53’üne karşılık gelmektedir. Parantez içinde verilen sayılar bu durumdaki kişi sayısını göstermektedir.

KTHY’nın tasfiyesi sonrasında iş kaybına uğrayan ve yeniden istihdam edilmek üzere başvuru yapan eski KTHY çalışanları değişik kamu kurumlarında geçici memur statüsünde istihdam edilmişlerdir. İstihdam edilenlerin ücretleri kamu çalışanları ücret skalası kullanılarak eğitim ve hizmet yıllarına bağlı olarak belirlenmiştir. Böylece eski ve yeni işteki ücret fonksiyonları farklılaşmıştır. Özelleştirme sonrası ücret fonksiyonunun temel belirleyeni formal eğitim ve hizmet yılları olmuştur. Halbuki eski işte formal eğitim ve hizmet yıllarının yanı sıra yapılan işin niteliği ve işteki pozisyon ücreti belirleyen önemli faktörlerdi. Bunun sonucu olarak sektöre özel beceri gerektiren işlerde (mühendis/denetçi/ uçak bakım teknisyeni/ uçuş hareket uzmanı/ hareket teknisyeni/ kabin memuru/ kabin amiri) ve yönetici konumunda çalışanlar, sektöre özel beceri gerektirmeyen işlerde

(memur ve işçi) çalışanlara oranla daha büyük kayba uğramışlardır.

Kadınlar erkeklere oranla daha düşük kayba uğramışlardır. Kadınların formal eğitim düzeylerinin erkeklere oranla daha yüksek olması bu farkı yaratan nedenlerden biri olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır. Üniversite mezunu oranı kadınlarda %26, erkeklerde %15’tir. İlkokul ve ortaokul mezunu toplamı erkeklerde %26, kadınlarda %6, en kalabalık eğitim düzeyini oluşturan lise mezunu oranı kadınlarda %60, erkeklerde ise %56’dır. Bu oranlara bakıldığında kadının erkeğe göre daha yüksek eğitim düzeyine sahip olduğu ve bu nedenle de eğitim düzeyine göre belirlenen ücret skalasında daha yüksek bareme yerleşerek göreceli olarak daha düşük ücret kaybıyla istihdam edildiği görülmektedir (Tablo 4).

Eğitim ve Özelleştirme Öncesi ve Sonrası Ücretlerin Karşılaştırılması

Tablo 4’teki veriler genel eğilim olarak daha az eğitime sahip olanların daha büyük kayba uğradıklarını göstermektedir. Ancak lise mezunlarının hem erkek hem de kadınlarda ilkökullü ve ortaokul mezunlarından daha büyük kayba uğramış olmaları özelleştirme öncesi ücret yapısında eğitimin yanı sıra, yapılan işin niteliği ve işteki pozisyonun önemli bir belirleyiciler olduğuna işaret ettiği şeklinde yorumlanmıştır. Bir diğer belirleyici ise hizmet yıllarıdır (kadem).

Tablo3. Yapılan işin niteliğine göre Kamuda Alınan Ücretin KTHY’da Alınan Ücrete Oranı.

	İşçi	Memur	Teknik Personel	Yönetici
Toplam	0,53 (23)	0,53 (145)	0,51 (70)	0,45 (18)
Kadın	0,54 (11)	0,54 (108)	0,50 (54)	0,46 (2)
Erkek	0,52 (21)	0,51 (37)	0,51 (16)	0,42 (16)

*Kaynak: HAVA-SEN ve KKTC Personel Dairesi. Yazarlar tarafından mikro veriler kullanılarak hesaplanmıştır.

Tablo 4. Eğitim düzeyine göre özelleştirme öncesi ve sonrası ücretler.

En son bitirilen okul	Toplam	Kadın	Erkek
İlkokul	0,49 (15)	0,52 (6)	0,47 (9)
Ortaokul	0,53 (17)	0,55 (4)	0,52 (13)
Lise	0,47 (156)	0,47 (105)	0,48 (51)
Önlisans	0,56 (9)	0,58 (8)	0,46 (1)
Lisans	0,56 (60)	0,57 (46)	0,53 (14)
Yüksek lisans	0,56 (8)	0,56 (6)	0,55 (2)

*Kaynak: HAVA-SEN ve KKTC Personel Dairesi. Yazarlar tarafından mikro veriler kullanılarak hesaplanmıştır.

Kıdem (Hizmet yılı) Öncesi ve Sonrası Ücretlerin Karşılaştırılması

Hizmet yıllarıyla parasal refah kaybının büyüklüğü karşılaştırıldığında en düşük kaybın hizmet yılları en az olanlarda yaşandığı görülmektedir. Hizmet yılları (kıdem) arttıkça kayıp büyümektedir. Bu tespit özelleştirme öncesi ücret fonksiyonunda kıdem getirisinin daha yüksek olduğu ve bu nedenle daha yüksek hizmet yılına sahip olanların daha büyük kayba uğradığı şeklinde yorumlanabilir (Tablo 5). Ancak kamu ücreti hesaplanmasında hizmet yıllarının 14 yıl ile sınırlandırıldığı, 14 yıl üstü hizmetler için herhangi bir barem artışı verilmediği bilgisi mevcuttur. Bu olgu kaybın büyüklüğünü etkilemiş olabilir. Kadın ve erkekler karşılaştırıldığında kadınların erkeklere oranla daha düşük kayba uğradıkları görülmektedir. Kadınların erkeklere oranla daha düşük hizmet yıllarına sahip olması kadınların daha az kayba uğramalarında etkili olmuştur. Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi erkeklerin hizmet yılları 1.3 yıl daha fazladır.

Erkeklerin ücret kaybının daha büyük olmasının bir diğer nedeni ise erkeklerin daha büyük bir oranının eski işlerinde yönetici pozisyonunda çalışıyor olmasıdır. Yeni işte ise tüm çalışanlar geçici birinci ya da ikinci sınıf memur statüsünde istihdam edilmişlerdir. Bu da işteki

statü farkı nedeniyle ortaya çıkan kadın erkek ortalama ücret farkının ortadan kalkmasına ve kadın ve erkek parasal refah kaybının erkeklerde daha yüksek olmasına neden olmuştur. Özetle kadınların daha eğitimli olması, hizmet yıllarının daha düşük olması ve eski işlerinde erkeklere oranla daha düşük statüde çalışıyor olmaları parasal refah kayıplarının daha düşük gerçekleşmesine neden olmuştur.

Parasal refah kaybıyla ilgili yapılan betimsel karşılaştırmalı analiz aylık kazanç kaybının hizmet yılları, eğitim düzeyi ve özelleştirme öncesi yapılan işin niteliği ve işteki pozisyona göre farklılık gösterdiğine işaret etmektedir. Hizmet yılları daha az, eğitim düzeyi daha yüksek ve ücreti göreceli daha düşük olan kadrolarda (sektöre özel beceri gerektirmeyen işlerde) görev yapanlar daha az kazanç kaybına uğramışlardır. Erkekler kadınlara oranla daha büyük gelir kaybına uğramışlardır. Erkeklerin kadınlara oranla daha büyük kazanç kaybına uğramalarının nedenleri eğitim düzeylerinin daha düşük, hizmet yıllarının daha fazla olması ve eski işlerinde daha ağırlıklı olarak sektöre özel beceri gerektiren yüksek ücretli kadrolarda ve yönetici pozisyonunda yer almış olmalarıdır. Çalışmanın devamında betimsel analizden elde edilen veriler eski ve yeni işteki ücret fonksiyonları tahmin edilerek yordamakta ve kaybın büyüklüğünü belirleyen etmenlerin etkinlik dereceleri tahmin edilmektedir.

Tablo 5. Hizmet yıllarına göre özelleştirme öncesi ve sonrası ücretler

(Kıdem) Hizmet yılları						
	5 yıl ve daha az	6-10 yıl	11-14 yıl	15-17 yıl	18-20 yıl	21 yıl ve üstü
Toplam	0,54 (73)	0,54 (39)	0,50 (66)	0,50 (38)	0,47 (29)	0,43 (20)
Kadın	0,54 (52)	0,55 (25)	0,49 (44)	0,51 (26)	0,48 (15)	0,45 (13)
Erkek	0,53 (21)	0,53 (14)	0,51 (22)	0,49 (12)	0,45 (14)	0,39 (7)

Eski ve Yeni Ücretlendirmede Belirleyici Faktörler ve Etkinlik Derecelerinin Ampirik Olarak Tespiti

Karşılaştırmalı betimsel analiz yöntemiyle yapılan incelemede tespit edilen refah kaybının oluşmasını ve büyüklüğünü belirleyen faktörler çoklu regresyon modeli ile ampirik olarak test edilmekte ve değişkenlerin etkinlik dereceleri tahmin edilmektedir. KTHY ücreti (özeleştirme öncesi) ve kamuda alınan ücretin (özelleştirme sonrası) bağımsız değişken olarak kabul edildiği iki ayrı ücret fonksiyonu çoklu regresyon analizi ile tahmin edilmiştir. Her iki regresyon denkleminde de, betimsel analizden elde edilen ücret belirleyicileri; yapılan işin niteliği, eğitim yılı, hizmet yılı ve cinsiyet, bağımsız (açıklayıcı) değişkenler olarak tanımlanmıştır. Yapılan işin niteliği bağımsız değişkeni kukla değişken olarak tanımlanmış ve sektöre özel beceri gerektirmeyen işler (işçiler ve memurlar) 1, sektöre özel beceri gerektiren işler (müdür, müdür yardımcıları, uçuş personeli ve teknik personel) 0 olarak tanımlanmıştır. Yeni istihdam ücret fonksiyonunda ise '1' daha yüksek maaş baremini ifade eden birinci sınıf geçici memur, '0' daha düşük maaş baremini ifade eden ikinci sınıf geçici memur için kullanılmıştır. Erkeklerin kadınlara oranla daha yüksek kayba uğramış olmaları nedeniyle çalışanların cinsiyeti de bağımsız değişken olarak ücret fonksiyonuna eklenmiştir. Özelleştirme öncesi ve sonrası ücret fonksiyonları denklem (1) ve (2) olarak yazılmıştır.

$$\text{LOGÖÖ} = c + \beta_1 \text{YIN} + \beta_2 \text{EY} + \beta_3 \text{HY} + \beta_4 \text{C} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{LOGÖS} = c + \beta_1 \text{YIN} + \beta_2 \text{EY} + \beta_3 \text{HY} + \beta_4 \text{C} \quad (2)$$

ÖÖUC: Özelleştirme öncesi KTHY'nda alınan ücret

ÖSUC: Özelleştirme sonrası alınan ücret

YIN: Yapılan işin niteliği

EY: Eğitim yılı

HY: Hizmet yılı

C: Cinsiyet

Regresyon analizi sonuçları Tablo 6'de paylaşılmıştır. Çalışmada yer alan bağımsız değişkenler özelleştirme öncesi ücreti % 73 ($R^2=0.732$), özelleştirme sonrası ücreti %58 ($R^2=0.584$) oranında açıklamaktadır. Her iki ücret fonksiyonunda eğitim yılı, hizmet yılı ve yapılan işin niteliğinin ücret üzerindeki etkisi %95 güven aralığında anlamlı çıkmıştır. Cinsiyet değişkeni özelleştirme öncesi ücret fonksiyonunda anlamlı çıkmamış ancak özelleştirme sonrası ücret fonksiyonunda %95 güven aralığında anlamlı çıkmıştır. Yeni ücret denkleminde, açıklayıcı değişkenlerin etkinlik derecesi ve veya önem sırası değişmiştir. Eski işteki ücreti belirleyen en önemli faktör olarak tahmin edilen yapılan işin niteliği yeni işte de ilk sırada ancak daha düşük oranda etkileyen bir değişken olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Özelleştirme öncesi ücret fonksiyonu analiz sonuçları yapılan işin niteliği katsayısını negatif olarak tahmin etmiştir. İşin niteliği kukla değişkeninin '1' olduğu durumda (sektöre özel beceri gerektirmeyen işlerde çalışanlar) ücret %16.9 oranında azalmaktadır. Bir başka ifade ile eski işte özel

beceri gerektiren işler %16.9 oranında daha yüksek ücretlendirilmektedir. Özelleştirme sonrası ücret fonksiyonunda birinci sınıf ve ikinci sınıf memur olarak yer alan yapılan işin niteliği kukla değişkeni de anlamlı bulunmuştur. Buna göre birinci sınıf memur statüsünde istihdam edilenlerin ikinci sınıf memur statüsünde istihdam edilenlere göre % 9.5 oranında daha yüksek ücret almaktadırlar.

Eğitim ve hizmet yılları değişkenlerinin hem etkinlik hem de önem sıraları değişmiştir. Etkinlik dereceleri azalmış, eğitim yılı hizmet yılını önem açısından geride bırakmıştır. Eğitim yılında meydana gelen 1 yıllık artış ücreti % 1.4 oranında artırırken hizmet yılında bir yıllık artış ücreti %1.3 oranında artırmaktadır. Özelleştirme öncesi ücret fonksiyonunda

bir yıllık eğitim artışı ücreti %1.5 oranında artırırken özelleştirme sonrası ücret fonksiyonunda bir yıllık eğitim artışı ücreti % 1.4 oranında artırmaktadır. Her iki ücret fonksiyonunda anlamlı olan hizmet yılının artışı özelleştirme öncesi ücreti % 2.8 oranında artırırken, özelleştirme sonrası hizmet yılındaki bir yıllık artış ücrette % 1.3 oranında artışa neden olmaktadır. Bu bulgular hizmet yılları kadına oranla daha yüksek ancak eğitim düzeyi daha düşük olan erkeklerin neden daha yüksek kayba uğradıklarını açıklamaktadır. Cinsiyet, yeni işteki ücreti belirleyen önemli ve eski ücretin aksine anlamlı bir değişken olarak tahmin edilmiştir. Kadınların erkeklere göre %2.7 oranında daha düşük ücretlendirildiği tahmin edilmiştir.

Tablo 6. Özelleştirme Öncesi (KTHY) ve Özelleştirme Sonrası (Kamu) İşteki Ücret Fonksiyonlarının Yordanmasına İlişkin Çoklu Regresyon Analizi Sonuçları

Özelleştirme Öncesi (KTHY) Ücret Fonksiyonu		Özelleştirme Sonrası (Kamu) Ücret Fonksiyonu
Değişken	ß	ß
Sabit	8.042604* (0.036662)	7.419879* (0.040662)
Eğitim Yılı	0.015478* (0.002345)	0.014187* (0.003171)
Hizmet Yılı	0.0280636* (0.001101)	0.013385* (0.000895)
Cinsiyet	-0.004120 (0.012713)	-0,026996* (0.010777)
Yapılan İşin Niteliği	-0.168909* (0.012915)	0.095622* (0.018879)
R ² =0.732072 F=172.8211 p=0.0000 N = 257		R ² =0.584296 F=88.90135 p=0.0000 N = 257

Not: Parantez içindeki rakamlar standart hataları göstermektedir.

Bağımlı Değişken = ln(ücret)

* %1 seviyesinde anlamlı

Bulguların Tartışılması

İncelenen vaka örneğinde özelleştirme sürecinin tasfiye ile sonuçlanması nedeniyle iş kaybı yaşanmış ancak siyasi bir karar sonucu iş kaybına uğrayanların kamuda istihdamları gerçekleştirilerek istihdam üzerindeki olumsuz etkisi engellenmiştir. Kararın alındığı tarihte işsiz olduğunu ve kamuda istihdam edilmek istediğini başvuru yaparak beyan eden eski KTYH çalışanları kamunun değişik birimlerinde istihdam edilmişlerdir. Bu olanağın tanınmaması durumunda örnek özelleştirme vakasının istihdamı olumsuz etkileyeceği açıktır. İstihdam olanağının tanınmaması durumunda özelleştirmenin istidamı nasıl etkileyeceği özelleştirme yapılan alanda rekabet, verimlilik ve üretimde, ve bunlara bağlı olarak emek talebinde yaşanacak değişime bağlıdır. Örnek vakada özelleştirme sonrası geçen 5 yıllık süreçte her hangi bir rekabet artışı yaşanmamış, işletme sayısında bir artış olmamıştır. Bu alanda faaliyet gösteren işletmeler yabancı işletmelerdir ve 2015 yılı itibarıyla yeni üretim birimlerini Kuzey Kıbrıs'a taşıma ya da var olanları büyütme ihtiyacı duymamıştır. Kuzey Kıbrıs'ın politik tanınmamışlığının getirdiği kısıt göz önünde bulundurulduğunda Kıbrıs sorununun çözülmemesi durumunda da, uzun vadede de, bu yönde bir değişim beklenmemektedir. Burdan hareketle örnek vakada özelleştirmenin istihdamı olumsuz etkilediği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Bir diğer bulgu ise tasfiye kararı ile yeniden istihdam edilme süreci arasında geçen 18 ayda yaşanan iş kaybının, kısa dönemde, işsizliğin yol açtığı piyasa etkisizliğine, diğer anlamıyla işsizliğin yarattığı toplumsal refah kaybına (deadweight loss) neden olduğudur. Çalışanların yeniden istihdam edilmesinin bu kaybın ortadan kaldırdığı düşünülebilir ancak çalışanların işte edindikleri beşeri sermaye birikimleri dikkate alınmadan gerçekleştirilen istihdam beşeri sermaye israfına yol açarak, uzun dönemde, kaynak dağılımında etkinlikten uzaklaşmaya ve toplumsal refah kaybının sürmesine neden olacaktır. Bu noktadan, örnek vakada özelleştirmenin istihdam kaybına dolayısıyla işsizliğin yarattığı toplumsal refah kaybına neden olmadığı ancak kaynak dağılımında

etkinlikten uzaklaşmaya neden olarak, uzun vadede, toplumsal refah kaybına yol açabileceği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Özelleştirmenin istihdam üzerindeki etkisi toplumsal cinsiyet perspektifinden analiz edildiğinde ulaşılan bulgu ise kadın istihdamının özelleştirmeden daha olumsuz etkilendiği yönündedir. Tasfiye öncesi kadınlar toplam çalışanların %47'sini oluştururken tasfiye sonrası iş kaybına uğrayanların % 63'ü kadındır. Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi iş kaybına uğrayanların bir kısmı kendi olanaklarıyla yeniden istihdam edilmişler ya da emekliye ayrılmışlardır. Emekli hakkını kazanmamış ya da yeniden istihdam edilme olanağı bulamamışların çoğunluğunu kadınların oluşturması emek piyasasındaki dezavantajlı konumlarına işaret etmektedir. Kuzey Kıbrıs genelinde kadınlar emek piyasasına daha az ve daha kısa sürelerle katılmaktadırlar ve iş bulmaları daha zordur (tarihsel olarak kadınların işsizlik oranı erkeklerin iki katıdır) (DPÖ, 2014) ve emek piyasasındaki kadın-erkek katmanlaşması ve basamaklılar nedeniyle iş seçenekleri daha sınırlıdır (Güven Lisaniler, 2010). Kadınların emek piyasasındaki dezavantajlı konumları özelleştirme nedeniyle ortaya çıkabilecek bir iş kaybından daha olumsuz etkilenmelerini getirmektedir. Örnek vakanın bulguları da bu olguyu destekler niteliktedir. Tasfiye öncesi dönemde kadınlar toplam çalışanların %47'sini oluştururken tasfiye sonrası kamuda istihdam edilmek üzere başvuranların %63'ü kadındır.

Özelleştirmenin çalışanların parasal refahı üzerindeki etkileri konusunda elde edilen bulgular çalışanların önemli oranda (ortalama %50) parasal refah kaybına uğradıklarını göstermektedir. Kaybı büyüklüğü çalışanların eğitim düzeyi, hizmet yılları, eski işlerinde yaptıkları işin niteliği ve buldukları pozisyona ve cinsiyete göre farklılık gösterdiği tespit edilmiştir. Daha yüksek eğitim düzeyine sahip olanlar daha düşük ve daha uzun hizmet yılı ve sektöre özel becerileri olanlar daha büyük kayba uğramışlardır.

Çoklu regresyon yöntemi ile özelleştirme öncesi ve sonrası ücret fonksiyonları tahmin edilerek yapılan ampirik analiz bulguları refah kaybının büyük

kısımının yapılan işin niteliğinde meydana gelen değişiminden kaynaklandığını göstermektedir. Bu bulgu sektöre özel beceri gerektiren işlerde çalışanların daha büyük kayba uğramalarını açıklamanın yanı sıra yaratılan istihdamın beşeri sermaye israfına yol açtığı ve uzun dönemde kaynak dağılımında etkinlikten uzaklaşmaya neden olacağı iddiasını da desteklemektedir.

Sonuç

İncelenen vakada, Özelleştirme Yasası kapsamında yeniden istihdam edilerek iş kayıplarının giderilmesi ve istihdamın olumsuz etkilenmesi engellenmeye çalışılmış, ancak çalışanların refah kaybının azaltılması için herhangi bir tedbir öngörülmemiş ve etkin kaynak dağılımı ilkesi göz ardı edilmiştir. Ayrıca gerek tasfiye gerekse yeniden istihdam süreçlerinin uzun tutulması ve kötü yönetilmesi gerek toplumsal gerekse bireysel refah kaybının büyümesine neden olmuştur. Bu süreçlerin toplum refahı üzerindeki etkisi parasal boyutu ile bir başka çalışma konusudur. Ancak toplum belleği ve algısı yaşanan tecrübelerle şekillenir. KTHY'nin reorganizasyon çalışmaları ile başlayan özelleştirme pratiği bir kamu varlığının kaybedilmesi ve çalışanların parasal ve parasal olmayan refah kaybı ile sonuçlanmıştır. Özelleştirmenin en önemli gerekçelerinden bir tanesi etkinlik olarak gösterilmektedir. Etkin olmayan kamu işletmeleri özelleştirilerek kaynakların etkin kullanımı sağlanacaktır. Oysa görüldüğü gibi KTHY'nin tasfiyesi etkinlik kaybı ile sonuçlanmıştır.

Kamu işletmelerinde mikro bazda etkinlik aramak ekonomik büyüme için gerekli bir koşuldur ancak ekonomik büyüme tek başına bir hedef değildir. Hedef ekonomik büyüme aracılığıyla toplum refahının yükseltilmesidir. Bu amacı gerçekleştirilmesi için etkin olmadığı ve kaynak israfına neden olduğu düşünülerek özelleştirilen ya da tasfiye edilen KİT'lerde çalışanların yeniden istihdamı ve refah kaybına uğramalarının önlenmesi gerekmektedir. İncelenen örnek vakada iş kaybına uğrayan KİT çalışanlarının yeniden istihdamı kamu birimlerinde istihdam olanağı

sağlanarak giderilmiştir. Özelleştirilme kapsamında olan diğer KİT'ler için örnek oluşturması bakımından değerlendirildiğinde bu yöntemin sürdürülebilir olmadığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Bunun nedenlerinden biri her ne kadar Özelleştirme Yasası'nda kamu iştiraki olan kurumlarda ve kamu kuruluşlarında yapılan özelleştirmelerde önerilen yöntemlerden biri olarak yer alsada Yasa'nın amacı ile çelişmesi bakımından daha çok çalışanı olan KİT'ler için uygulanabilir bir yöntem olarak değerlendirilmemiştir. Bu değerlendirme yeni yapılacak özelleştirmelerde iş kaybı olacağı şeklinde yorumlanabilir. Özelleştirme Yasası'nda tek bir amaç yer almaktadır, "Devletin bugünkü koşullara göre ekonomi içindeki payının küçültülmesi" (ÖY, 2012: 4). Dolayısıyla özelleştirme nedeniyle iş kaybına uğrayanların tamamının kamuda istihdam edilmesi kamunun emek piyasasındaki payının artmasına neden olacaktır. Bu da Yasa'nın amacıyla çelişmektedir. İkinci yeniden istihdam yöntemi olarak önerilen belirli bir süre için istihdam garantisi sağlanması özelleştirme sürecinde özel firma ile yapılacak pazarlığa ve tarafların pazarlık gücüne bağlıdır. Yasa sonrası özelleştirilen Ercan Havalimanı'nda gümrüksüz eşya satış mağazalarında çalışan 49 kişi için bir pazarlık söz konusu olmamıştır. Bu mağazaların faaliyetleri durdurulmuş ve burada çalışanlar iş kaybına uğramışlardır. Söz konusu çalışanlar için kamuda istihdam yöntemi benimsenmiştir. İş kaybına uğrayanların sayıca az olması, ihaleye katılan firmaların sayısının sınırlı olması ya da devredilen kamu işletmesinin devir anında ciddi boyutta alt yapı yatırımına ihtiyaç duyar durumda olması çalışanlara istihdam garantisi verilmesinin pazarlık konusu olmamasına neden olduğu şeklinde yorumlanabilir. Ancak özelleştirme kapsamında olan Kıbrıs Türk Elektrik Kurumu'nda yaklaşık 700 kişi çalışmaktadır, Kurum ciddi bir mali kriz içindedir ve zarar etmektedir. Bu durumda çalışanlara istihdam garantisi talebi olası görülmemektedir. Aynı zamanda tüm çalışanların kamuda istihdamı da Yasa'nın amacı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda olası görülmemektedir. Bu durumda üçüncü yöntemin; yeni işverenin istihdamın devamını sağlaması konusunda, mali destek sağlanarak

teşvik edilmesi yönteminin uygulanması daha olası görünmektedir. Kamu kurumlarında istihdam fazlası olduğu düşünüldüğünde, sağlanan teşvik nedeniyle bir kısım istihdamın devamı sağlansa da iş kaybının olması kaçınılmaz görünmektedir. Ancak Yasa bu olası sonuç için herhangi bir önlem içermemektedir.

Bir diğer konu ise iş kaybı ile yeniden istihdam edilme arasındaki zaman farkıdır. Vaka örneğinde çalışanlar iş kaybına uğradıkları tarihten birbuçuk yıl sonra yeniden istihdam edilmişlerdir. Bu süreçte çalışanların yaşamlarını idame ettirebilmeleri için herhangi bir politika öngörülmemiştir. Aylık kazançları sıfırlanmış buna bağlı olarak sosyal sigorta yatırımları yapılamamış, sosyal sigorta kapsamı dışına düşerek işsizlik ödeneği ve temel sağlık hizmetleri gibi sosyal hizmetlerden yararlanamayarak yoksulluğa itilmişlerdir. Bu durumu incelenen vakaya özel bir sonuç olduğu düşünülebilir ancak Ercan Havalimanının işletme hakkının özele devredilerek özelleştirilmesi ile faaliyetine son verilen gümrüksüz mal satış mağazası çalışanlarının da kamuda istihdam edilme kararı sonrası aynı şekilde yoksulluğa itilmiş olmaları bu olgunun örnek vakaya özel olmadığını göstermektedir. Bu örnekte de benzer bir süreç yaşanmıştır. Kamu istihdamının gerçekleşebilmesi için mağazaların bağlı olduğu KİT'nün özelleştirilmesinin tamamlanması gerekmektedir. Ancak ihale sonuçsuz kalmıştır ve çalışanlar vaka örneğindeki gibi mağdur edilmişlerdir. Bu da Yasa'nın geçiş sürecinde iş kaybına uğrayanların mağduriyetlerini telafi edecek önlemler içermediğini ve revize edilmesi gerektiğine işaret etmektedir.

Özetlemek gerekirse vaka örneğinin incelenmesinden elde edilen bulgular özelleştirme nedeniyle ortaya çıkan iş kaybının kamuda yeniden istihdam olanağı sağlanarak üstesinden gelinemeyeceği şeklindedir. Ayrıca kamuda yeniden istihdam edilerek iş kaybı önlenirse bile çalışanlar geçiş sürecinde mağdur edilmektedirler. Özelleştirmenin tasfiye yöntemi kullanılarak gerçekleştirilmesi durumunda mağduriyet artmaktadır.

Çalışmanın bir diğer bulgusu ise çalışanların maaş intibakı sürecindeki mağduriyetidir. Vaka

örneğinde yeniden istihdamın geçici statüde yapılması ve hizmet yıllarının tamamının maaş intibakına dahil edilmemesi bir diğer mağduriyet yaşanmasına neden olmaktadır. Geçici statüde istihdam edilmeleri kademe ilerlemesini engelleyerek yapabilirliklerini sınırlayarak çalışanın parasal ve parasal olmayan refah kaybının uzun vadede de sürmesine neden olmaktadır. Ayrıca hizmet yıllarının tamamının intibak ettirilmemesi aylık kazancın yanı sıra yaşlılık aylığı ve emekli ikramiyesini de olumsuz etkilemekte çalışanların emeklilik sonrası refahını da olumsuz etkilemektedir.

Her ne kadar tek bir vaka örneğinden yola çıkarak değerlendirmeler yapılmışsa da Özelleştirme Yasası'nda yeniden istihdam yöntemleri düzenlenirken çalışanların iş kaybının ve istihdamlardan doğacak kamu yükünü azaltılmasına yönelik önlemler alındığı ancak çalışanların parasal ve parasal olmayan refah kaybı göz önünde bulundurulmadığı yorumu yapılabilir. İş kaybının engellenmesi tabii ki önemlidir. Ancak parasal ve parasal olmayan refah kaybını azaltmaya, ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik önlemlerin çalışanların yapabilirlikleri, iyi olmayı başarma özgürlüklerini de koruyacak ve geliştirecek şekilde tasarlanması gerekmektedir. Kişilerin parasal refahını ve yapabilirliklerini göz önünde bulundurmamanın yaklaşımlar kişilerin refahını ve ülkenin insani gelişmişlik düzeyini olumsuz etkilemektedir (Sen, 2004).

Notlar

1. Geçici Madde 1: Kıbrıs Türk Hava Yolları Eski Çalışanları Hakkında Uygulama Bu Yasanın Üçüncü Kısımında yer alan, özelleştirme uygulamaları sonucunda kamu iştirakleri dışında kalan şirket çalışanlarının işsiz kalacak olanlarının istihdamının sağlanmasına ilişkin kurallar, mahkemece tasfiyesine karar verildiği tarihte, Şirketin Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti sınırları dahilindeki şubelerinde Kıbrıs Türk Hava Yolları çalışanı statüsünde olan ve bu Yasanın yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren altı ay içerisinde talepte bulunanlar hakkında da uygulanır (ÖY, 2012: Yedinci Kısım: Geçici ve Son Kurallar: Geçici Madde 1: 39)

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Otobiyografik Öz

Profesör Fatma Güven Lisaniler Dođu Akdeniz Üniversitesi Ekonomi Bölümü öğretim üyesidir. 2004 yılında yayınlanmış KKTC'de emek piyasasında ve eğitimde kadın erkek eşitliğini inceleyen "Kadının Statüsünün Tespiti: Kadın erkek eşitliğine doğru bir adım" isimli bir kitabı vardır. Kıbrıs sorunu, küçük ölçekli ekonomilerde kalkınma, emek piyasasının yapısı ve sorunları, kamu-özel sektör katmanlaşması, emek piyasasında toplumsal cinsiyet

temelli ayrımcılık üzerine yayınları bulunmaktadır.

Yardımcı Doçent Fehiman Eminer Lefke Avrupa Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Ekonomi Bölümü öğretim üyesi ve bölüm başkanıdır. Doktora derecesini Maliye Teorisi alanında Marmara Üniversitesinde tamamlamıştır. Kamu harcamaları, dış yardımlar, özelleştirme ve devletin büyüklüğü ilgi alanlarıdır.

Doktor Hasan Rüstemoğlu Uluslararası Kıbrıs Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi öğretim üyesidir. Doktorasını 2016 yılında Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi Ekonomi Bölümü'nde tamamlamıştır. Kalkınma, çevre ve enerji ekonomisi, toplumsal cinsiyet temelli ayrımcılık ve emek piyasası ilgi alanlarıdır. Çevre ekonomisi alanında uluslararası dergilerde yayınları bulunmaktadır.

Biographic Sketch

Fatma Güven Lisaniler is Professor of Economics at Eastern Mediterranean University. As an economist; she has specialized in economic development, with special reference to labor market issues and SMEs. She has publications in academic journals and chapters in books on Cyprus problem, labor market segmentation, and gender equality in the labor market.

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A Life Story under the Shadow of the Cyprus Issue: The Migration, Homecoming and Community Activities of Mr. İsmail Cemal

Kıbrıs Sorunu'nun Gölgesinde Bir Hayat Hikayesi: İsmail Cemal'in Göç Etmesi, Geri Dönüşü ve Aktivizmi

Hanife Aliefendiođlu, Béla Vizvári

Abstract

This paper discusses the life story of İsmail Cemal as a migrant Cypriot by crisscrossing the recent socio-political history of the island. Mr. Cemal established progressive grassroots-community work and social networking in Büyükkonuk village after spending a long time in Australia. We, as two foreign academics on the island, believe sharing a life story has the power to bring social-political transformation in a community. The study has conducted in 2013 as a result of five visits and in-depth interviews. The study consists of five sections on his childhood in Paphos, community life during the Cyprus conflict between 1950s and 1970s, his migration and working experience in Australia, his homecoming and community activities that resulted with an eco-village.

Keywords: *the Cyprus conflict and migration, diaspora, community building activities, ecovillage, alternative tourism.*

Özet

Bu yazı Sayın İsmail Cemal'in bir göçmen olarak yaşam öyküsünü Kıbrıs'ın yakın sosyo-politik tarihinin ışığında tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Sayın Cemal Avustralya'da uzun yıllar yaşadıktan sonra adaya Büyükkonuk köyüne dönerek taban faaliyetleri yürütmüş ve bir dayanışma ağı yaratmıştır. Bizler adada yaşayan iki yabancı akademisyen olarak kimi hayat hikayelerinin paylaşılmasının topluluklar için sosyal ve politik dönüşümler yaratacak gücün farkında olarak 2013 yılında Sayın Cemal ile beş ayrı derinlemesine görüşme gerçekleştirdik. Bu çalışma, Sayın Cemal'in Baf'taki çocukluğundan başlayarak 1950-1970ler arası Kıbrıs'taki çatışma dönemini, göç etmesini, Avustralya'daki çalışma deneyimini, geri dönüşünü ve bir ekoköy kurulmasıyla sonuçlanan toplumsal aktivitelerini içermektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: *Kıbrıs sorunu ve göç, diaspora, topluluk faaliyetleri, eko-köy, alternatif turizm.*

The aim of this paper is to discuss the life story of İsmail Cemal by crisscrossing the recent socio-political history of the island of Cyprus. We aim to write a comprehensive life story of Mr. Cemal, who is one of the leading community figures in North Cyprus. He has migrated on the island, but also spent a long time away from it; with experience and a new perspective, he returned to the island to settle there.

As two foreign or non-Cypriot academics who have lived on Cyprus for more than 10 years, we have closely observed Mr. Cemal's progressive grassroots-community work and social networking, which has challenged the mainstream capitalist-mass tourism discourse and practices. İsmail Cemal, along with his wife, Lois Cemal, has been trying to build a community in Büyükkonuk by providing local-traditional and global-contemporary activities. According to Lenart-Cheng and Walker (2011: 141), sharing a life story furthers social-political transformation in a society. Our motivation is to bring alternative community activities to the attention of the public on the island by sharing Mr. Cemal's initiatives in Büyükkonuk. Our work is based on five different visits and in-depth interviews with Mr. Cemal in Spring and summer of 2013.

A short background

The colonial history of Cyprus plays an important role on the island at various levels. The Ottoman Empire leased the island to Britain in 1878. Under British rule, all Cypriots became "equal subjects of the new administration" (Bryant, 2004: 27; Michael, 2009). After a long colonial period under the British, Cyprus became an independent country in 1960. Agricultural products, such as citrus fruits, potatoes, and table grapes, were the main bases of the economy of Cyprus. In 1960-1961, agricultural exports accounted for 43% of its total exports.

İsmail Cemal was born on December 6, 1948 in the village of Paphos, Aks(il)u as the son of a villager/farmer¹. His father later began to work with the British in various locations after reaching middle

age. İsmail remembers going to Aksilu during the summer while his father worked in the British camp in Famagusta.

Like many other Cypriot families who were involved in the population exchange after 1974, his parental family left Aksilu to go north. They chose to come to the Büyükkonuk (Komikebir) village on the Karpaz peninsula where they applied for an exchange property. According to İsmail Cemal, some people from Aksilu moved to Lapta, but many of the villagers came to Büyükkonuk.

Mr. Cemal believes that his previous childhood village was not an old settlement; it was just a settlement, where a shepherd had found a water source.

"We never had a sophisticated lifestyle. It was basically a survival culture. My father and my mother were always arguing. Going out and coming back, and it was a normal relationship. I don't know how things went... The marriages were mostly convenience marriages or arranged marriages. So, my family, on my mother's side and my father's side, they were second marriages. My mother, her first husband died, and my father, his wife died, and they got together. It was a convenience marriage. First, they both liked each other. They had no property or anything, so they used to steal olives at night and take them to town and sell so they could buy food. Then, the war came, and everyone was going to the war and being soldiers because it was a British colony. After the war, my father also went to the Suez canal project as part of the team caring for the large Cypriot mules;...., he stayed for five years altogether and what he earned he sent to my mother, and my mother managed to buy some property. So when he came back they had some property, they had a farm".

His childhood was spent in deep poverty, like many Turkish Cypriots in the pre-money-market economy. He remembers the survival culture of his childhood and youth. He recalls the saying: "He doesn't own a tree to hang himself", referring

to a person in absolute poverty.

“Very many Cypriots, they were homeless, landless people. There was poverty after the war. It was just in the early 50s and 60s, money was not available, because there was no money. It was an exchange system: You give me this, I give you that. There was no money around. Well, this is it. I mean it excludes all emotional attachments and all that shows how people used to survive ... really ... lots of things that were merciless, rude, inhumane, people did them to survive. This is life”.

Life in Paphos

In the first half of the interview, İsmail Cemal spoke about his childhood, which was spent in the mountainous Paphos region, and later in Famagusta. He recalled people from the Paphos region going to the Mesaoria Plain for harvesting throughout the whole summer. Mr. Cemal thought that the farmers striped the whole land, which led to today’s dry Mesaoria, which, for him, is an “ecological disaster”. During that time, “Mesaoria was feeding the whole country, really²”. Paphos, on the other hand, was a grape growing area. In his childhood, he helped load the donkeys to carry the grapes from the vineyard to the village.

Paphos was also goat-raising area, because of its geography.

“Sheep are not very practical in the area. Sheep want flat land. So everybody was raising goats. They say that my grandfather received a medal

from the British authorities for having 1000. It was a big, big herd”.

Agriculture was the main source of income for the population in the rural area. The main crops of Cyprus were varied and plentiful in the period from 1961 to 1974.

Traditionally, agriculture had been similar in previous times. The French consul, M. Fourcade, wrote a report on Cyprus in 1844. According to his data, barley, wheat and oats were the crops that used the greatest amount of arable land, in that order (Gazioğlu, 1990: 132). In the middle of the eighteenth century, Alexander Drummond stated that the main exports from Cyprus were wine (£68,500), silk (£35.000), and cotton (£28,130). This historical background of its agriculture makes it understandable that the main crops mentioned by Mr. Cemal were grapes, barley, and wheat.

With respect to the infrastructure of the villages, Mr. Cemal stated: “We never had electricity until after 1974. You see, electricity came to the area but at that time there was a conflict from ‘63 to ‘74 The Turkish villages refused to let the Greeks come into the villages to install electricity. Mehmetçik was an example in the Karpaz also. Mehmetçik was an all Turkish village and didn’t have electricity before 1974.”³

Mr. Cemal noted that the basic energy source was wood: “Because they used to cook with wood, they used to bake with wood; they used to keep warm with wood, so wood! Wood is not only solid wood, I’m talking about anything!”

Table 1. The main crops of Cyprus in the period from 1961 to 1974.

Products	Potatoes	Grapes	Oranges	Barley	Wheat	Carobs	Forage	Grapefruit (incl.pomelos)	Lemons and limes
Average harvested quantity in tons	149,414	141,264	96,499	75,481	64,438	46,423	41,292	36,266	21,852

(Retrieved from <http://www.fao.org>)

He made a distinction between cash crop agricultural products:

“Grapes for wine don’t need water and up in the hills it is cool and the grape vines are very small; maybe you will get 3 or 4 bunches from one of them. It was what we called a cash crop. A cash crop is when you have it, you sell it immediately. Olives weren’t a cash crop. Olives, you had to find your own market. The government supported olive tree growing, for example, paying for retaining walls around olive fields, but it does not buy the crop. But the grapes were a cash crop. Not that the government was buying, but the alcohol companies⁴ had a policy that if you had ten shares from the company, you are entitled to give them a thousand kilos of grapes, and they have to take them from you, because you are a shareholder”.

Mr. Cemal started school in Aksilu in 1954 with one teacher for six levels in one room. They used slates and chalk. One incident caused them to change to paper and notebooks. He narrated the story as follows:

“There was an earthquake. It was in 1952. So, they built us a new village. One of the blessings of this event was cement bags. The teacher asked us to collect all of the cement bags. So, we just collected all of the cement bags, and we just cut them. At that time, cement was imported from England. To make the bag strong, they had six layers. Now, they only have three. Six layers of paper was a lot of paper, so the teacher had a stock of paper. That was our first privilege of having paper. This was my first paper”.

His observations about gender differentiation in his childhood were quite prominent: Mr. Cemal placed the role of a man as a provider, as one that has been played for centuries. For him, a woman does everything else around the home. He did establish visible and invisible lines regarding the gender roles of women and men:

“In social structure, there are two things. One

that is visible and can be observed, and there is one that you don’t observe. So, in a relationship, you can never know, but what was expected of a man in public was to be dominant, you know, a macho man”.

With respect to the gender differentiation between his father and mother, we learned that his father was not a family man, which led his mother to become a creative entrepreneur.

“My father, well, he should have been born in New York or Hollywood. He was a fun-loving man. He wasn’t a hard-working, a family man and all, and had no interest in anything. He wanted to gamble; he was a gambler, womanizer, and all kinds of things...he was not meant to be a family man, dedicated provider”.

Mr. Cemal gave this description of his mother:

“She used to raise turkeys. She knew that the Greeks want turkey during Christmas. She used to raise all these turkeys ... in the villages...full of turkey. Everybody was complaining because they were going into their vineyards and eating their grapes”.

His family moved from Paphos to Limassol after his father was a witness in a criminal case. His father was later hired by the British military camp in Famagusta. Mr. Cemal attended Alasya primary and Namık Kemal high school. His description of the ethnic tensions on the island is a familiar one (Kızılyürek, 2002; Bryant, 2007; Michael, 2009; Hampton, 2002).

“The military police were hired by the British to fight EOKA. That added to the whole enmity between the Greeks and the Turks, because the British hired the Turks to become the military police to chase out EOKA. Of course, they gave the Turkish Cypriots privileges, and they did all kind of things, and the British would turn a blind eye to them. This really increased the enmity between the Greeks and the Turks. Physically, it

was a bad time period. I mean they should have been the best of friends after we kicked out the British. They should have just celebrated; they should have set a big table and had fun, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots”.

During his stay in Famagusta, Mr. Cemal was taken to military training that he described as child soldering.

“We did schooling until one o'clock. After one, we were actually given military training because of a shortage of people. I was there in 1963. Yes, my gun, my rifle was bigger than me”.

Mr. Cemal mostly stood guard on shifts. He did not use the gun, but he was trained to use it, like many other Cypriots.

The time of conflict

During the 1950s, armed conflict broke out between the main communities. The conflict was fairly recent compared to their long cohabitation (Anthias, 1989: 153; Hampton, 2002: 148). According to Anastasiou (2002), two inter-related parameters defined the conflict on the island: a) the “long-standing impact of ethnic nationalism as a world-and-life view”, which makes them similar in terms of their understanding of nationalism; b) the collective memory of “experiences of pain and injury in each community” (581-582).

İsmail Cemal’s life was interrupted by tension, exclusion, deprivation, displacement and migration as a result of this conflict. He pointed out the external impacts on the conflict:

“The general policy of the time for local and foreign authorities toward Turkish Cypriots was to divide the island. And, of course, under the security and protection, of course, there was conflict, but the conflict wasn't to the degree that they magnified it. You talk to some person who thinks and behaves in some line. There is the truth, and there are many ways in which this story is told, ok. That's what we are doing now.

We are telling a story, but what the truth it is, I don't know. Maybe it's a story from my point of view, maybe. You see, that is how to talk. This is my story, ok, and then, everybody has a story to tell you about these things. But basically, the way I look at it is that there was a policy to divide the island. They had to segregate the communities because if you leave them living together, you don't create the segregation. Then, you cannot achieve the division, so the segregation was there. The segregation started even earlier than the 60s; it started in 1957, and the Greek Cypriots were attacking the small villages”.

On the way to Australia

After graduating from high school, Mr. Cemal was awarded a scholarship for a university education in Turkey. But the scholarship was postponed two years because of the conflict on the island. During this period, he was still engaged in military service. Mr. Cemal’s brother-in-law had recently gone to Australia to work, and he offered Mr. Cemal the opportunity to move to his sister’s home in Limassol and take care of the family and the farm. Since he was a soldier, he was given special permission to transfer to Limassol by the Turkish commander. He spent two years there and was close to attending his planned studies in Turkey. Meanwhile, his brother-in-law suggested to him that he should go to Australia to work and stay with them as İsmail’s sister had now gone to Australia with all 4 of their children. So this is what he decided to do.

He had two different images in the media. The one from Cyprus was limited to some movie shows and the Bayrak radio. “But, of course, we had radio. Bayrak was good; Bayrak, I think, was the only media that actually informed. There was Kemal Tunç and we were entertained every Sunday by sketches of Caher and Aliko ⁵. We had a little world at the time, but it was enough. But now, we have such a big world, and we are still looking for more.” His second media image was of British comedian

Norman Wisdom.

“One thing that made me leave may sound very silly. I used to watch Norman Wisdom, a British comedian in the 50s, in a movie. They used to show two movies; one was Turkish, one was English. They had a student matinee in the afternoon, Saturday at 2 o’clock, and it went on to 6. So, I was really hooked up on this. I used to love him so much. We used to laugh so much. I used to say to myself, I don’t understand a word of what he was saying, and if I could understand English, how much more I would enjoy it. So, I said to myself, I have to go to Australia and learn English, so I can watch Norman Wisdom”⁶.

Ismail Cemal is very glad that he went to Australia. This gave him a chance to see the world and, on return to Cyprus, to go to parts of the island he had never visited. Before he went to Australia, he had never been to Kyrenia and Trodos.

It took Mr. Cemal one month to go to Melbourne and Sydney, Australia, via Genoa, Italy by ship. “It was a big thing”, he said. He passed the main test and obtained the right to stay as a commonwealth citizen. After two years, he had the right to become an Australian citizen.

He found the Australian people to be tolerant and ethical.

Also, they are sympathetic, the Australian people. I never regret any time that I spent there. What I learned over the long while I was there I may say was ethics; Australians are very good with ethics. In their contacts, either ways, everybody, it is not the law, but everybody agrees on that...

Mr. Cemal is still amazed about how quickly he narrowed down his community until he reached his own villagers.

“You realize that wherever you go, you always find people from your country. You narrow down to the background; you narrow down the community; you narrow down to Cypriots; you narrow down to Paphos; down to villages; it is amazing”.

One of the earlier jobs Mr. Cemal found was for an Australian car company. He had to attend English courses, and his dedication to English when he was at school in Cyprus enabled him to be very successful in the language. After staying with his sister, Mr. Cemal moved to a single room.

With respect to the first years in Sydney, he stated:

“Well, going from a closed society to a permissive society, it’s like a very privileged freedom you have. Especially when you are young, you are not accountable to anybody. You can do anything and get away with it, and on top of it all, you have the money to do it”.

Mr. Cemal learned many things, not just about scholarly subjects, but about life. He experienced a time of adaptation along with other young workers who came from different cultures. Mr. Cemal made some decisions just out of curiosity; he decided to move to Western Australia to a mining town and worked there for 6-7 years. In Western Australia he bought his tools and started to work as a carpenter. He worked on building the towns and settlements of the companies that were mining iron ore, which is one of the main export goods of Australia.

It involved teamwork, and Bob was his friend from work: İsmail Cemal was impressed by Bob’s mentorship of him as was a relatively inexperienced carpenter:

“He said to me, ‘fill your pockets with nails and take them home. After dinner, you go into the bush. The desert is not just sand, it has bushes and lots of trees as well, but they are very few. If you go to the bush a mile away, you will find a dry trunk. With your hammer you hit nails, and you hit, and you hit, so that’s what I did. Then, I took a swing, swing after swing’. In a week’s time, I was getting better. So, Bob used to call me, ‘come, let’s go do this’. When I missed hitting a nail he would say ‘the wind is too strong’. I went through that and I became a very good carpenter, because I had education through Bob himself”.

İsmail Cemal has a clear accent in English. It cannot be categorized as British or Australian.

"I don't know what you can say about my accent, but a lot of people don't know what to say. I have been to Australia, and maybe I am more British and not American. I communicate, but my accent is not a specific accent of any region".

Mr. Cemal appreciated that the language he speaks is influenced by Greek, Italian, Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, and English.

"When you are speaking in dialects, you should not be ashamed. You should be proud of it. When I read and write, I do not use dialects.... If I write something, I write it properly but I do not speak like I write.... Other cultures speak to each other in dialects like the Scotsman, yet the Scot writes in English. Some Turkish Cypriots are ashamed because they do not speak Istanbul Turkish. But why would you worry about it?"

Mr. Cemal considered local dialects to be intangible heritage that can be protected by passing it through the generations. He also mentioned that, with language, you can only pass that kind of heritage intact to the next generation, because it is a tool of communication and is not like traditional knowledge.

Mr. Cemal remembered the attempt to purify the Turkish language in Cyprus, mainly from the influence of the Greek language. TMT, the Turkish Resistance Organization, actually banned its members from speaking in the Greek language.

"There are some other versions of this story; they have this pressure to speak this pure Turkish. If they are not with their school friends, the shopkeepers and bus drivers, they cannot understand it, so they feel this pressure to speak this pure Turkish".

Homecoming

After selling their house in Australia, İsmail

Cemal, his wife Lois and two children moved to

Cyprus in late 1986. They settled in Büyükkonuk ⁷, where Mr. Cemal's parents were living at that time. Mr. Cemal had initially been concerned about whether his wife, Lois, could adapt to their new life after seeing the amount of corruption in Cyprus, because she was a lady coming from a very democratic country.

This is how İsmail Cemal described Cyprus in the mid-80s: "The atmosphere was more than damaged. It was not pleasant. It was a society scared of saying anything, and it was a people suppressed and oppressed, by poverty and forced obedience."

The family at first lived in a two-room stone house heated by wood. It had one cupboard, one wall for book shelves, and the toilet was outside. They bought a secondhand table and sat on old school chairs, the children had iron beds. They lived like this for three years. As Lois explained: "The kids had baths behind the kitchen door; they did not know any better." It was while living here that their third child was born.

Lois was a nurse. She gave injections to many villagers, and they 'paid' her with garden produce, potatoes, grapes and so on. Looking back, İsmail and Lois remembered that during those times there were few shops and there were frequent power cuts. He brought a car to Cyprus, which was only the third car in the village; he was often asked to transport other villagers to hospital, to Görücülük ⁸ or to Ercan airport. Mrs. Cemal, Lois, was the only woman car driver in the village at that time. There was another woman who drove a tractor. Women did not have the courage to walk around the village or go out to the fields alone.

Lois started an informal playgroup for mothers and children. But because it was not run by the government, the villagers viewed it suspiciously. For a while they looked around the northern part of the island for a place to live and in the end decided to stay in the village. Their children went to the village school for their primary education. First they had rented a stone cottage while they built a small apartment on top with a garage/storeroom below,

and later on, Mr. Cemal built their large stone house, which took many years to build.

“We were living upstairs. When we moved down to the big stone house the apartment was left empty. We had a couple of friends who used it while visiting. Once there were tourists cycling through the village. They asked us for accommodation, and we said OK, so we let them in. Slowly, it came to us that we actually could rent such a place. We did not want to rent the place permanently to someone. We did not want to have to share our space with them. But visitors just come and go. We started renting our place to tourists”.

After they began providing accommodations for visitors, İsmail and Lois thought about combining this service with handicrafts. Having worked in the carpentry industry for years, Mr. Cemal was also interested in handicrafts, such as souvenirs for tourists. He was aware of sources for juniper and olive wood that could be used for making wooden souvenirs at the carpentry workshop in the village. Mr. Cemal said that it annoyed him that the villagers “were just burning the olive wood and juniper roof beams.” for firewood. He first made a little chair out of juniper. He stated: “We prefer to make things using local materials that reflect Cypriot environment as well as culture.”

Lois and İsmail also encouraged women in the village to sell their embroideries and other crafts in their shop, allowing them to charge their own prices. The shop charged 10% commission to sell their goods. As Mr. Cemal put it: “We are not here to exploit you. You set your price. If it sells we take commission from it.” This small workshop is now known as Delcraft.

It was about this time, in early 2000 that İsmail started to wear his iconic white ‘mandilya’ headscarf. At first he used it to cover his long hair from getting dusty while he was in the carpentry shop. But then it became a symbol to him of his Cypriotness, like a protest to the changes going on around him, the pressure to westernize, the pressure

of fashion. He explains:

“Some people think I wear it because I’m going bald. But I’m not. I’ve kept wearing it because to me it was a symbol of my culture, part of my heritage. Men in my youth wore scarves, white for the Turks, black for the Greek Cypriots. In the fields it gave shade and stopped flies going in their ears. Some older men laugh at me, saying ‘what is that thing on your head’. They don’t even know what it is called. I feel sorry that they have forgotten their history, their culture, so soon”.

Towards an Eco-village

The Karpaz Region has a natural habitat and is characterized by biodiversity. It is one of the NATURA 2000 fields in the region, which includes three environmental protection areas (Karpaz Bölgesi Yerel Kalkınma Stratejisi, 2011: 15). In the region, there are five municipal administrations, İskele, Mehmetcik, Büyükkonuk, Yenierenköy, and Dipkarpaz. There are 35 villages (Karpaz Bölgesi Yerel Kalkınma Stratejisi, 2011). Büyükkonuk, which has a population of 2,885, is the fourth largest village/municipality in the region. It is known as a village that is rich in community activities, such as the Eco-Days, which are organized twice a year. The village is very close to the northern and southern beaches. Various international organizations fund Büyükkonuk as an eco-village for environmental protection, the protection of cultural heritage, and to increase the number of accommodation facilities. It is expected that the village will become a leading community for eco-tourism in the near future (Karpaz Bölgesi Yerel Kalkınma Stratejisi, 2011: 9). Most of the bed and breakfasts (B&Bs) and hotels are now members of the Karpaz Eco-tourism Union (Karpaz Bölgesi Yerel Kalkınma Stratejisi, 2011: 26). The main agricultural products in the region are grains, potatoes, carobs, olives, grapes and greenhouse vegetables (Karpaz Bölgesi Yerel Kalkınma Stratejisi, 2011: 31-32).

Having spent a lot of time in the village,

Lois and İsmail often worried about how to save the village and how to save the way of life. One day, while they were taking the government's tourist guide course, they came across an advertisement in the newspaper about a seminar on cultural development, implemented by UNDP. It was 2003 and Cyprus was heading for accession to the European Union⁹. While attending that seminar, they were given a pamphlet on a post-graduate course in cultural development which was seeking applicants. The course was organized by the ILO (International Labor Organization) and the UNDP (United Nations Development Project) in Italy at Turin University. Mr. Cemal applied and was accepted. He stated that the "course itself was brilliant. We had lecturers from all over the world. We met fantastic people there. It was all about culture. For four months, 9 to 5, it was very intense, with continuous lecturing and lecturing."

While he was there, he formed his plan for the cultural development project for his village, Büyükkonuk. He returned to Cyprus trained and with ideas and enthusiasm. Importantly, Mr. Cemal and his wife, Lois, became experienced in project writing. He stated:

"Lois and I became more or less professional in project writing. It is rare for us to write a project and not have it accepted. Actually, all of our projects have been accepted, especially the cultural projects, which are my line".

İsmail became a prime motivator in many cultural projects in Buyukkonuk. There were projects to fully restore a traditional olive mill into an olive oil museum, to enhance the village square (including repairs to the roof of the church), for a composting course to educate villagers, for rainwater collection off roofs, for village signage, and to open new walking trails. With the help and support of local and international donors, such as the UNDP, the European Union, the Turkish Embassy and the Ministry of Tourism, İsmail, Lois, and a core group in the village/region started to discuss the concept of ecotourism. They called it an eco-village destination

in Cyprus, providing a different form of tourism. At the beginning, it sounded like special interest tourism, such as diving. Ecotourism was very new to Cypriots.

In the beginning, about 2 million TL from the Turkish Embassy, was released to the Tourism Department for B&B accommodations in Karpaz. This was a substantial amount of money. Eventually, only 12 people received this money instead of the intended 50. Most of the money went to Dipkarpaz. Three people from Büyükkonuk received money from this fund to create their B&Bs.

A very early call for proposals made technical assistance and funds available to help people who were already working in tourism. İsmail and Lois Cemal were able to expand and refurbish their existing small B&B, craft outlet and activity centre. İsmail recalls;

"There was a separate call from UNDP for entrepreneurial people who were already established and were involved in ecotourism activities. As we already had the apartment upstairs as occasional B&B use, we renovated the garage downstairs to make three more rooms and we put two beds into each of them. Our B&B then had a capacity of 10...Additionally, we had to refurbish the activity center. The project gave us materials. We paid for all of the labor. It took almost 8 months to do the work".

These activities have now been greatly reduced as both the Cemals enter retirement age. They do, however, still actively help with tourism activities, are on the Eco-Day festival committee and manage a website in English to bring tourists to Buyukkonuk.

The Turkish Embassy has been the biggest investor in eco-tourism in Buyukkonuk because it has provided many opportunities to the municipality, such as the restoration of a large house that arched across the road. Karpaz Mediterranean University chose the village as a venue in which it would provide tourism training, especially ecotourism, which will be one of the subjects of their

research and training. The Americans, with USAID funding, saw the village's potential and starting from 2005, worked with the ecotourism committee on several projects. They helped to establish a logo for 10 local products that could use this geographical emblem. The eco-tourism committee later became the Buyukkonuk Ecotourism Association which was then eligible to apply for EU funding independently.

Mr. Cemal explained how and why Büyükkonuk was found to be suitable for the eco-village concept by international organizations:

"It is not on the coast, and so it was not going to be taken by a developer. People carried on traditional farming. Most villages close to cities their people work in cities. Our people mostly worked in the village in farming and animal husbandry. The council of ministers chose us as a pilot village. We did receive a lot of training from different donors. They helped us to form a village eco-tourism committee. Our committee discussed alternative tourism. We realized that we have to do the job with villagers. In the training they asked us what we wanted in the future for the village. We believe we want a quiet village where people can come and enjoy a place of tranquility, where they will have an opportunity to find local food, and they will be able to walk in a relatively clean landscape. In their walks, they should be able to join in the seasonal village activities".

The representatives from USAID suggested and funded a village festival. They gave three weeks of training to the villagers, followed by the first festival, which featured 20 stands. It was estimated that 1500 people attended, and by mid-day, all of the food and water had been consumed. As the festivals became larger and larger, both in terms of visitors and participants, the municipality took over its organization. The last festival (2013) featured 120 stands, and 20,000 people attended. Mr. Cemal believes that the village needs more activities, and that is why they have additional events during the year, such as "Olive Day" and "Sunday Markets". With all of these activities the village is better known

than before. When one says Buyukkonuk, they may first think of the festivals rather than an eco-village. Today, Eco-Days are organized twice in year, in May and October. Thousands of people visit and enjoy organic and traditional foods. During the Eco-Days, people are also provided with many other activities, such as cycling and walking tours, donkey rides, crafts, and cooking demonstrations.

In 2011, as tenants of the ecovillage, İsmail Cemal and villagers from around the region opposed a proposed petroleum and oil storage facility for the coast of Yedikonuk, a very close neighboring village. Actually, this generated substantial publicity and credit for the village and the region. Villages from around the region formed a coordination committee, which included İsmail Cemal¹⁰ both as a member and the spokesperson. This committee issued a press release regarding their concerns about the incongruity of being an ecotourism region and being chosen for a petroleum storage depot at the same time. They stated that this decision would be extremely dangerous for the region. After almost 8 months of campaigning the petrol storage proposal was finally rejected by the government. The committee and villagers had won their case for eco-tourism.

Another project of İsmail Cemal was a project to raise the awareness of the plight of Cypriot donkeys which are no longer used in agriculture. Eight young people from the peninsula from different professions were taken to the UK and Portugal. They were to learn about donkey care, their protection and the potential use of donkeys in ecotourism. Mr. Cemal mentioned that donkeys had been important participants in the previous generations of village life and that there are still lots of stories regarding donkeys in every household. Following this project rides on donkeys at Eco-Day festivals and events became very popular. There is also a Donkey Day event held every year in February, similar to the Olive Day Fest, to remind people of the role of donkeys in traditional Cypriot village life.

Regarding the village's social structure,

according to İsmail Cemal, there is relative harmony. Prior to 1974, the economic opportunities in Buyukkonuk were very unfair. Locally, the Greek Cypriots used to have economic control of the village. Now the municipality, muhtar and shopkeeper jobs are divided between Turkish mainlanders, and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish settlers now have more economic balance. There are not many mixed marriages between the settlers and Cypriots. Currently, members of the younger generation of Turkish settler families can now be considered as Cypriots. In the village, the local Cypriots speak in the Karpaz dialect, but the older settlers from Turkey have kept their mainland accent and people from Paphos speak in the Paphos dialect.

Based on Mr. Cemal's narrative, both leaving and returning to Cyprus were major events in his life that led to important changes for him and his surroundings. Having lived again in Cyprus since 1986, Mr. Cemal has witnessed the potential of more sustainable local/community activities, as well as the disadvantages of the mass tourism that has been fed by the casino industry. Eco-tourists, unlike mass tourism customers, are more responsible and are shown to revisit many times.

"The eco-concept has kept us very active and occupied. We do not yet have the full product, and there still is a lot of potential. I believe we raised the awareness not only for the village but on the island. Eco-tourism has to be a priority form of tourism: a sustainable tourism for the future really, since there are so many examples of the failure of mass tourism. The negative aspects of mass tourism projects that people started long ago we are now trying to clean up. I think this should be an example for Cyprus, taking a step towards ecotourism, because of the small size, because of being an island with limited environment and because of the need for sustainability. Almost everything about ecotourism is positive".

We believe that the activities initiated by Mr. Cemal will create a powerful sense of community and contribute to the creation of social

and political justice on the island. We will be happy if the life story of Mr. Cemal, which we obtained and shared in this article, is placed in the collective social memory of the Cypriot community. We also urge policymakers to realize the value of life stories as a tool of communication in making the more sensitive decisions regarding the environment and the community in order to obtain sustainable development.

Notes

1. In Mr. Cemal's village, the first language spoken was Greek.
2. The company that Mr. Cemal mentioned in his narratives was KEO. KEO is still active. It was formed in 1927 with its shares quoted and trading on the Cyprus Stock Exchange. It produces and exports wine, beer, and a wide variety of alcoholic and non-alcoholic products.
3. There were 346 mixed villages in Cyprus in 1891. This number had dropped to 252 in 1931. There is only one mixed village today, where Turkish and Greek Cypriots live together, Pyla (5). At the time of Cyprus' independence, there were 114 mixed villages left (6). The number of mixed villages dropped to 48 in 1964 (7). The demographic structure is as follows: 77% Greek Cypriots, 18.4% Turkish Cypriots, 0.5% Maronites, and 0.6% Armenians (6). Cyprus became an independent country pursuant to the London-Zurich Agreement and the guarantorship of Greece, Turkey and Britain (6). "Greek Cypriots were not allowed into the enclaves; and Turkish Cypriots were not allowed out" (7). (Calotychos 1998).
4. The Mesaoria plain is enclosed between the Trodos mountain range and the northern Kyrenia. Mesaoria (also called Mesarya) is the plain on the Island of Cyprus. The meaning of the name is "between the mountains". Mesaoria is the part of the island between the Trodos and Kyrenia (Beşparmak/Pentadaktylos) Mountains. It consists of two parts. The larger part is situated in an east-

west direction from the Bay of Famagusta to the Trodos Mountains. The smaller part is around Güzelyurt (Morphou). Its total area is around 1000 sq km. There are many villages on the plain. The altitude is from sea level to 300 meters. The summer is hot and dry, and most of the rivers lose their water. The Güzelyurt part has more rainfall and is a citrus production region. The larger part comprises the main arable land of Cyprus. The main products are barley, wheat, and animal feed. Cyprus is famous for its production of potatoes. If the land is irrigated, they can be harvested twice a year. The traditional products are tobacco, almonds, carobs, olives, figs, grapes and grape products, including raisins (for further information, please see: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mesaoria>; <http://www.fergusmurraysculpture.com/cyprus/interiors-5-pages/ii-the-mesaoria/>).

5. Caher and Aleko are two literary figures who spoke the Karpazian dialect of Turkish. Bayrak Radio aired this program until 1972, when it was prohibited. The program gave moral support to Turkish Cypriots. Recently, a sculpture of Caher and Aleko was erected in Büyükkonuk.

6. Norman Wisdom (1915-2010) was an English actor, comedian and singer-songwriter known as the character Norman Pitkin.

7. According to a census during the Ottoman time period in 1831, out of 90 in the male population, there were 26 Muslims and 46 Christians. In 1891, during the British time period, the population was 740, out of which 231 were Muslims and 509 were Christians. In 1960, there were 289 Turkish Cypriots and 654 Greek Cypriots in the village. As of 2010, the village's population is 950. With the surrounding villages, including Tuzluca, Yedikonuk, Sazlıköy, Zeybökköy, Kilitkaya, Mersinlik and Kaplıca (see Bağışkan), the population can reach up to 2900.

8. "Görücülük" is acting as a go-between, which is provided by several women of the family of a young man who wants to get married. The group pays a special visit to the home of the girl and reveals their intentions.

9. The ethnic tension and conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island made a pick in the 1950s during the British colonial authority and continued until the partition of the island in 1974. After the coup in Cyprus initiated by Greek junta, Turkish troops landed the north and took 37 percent of the island under its control. Throughout this time, the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have been left unrecognized by the international community, however, the Republic of Cyprus kept its existence. In 1975, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and, in 1983 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established. The peace negotiations between the leaders of two communities on the island have been continuing on and off the aftermath of 1974 war. Since 1974, these two communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were largely isolated from each other until the partial border opening on 23rd April 2003. During this time there were many reconciliation activities and bi-communal workshops held by local and international initiatives. The referenda, which were held on 24 April 2004, was prepared and submitted by UN titled as 'The Annan Plan'. The referenda were voted for the 'united Cyprus' and 'accession of Cyprus to the EU' as a united country. Turkish Cypriots said 'yes' with the percentage of 65 and Greek Cypriots said 'no' with the percentage of 76 for this plan. Consequently, the Republic of Cyprus as a representative of the whole Island entered to the EU.

10. Other members included: Kemal Yılmaz (Yedikonuk), Orçun Kara (Kaplıca), Yılmaz Erginel (Balalan), Ali Çelebi (Mehmetçik), İbrahim Hakkı Genç (Kaplıca), Ahmet Tumbo (Kilitkaya), Orhan Çiftlikdüzü (Tatlısu), Hasan (Balalan), Lois Cemal (Karpaz Dostları Derneđi) and Raif Mındık'ın (Ekoturizm Derneđi).

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Biographical Sketch

Hanife Aliefendioglu studied sociology and social anthropology in Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey. She has been teaching sociology of communication, media anthropology, cultural studies, and gender and media in Faculty of Communication and Media Studies in Eastern Mediterranean University in North Cyprus. She was awarded as a study fellow by the International Gender Studies at Oxford University in 1997 by Five College Women’s Studies Consortium at Mount Holyoke College in MA, USA in 2007. She is the co-editor of international women’s studies journal, *Kadın/Woman2000*. Béla Vizvári has MS (1973) and PhD (1979) degrees in mathematics (operations research) from Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest (ELTE). He received of the degree dr.sc.nat. from TH Merseburg (Germany) in 1987 and CSc (1988) from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He got the degree of dr.habil. (2003) from ELTE. He held a research position in operations research at the Computer and Automation Institute in Hungary from 1973 to 1989. In 1989, he joined to the Department of Industrial Engineering, Bilkent University. He was with ELTE from 1993 to 2007. He served as director of the Institute of Mathematics 1 in 2004 and 2005. Since 2007, he

has been a member of the Department of Industrial Engineering, Eastern Mediterranean University. He has interest in history since his early years. As the managing editor of Letters of Applied Mathematics, he helps to publish papers on the history of science.

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Otobiyografik Öz

Hanife Aliefendiođlu Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü'nden mezun oldu ve aynı üniversitede Antropoloji Bölümü'nden 2001 yılında yüksek lisans ve doktora derecesi aldı. Dođu Akdeniz Üniversitesi, İletişim Fakültesi'nde 2001 yılından bu yana iletişim sosyolojisi, medya antropolojisi, kültürel çalışmalar, toplumsal cinsiyet derslerini veriyor. 1997 yılında Oxford Üniversitesi'nde uluslararası toplumsal cinsiyet çalışmaları Merkezi'nden ve 2007 yılında ise ABD'de Five College Women's Studies Consortium at Mount Holyoke College'dan araştırma bursu aldı. Barış İçin İletişim ve Araştırma Merkezi'nin yönetim kurulu üyesi olarak görev yaptı. Derslerinin yanı sıra halen Kadın/Woman2000 adlı uluslararası derginin eş editörlüğünü yürütüyor.

Béla Vizvári, Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest (ELTE)'den matematik alanında 1973 yılında MS, 1979 yılında ise doktora derecesi aldı. 1988 yılında Almanya'da TH Merseburg'dan doktora derecesi, 1988 yılında ise Hungarian Academy of Sciences'tan CSC derecesi aldı. ELTE'den 2003 yılında Dr. Habil Derecesi aldı.1973-1989 yılları arasında Macaristan Bilgisayar ve Otomasyon Enstitüsü'nde operasyon araştırmacısı olarak çalıştı. 1989, Bilkent Üniversitesi Endüstri Mühendisliği Bölümü'ne katıldı. 1993-2007 yılları arasında yine ELTE'de görev yaptı. 2004-2005 1. Matematik Enstitüsü'nün direktörlüğünü yürüttü. 2007 yılından bu yana, DAÜ Endüstri Mühendisliği Bölümü'nde öğretim görevlisi olarak görev yapmaktadır. Uzun yıllardır tarih araştırmalarına ilgi duyuyor. Letters of Applied Mathematics Dergisi'nin editörü olarak bilim tarihi alanındaki çalışmaların basılmasını sağlıyor.

An Overview of Existing Monuments in Nicosia, North Cyprus

Kuzey Kıbrıs'ın Başkenti Lefkoşa'daki Anıtlara Genel Bir Bakış

Devrim Yücel Besim, Ayer Kaşif

Abstract

Monuments as the landmarks of cities are important tangible elements which build the relationships between environment, architecture and human beings. This particular study focuses on examples in the capital city of Nicosia, North Cyprus which were constructed between 1963 and 2012. They predominantly depict and convey messages about the national struggle between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots during the period of tension in the years 1963-1974. Within this scope, the present paper invents and describes monuments in North Nicosia by chronicling their designers/builders, construction dates, locations, materials and purposes. It records the formal characteristics and structural properties of each and examines them aesthetically through observations and semi-structured interviews with their designers. Each monument's relationship and contribution to the environment and the city is critically reviewed based on the collected data. It aims to identify correlations between the political, cultural and social contexts in North Cyprus and the conceptual expression of the monuments.

Keywords: Monument, memorial, landmark, urban space, Nicosia, North Cyprus.

Özet

Kentlerin önemli noktalarına vurgu yapan anıtlar, çevre, mimari ve insan ilişkilerini kuran önemli yapısal elemanlardır. Bu çalışmada, Kuzey Kıbrıs'ın başkenti Lefkoşa'da bulunan ve 1963-2012 yılları arasında yapılmış olan anıtlar ele alınmaktadır. Ayrıca, kentte bulunan büst ve çember düzenlemelerindeki diğer peyzaj elemanlarına da değinilmektedir. Anıtların tasarımcıları, yapımından sorumlular, yapım yılları, kent içindeki konumları ve yapılış amaçları ile ilgili künye bilgileri verilir; malzeme, form ve yapısal özellikleriyle tanımları yapılmaktadır. Çalışmayı gerçekleştiren araştırmacılar tarafından yapılan mimari gözlemler ve sözel görüşmelerle elde edilen bilgiler ışığında irdelenen anıtlar, buldukları yakın çevreye ve kente katkıları açısından değerlendirilmektedirler. Çalışmanın sonunda, anıtların ifade ediliş biçimleri ile Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta yaşanan politik, kültürel ve sosyal değişimler arasında ilişki kurulması hedeflenmektedir.

Anabtar Kelimeler: Anıt, abide, kent simgesi, kentsel mekan, Lefkoşa, Kuzey Kıbrıs.

Introduction

Meaning and Function of Monuments

A quality living environment is a common wish of many people today. While people do spend a lot of time in their private spaces, the need for satisfying public spaces in cities is consistently rising. Designers are sensitive to enriching the quality of life in public spaces and they consider the need to redefine public spaces as dynamic, inhabitable and sustainable spaces (Dixon, 2004).

This condition similarly applies to the island of Cyprus where the Mediterranean climate and living traditions are enjoyed. Unfortunately, especially in Northern Cyprus, consideration of the quality of urban design is not as high as it should be. People living in North Cyprus do not have much choice in where they can enjoy gathering and spending time, such as in public outdoor spaces, due to lack of urban infrastructure.

In some public outdoor spaces, monuments are one of the main elements, which one can create an urban space around and/or a focal point for urban spaces. A monument is generally characterized as “a huge sculpture or a combination of sculptures” which is set up to memorialize an important person or a group of people, or a rare event. As sculptures, monuments are basically three dimensional structures made from stone, wood, metal or plastic (Hasol, 1995). Sculptures and monuments are an art form of volume or mass which relate the ideas of the artist and can affect people by increasing or decreasing stress (Erzen, 1996). Sculptures and especially monuments have always had a very strong relationship with architecture in comparison to the other fields of visual arts.¹ Sculpture is commonly conceived of as a value-added artistic feature envisioned to complete and communicate the meaning of a building.² Whereas, the standing of a monument as sculpture or as architecture depends on its position. In association with a building, monuments more closely relate to the field of sculpture but as a focal element in cities they relate more closely to the field of architecture (Hubbard, 1987; Sözeri, 2008).

Typically existing beyond the limits of sculpture

in meaning and role, sculpture as monument turns into an object of admiration when placed in the public outdoor space. It is considered inseparable from landscape and accepted as part of streetscape due to its complicity with urban design. Furthermore, it complements urban design with the thoughts of other fields of art.

A monument holds the memory of the city and assists with its sustainability. While sculpture symbolizes a subject, a monument carries symbolic meanings belonging to its place. It gives powerful messages to the city through its form and transfers them to successive generations. This is the reason that the construction of a monument must be lasting to maintain its meaning. It becomes a social attraction and can hold a permanent central place in a changing cityscape (Rossi, 2006).

In a square, which is the most emblematic urban space for the commemoration of history or government of a certain place (Broto, 2006), a monument is especially enriching of the quality of urban life by providing various public facilities, constituting visual richness, as well as bringing people together (Öztürk Kurtaslan, 2005). It adds value to the city with its existence as an edifice of art. However, it is not a decorative object. It is one of the prime components forming the character of the city. Various examples all around the world have become symbols of their respective cities, such as Statue of Liberty in New York, Eiffel Tower in Paris, and Statue of Cristo Redentor in Rio de Janeiro (Irving, 2007).

The scale of a monument can vary from the small object to architectural in size (Senyapılı, 2003). Its scale is very often relative to its location. For example, New England Holocaust Memorial is in a park and consists of six glass towers under which a citizen may walk (Landecker, 1997). It should be erected onto a proper site and be reached easily by the public. On the other hand, being monumental with a well-proportioned scale in a particular location might not be enough. It also needs to accentuate power with its clean structure, clear expression, and an original identity. Then it becomes attractive enough with its appearance and can be perceived distinctly.

Monuments have diverse functions. They can serve to commemorate a person or an important event. The 9/11 Memorial in New York City, for the victims of the World Trade Centre attack, is a contemporary example of a commemorative monument (Wolfe, 2005). A monument can serve educational purposes. It can inform through its expression and increase awareness of its special subject. Because of its symbolic meaning and by its placement, a monument can interrelate with educational infrastructure such as exhibition grounds, museums, and libraries. For example, the Dr. Martin Luther King National Memorial in Washington, D.C. aims to share the message regarding human rights (Dixon, 2004). A monument also can convey common ideals and sometimes sends socio-political messages. These ideals can be understood easily and respected by people supporting the monument's installation but misunderstood and disrespected by others. Because of this function and its nature, monuments remain a main topic of debate within changing political circumstances. Sometimes even, monuments may be demolished by force³ since they remind the people of undesirable conditions or circumstances. Moreover any monument, with its function, can prompt ceremonies and celebrations. Activities occurring in conjunction with a monument have a built-in venue which creates a distinctive atmosphere.

There are various types of monuments according to their form. Tombs and mausoleums⁴ are structures hosting graves and built to memorialize important people. An obelisk⁵ is a monolithic stone column. Triumphal arches or gates⁶ are a kind of memorial representing victory or success of members of the military. Natural monuments, such as old trees or unique geologic formations⁷, can be designated in parks and gardens. Some special bridges⁸ and towers⁹ can also represent as monuments when they serve in some way beyond their practical functions. In addition, coeval monuments exist which are created using formations of water¹⁰ or light¹¹. Conversely, newly constructed buildings with extraordinary structural systems or some with unique forms are interpreted as monuments in

cities as they are symbols of the present day world. In this respect, such contemporary buildings designed by Zaha Hadid, Frank Gehry, Santiago Calatrava and other leading architects are considered and treated as iconic monuments.

One of the aims of having such a variety of civic monuments created by famous designers is an effort to gain the attention of and attract more people for increasing the economic benefit of tourism (Sözeri, 2008). In this way, the island of Cyprus has tried to attract tourism income by having many monuments and monumental buildings symbolizing numerous notable periods, actors, and events in the long history of the island. The monuments represent those things and activities which left lasting imprints on the island's society and culture. However, in recent times, the monuments are not gathering sufficient attention from either locals or the tourists who visit the island. Even more, their meanings and significance are being disregarded and lost as time passes. With this understanding, the present study aims to record the characteristics of monuments located in the north part of the Nicosia City and shed light on the tangible and intangible significance of each in relation to community memory and the country's economy.

Method of the Study

This particular study focuses on fourteen monuments in and around the north part of Nicosia, Cyprus. This part of Nicosia was selected as the research area for four primary reasons. It serves as the capital city of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is the northern section of the island divided by a United Nations buffer zone. The north part of the similarly-divided city of Nicosia constitutes the largest city in the Republic. It also has the most extensive built environment, including many monuments. Finally, it is a place where one can observe much of the history of the island since it was a scene of conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in the years 1955 to 1974 (Altan, 2006).

The fourteen selected monuments were all constructed between 1963 and 2012 and the following paragraphs describe them in chronological order according to their year of construction. The paragraphs also document each monument's type, location, designer(s), constructor(s), material(s), and function(s) or symbolic meaning(s). Interviews with the designer(s) and/or the ones who were responsible for each monument's construction provided the main data for this study. Review and interpretation of original sketches, application drawings, and early photographs from private archives provided further detail about each monument. Their locations and formal characteristics allow for critical analysis.

The primary aim of the analysis is to identify relationships between the city and the citizens within the changing political and social circumstances on the island since the 1960s. Simultaneously, this study is documentary in nature, recording information about the development of public art in Cyprus.

Documentation of Existing Monuments in Nicosia and its Environment

The first instance in the historical records about Cyprus' monuments refers to colossal male and female statues from antique times. These were found east of Kokkina (Erenköy) in temples dating from the Archaic period (BC 600-475) to the Roman period (BC 30-AC 330) (Altan, 2006).

A later example of monument is an obelisk called the Venetian Column. The Venetians brought this six-meter high granite obelisk to Nicosia and the court of Sarayönü Mosque from the ancient city of Salamis in the 15th century. It served as the symbol of Venetian sovereignty. During the Ottoman period, it was taken back to its original place in Salamis. The British brought it back to Nicosia in 1917 and placed it where it rests today in Atatürk Square (Altan, 2006).

Reference books list the Kyrenia Gate of Nicosia as another monument from the city's early history. In order to provide motorcar access to the old town, the city walls were razed during the British Period and

the Kyrenia Gate was preserved between the two road accesses. Though, once a well-integrated component of the Venetian Walls surrounding the city, the Kyrenia Gate is now a detached historical structure. (Altan, 2006).

This brief historical survey traces some of the cultural transitions on the island; however, the monuments established after 1960 are different than these early ones. Several post-1960 monuments were erected by Turkish Cypriots to symbolize the national struggle following the problems and clashes between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the 1950s. Many remind Turkish Cypriots to observe certain events whether they occurred officially, socially, or individually (Adil, 2009). For example, numerous cemeteries (41 in the north) host monuments for martyrs and fallen soldiers (Anonym, 1990; Sadrazam, 1996; Anonym, 2007). On a smaller scale, Hakkı Atun, a Turkish Cypriot architect, created a monument for military ceremonies which is still housed in the back of Selimiye Mosque in Nicosia (Atun, 2011).

Additionally, after 1960 several town centers and some governmental buildings installed statues of countless sizes. As such, the one of Atatürk¹² in front of the Civil Defense Building in Nicosia is a huge and spectacular figure compared to other smaller ones and small busts of him throughout the city. Also, small busts of important Turkish Cypriot leaders and small sculptures exist at the entrances of important public buildings. One remarkable example of statue from this era stands in front of the Parliament Building.

Monument of Martyrs: 28 January 1963

The Monument of Martyrs, in front of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Legislative Assembly, stands in the intersection of four main roads. Its Turkish Cypriot designers, Arif Feridun and Solmaz Feridun, both architects, won an architectural competition for it. They defined the monument as a Turkish Cypriot ideal : the tombstone of all the fallen martyrs since 1571, the date Ottomans captured the Island of Cyprus (Anonym, 1990). It rests on a platform

partly surrounded on the north by a low wall, which resembles the bastions of a fort (Fig. 1). Within, a central block narrows toward the top and is otherwise a plain column with only a crescent and a star adorning it. Because of its installation during the difficult conditions of conflict, its construction was very rushed and design alterations occurred in situ. Unfortunately, repairs made in the subsequent years were executed without consulting the original designers (Feridun, 2011).



Figure 1. Monument of Martyrs in Nicosia (Yücel Besim, 2010)

Atatürk Statue: 29 October 1963

A statue of Atatürk in front of Kyrenia Gate is in between a congested traffic on two sides. It is made of bronze on a base covered with black marble (Fig. 2). The sculpture is made by Hüseyin Gezer who is a very well known Turkish sculptor. The base and the site were designed later by Ayer Kaşif, a Turkish Cypriot architect. Kaşif (2011) mentioned that the sculptor of the monument did not find the base suitable for the statue.



Figure 2. Atatürk Statue in Nicosia (Yücel Besim, 2010)

Martyrs' Monument of Taşkent (Sihari): 14 August 1978

The location of Martyrs' Monument of Taşkent differs from those in the city center. Designed by Burhan Atun, a Turkish Cypriot architect, it was placed on a special rural site near Taşkent village on the road between Nicosia and Buffavento Castle. The natural landscape elements influenced its design and Atun constructed it using natural materials from the region (Fig. 3). The designer formed a hill into a monument by inserting a marble mass between two stone masses. Atun erected it in memory of martyrs from Dohni, a village in south part of the island (Atun, 2010).



Figure 3. Martyrs' Monument of Taşkent (Sihari) (Yücel Besim, 2010)

Martyrs' Monument of Küçük Kaymaklı (Omorphita): 25 December 1978

The Martyrs' Monument of Küçük Kaymaklı sets in the center of a roundabout at the crossroads of Küçük Kaymaklı and Yenişehir. Kutsal Çizgen, a Turkish Cypriot architect, designed it in the memory of the martyrs of Küçük Kaymaklı, who fell fighting in the national struggle. The design includes three vertical elements made of exposed concrete. The vertical elements vary in height but are connected to each other by arches. In the middle of these elements, a small pool is set aside for torches though they are not utilized (Fig. 4). Burhan Atun constructed it (Atun, 2010).

Martyrs' Monument of Gönyeli (Güenyeli): 1979

The Martyrs' Monument of Gönyeli sets along the main road in front of Gönyeli Mosque. It consists of a triangular platform with three vertical columns connected at their tops by three horizontal elements. Exposed concrete painted in gray is its key material. The columns each symbolize a significant year in the struggle of Turkish Cypriots: 1958, 1963 and 1974. The peace efforts of the Turkish army are symbolized by copper reliefs on each column (Fig. 5). While Burhan Atun is this monument's designer, Ahmet Şevket Uzunahmet, a Turkish Cypriot artist, sculpted the reliefs (Atun, 2010).



Figure 5. Martyrs' Monument of Gönyeli (Güenyeli) (Yücel Besim, 2010)

Monument of 'Peace at Home Peace in the World': 1981

The monument titled Peace at Home Peace in the World is centrally located in a congested roundabout near the Central Bank. Trade unions hold strikes and non-governmental organizations coordinate demonstrations in the vicinity of this monument because of its central location. The monument is made of exposed concrete but painted white (Fig. 6). It was erected for the 100th anniversary of Atatürk and reflects his principle of "peace at home, peace in the world." It sits upon a pedestal representing five out of the eleven bastions of Nicosia. The configuration

of the monument is like a hand open from the palm toward the sky. It once included a round pool with jetting water to symbolize innocence and purity. Hasan Emirali and Ekrem Bodamyalızade, Turkish Cypriot architects, and Soyer Yıkan, a Turkish Cypriot civil engineer, designed this monument and won an architectural competition for the design (Akıncı, 2010).

TRNC Flag: 1974 and 1984

The pattern of a colossal flag of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus rests on the southern slope of the Kyrenia Mountains near Taşkent (Sihari) village. The Turkish army first arranged it using



Figure 4. Martyrs' Monument of Küçük Kaymaklı (Omorphita) (Yücel Besim, 2010)



Figure 6. Monument of 'Peace at Home Peace in the World' (Yücel Besim, 2010)



Figure 7. TRNC Flag (Yücel Besim, 2010)

natural stones painted red and white in 1974. It was renewed and altered to its current form and sized to 450 meters by 275 meters in 1984. Even though it appears two dimensional, it is an important monument which can be seen conspicuously from a long distance throughout the day and night because it is illuminated (Kaşif, 2011). It is a demonstrative monument illustrating the existence of Turkish Cypriots on the island (Fig. 7).

National Struggle and Liberation Monument: 20 July 1988

The National Struggle and Liberation Monument is in the roundabout for the main motorways leading to Nicosia, Kyrenia, Famagusta, and Morphou. It symbolizes liberation and gives the message of the difficulties of the national struggle to the future generations. Cyprus Credit Bank financially supported the construction of its four magnificent columns covered with travertine. Together they form an inner space at ground level while the columns thrust up toward the sky. On four sides of the monument sculptures and depictions surround the base. Two sculptures designed by Prof. Dr. Ferit Özsen, a famous Turkish sculptor, are of Turkish Cypriot leaders: Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Raif Denktaş are (Berk, 1973; Gezer, 1984). Hasan Emirali, a Turkish Cypriot architect, designed the site and landscape for this monument (Atakan, 2010). Since it is used for official celebrations, the government keeps it well-maintained (Fig. 8), decorated specially for ceremonies, and illuminated at nights. Gönyeli



Figure 8. National Struggle and Liberation Monument (Yücel Besim, 2010)

municipality added pools after its initial installation. Unfortunately, the surrounding area is maintained with artificial landscaping (Yücel Besim, 2012).

Statue of Dr. Fazıl Küçük: 27 January 1989

The Statue of Dr. Fazıl Küçük, political leader of Turkish Cypriots, is in the urban space, İnönü Square, which is next to Kyrenia Gate in Surlarıçi. The site is close to Dr. Fazıl Küçük's residence and printing office and a place where many events occurred in 1958. The sculpture, composed of bronze and sitting on a stone platform (Fig. 9), contains statues of Dr. Fazıl Küçük and a small girl holding flowers. The girl represents the people of North Cyprus and the monument represents confidence. The monument was designed by Prof. Dr. Tankut Öktem who is a well-known sculptor from Turkey (Gezer, 1984). Turkish Cypriot architect, Ali Semi, executed this project, considered the first public open space arrangement in the north part of Nicosia (Atakan, 2010)

Mausoleum of Dr. Fazıl Küçük: 8 December 1989

The Mausoleum of Dr. Fazıl Küçük is arranged as a whole project for a special site allocated to its purpose: Mumcu Hill, also called Anıttepe. The colossal TRNC flag on the mountainside and the city both can be clearly viewed from the site of this monument. It was designed for the leader of Turkish Cypriots who died in 1984, but it and its landscape design were



Figure 9. Statue of Dr. Fazıl Küçük (Yücel Besim, 2010)



Figure 10. Mausoleum of Dr. Fazıl Küçük (Yücel Besim, 2010)

not completed until 1990 (Fig. 10). Fazıl Öztürk's winning design from an architectural competition was not implemented, but public servant and Turkish Cypriot architect, Kutsal Çizgen's design was realized (Atakan, 2010). The monument is defined by a rectangular space with a high ceiling and a tomb in the middle. Reliefs by Tahsin Akbulut, a Turkish Cypriot sculptor, are visible on approach to the tomb. (Ertan, 2010).

Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) Monument: October 2007

The Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT) erected the Turkish Resistance Organization Monument in Cumhuriyet Parkı, which means the Park of the Republic (Fig. 11). The monument's circular platform includes symbolic representations of the bastions of old Nicosia and the image from TMT's flags. The monument is similar to an obelisk in shape because it thins towards its top. Selami Sözen, a Turkish landscape architect who also designed the park, directed the monument be made of exposed concrete (Türkmen, 2010). The monument gained importance because Rauf Raif Denktaş, the founder of TRNC, was resting in the park when he died in 2012. Later, an international architectural competition was organized for designing Denktaş' mausoleum and a museum to be built in this park (Yılmaz, 2012).

National Sovereignty Monument: 21 July 2009

The National Sovereignty Monument is in a roundabout in front of the Civil Defense Organization in Nicosia and at the opposite end of an axis to Metehan Gate at the Kermia border. Greek sculptor, Polyxene Kasta, designed this monument to replace a smaller one that was in the shape of a burning torch (Kaşif, 2011). The latter was relocated to the next roundabout and the Turkish Municipality of Nicosia and the Civil Defense Organization erected the new one. Prof. Dr. Tankut Öktem designed this seven-meter tall sculpture of Ataturk riding a horse (Fig. 12). Öktem's daughter, Pınar Öktem Doğan, finished the project with a landscape design. The monument's base is circular and represents the island of Cyprus. Its vertical expression is a rounded wall covered by beige marble on the west side and a circular platform in the middle. In plan, these shapes form of a crescent and a star. One TRNC and 16 Turkish flags adjoin the statue to represent the sixteen Turkish states established in history. The red flowers planted on the front of the platform also correspond to the flags.

Statue of Bülent Ecevit: 26 August 2010

The Statue of Bülent Ecevit, who was a poet and writer but also the Prime Minister of Turkey in 1974, celebrates the man responsible for making the decision for the Peace Operation in Cyprus. His statue stands on a platform in front of the Lycee that



Figure 11. Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) Monument (Yücel Besim, 2010)



Figure 12. National Sovereignty Monument (Yücel Besim, 2010)

also carries his name at the intersection of two main roads in Göçmenköy (Fig. 13). The sculptor from Turkey, Eray Okkan, made the statue of fiberglass to look like bronze. Some of Ecevit's poems are carved on the base of the statue. It was erected with support from the Turkish Municipality of Nicosia and Sönmezlıler Ocađı, a nationalist society. It should be noted that Ecevit was commemorated with this statue thirty-six years after his time of service to the Turkish Cypriots (Bilge, 2010).

Monument of the First Step: 27 January 2011

The Monument of the First Step is in a small round-shaped public plaza in Kızılbaş (Neapolis). It is erected to the memory of four young Turkish Cypriots killed in 1957, the first martyrs of the national struggle (Esensey, 2012). The Turkish Municipality of Nicosia and the society of Sönmezler Ocađı joined forces to build this monument (Fig. 14). The monument, designed by Turkish Cypriot architect, Ahmet Ünsal, involves a trapezoid-shaped, two-meter high column of concrete covered with light-colored marble. Turkish Cypriot sculptor, Celal Deniz's bronze masks of the martyrs are placed at the top on each of the column. Ünsal is also attributed with the landscape design (Ertan, 2010).

Conclusion

Analysis of Examined Monuments

These fourteen monuments – selected from in and around Nicosia and described in chronological order and documented in this study with their individual locations, construction dates, designers and formal characteristics – have several overarching similarities. They are mostly military monuments based on their function of reminding people of some details of the national struggle of Turkish Cypriots. They generally symbolize incidents which occurred between the years 1963 and 1974. They all memorialize fallen soldiers, killed civilians, or important leaders that took part in the struggle. The content of the complementary reliefs and inscriptions of each monuments parallel national sentiments and



Figure 13. Statue of Bülent Ecevit (Yücel Besim, 2010)



Figure 14. Monument of the First Step (Yücel Besim, 2010)

their arrangements and forms strongly emphasize military symbols. Furthermore, flags of the Turkish Republic and the TRNC prominently exaggerate the monument.

Contrarily, the placement of the monuments diminishes their prominence and this is the first critical issue to face with. As such, the monuments overwhelmingly fail to relate to nearby environs or engage citizens. Compared to those monuments in the city, relatively few citizens can access the two placed in rural areas (Fig. 3 & 7). Of those monuments in the urban setting, people have difficult access to them because of automobile traffic. Citizens strain to access five of the urban examples (Fig. 1, 4, 6, 8 & 12) because they are in the roundabouts. Likewise, people are challenged to access three others because they are on the street or positioned between main roads (Fig. 2, 5 & 13). Only one monument (11) is in a park and two (Fig. 9 & 14) are in squares.

Pedestrians are unable to approach most monuments. The monuments located in or near roads cannot be experienced properly by the average pedestrian. Their poor positioning and size may even cause problems with view corridors for automobile drivers. Even though three examples such as figures 9, 10 and 11 are arranged with landscaping specially allocated to the monument, pedestrians have difficulty experiencing either the monument or the landscaped areas. For example, though one monument (Fig. 14) was placed in a square it still has accessibility problems; surrounded by old eucalyptus trees, it is difficult to see the access because a major road surrounds the square. The only monument

which benefits from a pedestrian-accessible site is that of the Statue of Dr. Fazıl Küçük (Fig. 9). Its placement in İnönü Square means that the site already had pedestrian activity when the statue was installed.

Simultaneously, the second critical issue is that most of the monuments suffer from lack of contextual design. Their natural and constructed landscape elements do not adequately combine to constitute a whole. For example, the water element which is designed as a complementary component in the monument of Peace at Home Peace in the World is not used. Some monuments are lit up at night but mostly to achieve a decorative effect rather than to illuminate the monument's features. The city employs the monuments as if they are no more than accessories, often decorating them in a two-dimensional mode, especially for New Year celebrations. In addition, they are commonly used as an advertising media.

The design of the monuments is a third critical subject, especially in relationship to their originality. While local designers (architects and sculptors) created seven monuments (Fig. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 & 14) and sculptors from Turkey designed six of them (Fig. 2, 8, 9, 10, 12 & 13), some with cooperation from locals, the mixed designs faced difficulties and problems early in their installation processes. Critics have concerns about the originality of three examples.

One, the Statue of Bülent Ecevit, was criticized in many local newspaper articles because it did not look realistic and because it so closely resembled examples from other places (Cemal, 2010; Tolgay, 2010). Another one, the National Sovereignty Monument is very similar to a statue in Bodrum, Turkey (Fig. 15). The same sculptor designed both with only slight variation. In addition, similar statues also exist in Dipkarpaz (Rizokarpaso) and Yeşilköy (Ayios Andronicos) in North Cyprus. This monument also was cited extensively for its inharmonious relationship to human scale on its site, its danger to vehicular traffic, its cost, and its



Figure 15. Atatürk Statue in Bodrum, Turkey (Yücel Besim, 2012)

challenges with maintenance and lighting. Moreover, it was criticized because the sword in Atatürk's hand represents extreme nationalism. The third, the National Struggle and Liberation Monument displays similarly to the Republic Monument in Taksim Square in Istanbul, Turkey. Despite the fact that these three monument designs were chosen via architectural competitions, their similarities to other monuments demonstrate that the competition organizers should establish stronger criteria and more objective assessments. At the same time, it should be noted that many of the monument selections were performed during the very difficult living conditions in the years between 1963 and 1974.

A fourth critique regards construction techniques and materials choice, both of which have direct impact on the monuments' durability and maintenance. In particular, those monuments commissioned and designed by sculptors from Turkey, such as the Atatürk Statue at Kyrenia Gate, tend to not have harmonious relationships with their adjacent components. Some of this problem results from the designers of the various components (structures, bases, landscapes, sculptures) not having the option to work in coordination. For example, a Turk designed the Atatürk Statue and a Turkish Cypriot designed the base. Other problems resulted from the unavailability of certain materials.

The materials used in some of the monuments such as figures 4 and 6 have been altered over time, with changes and repairs applied in a different manner

than the original design and without permission of the designers. To exemplify the alterations, monuments with exposed concrete (Fig. 4, 5, 6 & 11) were painted with color and fiberglass was used (Fig. 13 & 14) for both statues and reliefs instead of real bronze. The desired powerful image and durability of the monuments, which would be supported by using originally prescribed and lasting materials, is diminished by these changes. In some cases, the municipalities or authorities responsible for maintaining the monuments have taken it upon themselves to modify the landscape around the monuments. These modifications have the effect of shifting the perception of some monuments and particularly did so to the National Struggle and Liberation Monument.

Besides the fourteen monuments described above, the municipality arranged for and the private sector supported the installation of other less conspicuous examples throughout the city of Nicosia. A woman's figure at the entrance to the industrial area and in front of Büyükhan, and the metal rod sculptures near Kyrenia Gate are installations that create a kind of nudes in the city. While some motivate installations as examples of traditional handicraft, the resulting monuments are not attractive enough, nor sized and located sufficiently to be meaningful. Furthermore, some criticize lesser monuments because they are two dimensional and have only a descriptive and figurative understanding (Şonya, 2004).

Busts also fall into this grouping. One bust is of Atatürk's mother, Zübeyde Hanım. It is in the front garden of 20 Temmuz Lycess and faces the main road. Another bust of Haşmet Muzaffer Gürkan, who was a dentist by trade but showed his love of Nicosia through his writing and research, sits on a piece of column made by Gallery Culture Bookshop. The column and bust is situated at a crossroad with his name but still cannot gather much attention. Both examples are poorly placed in their landscapes and thereby inadequately accessible by the public.

Further examples of less prominent monuments have emerged in North Cyprus as private universities have been established and their campuses built out. Many sculptures or monumental elements have been placed in and around the buildings, such as the new obelisks on the campus of Near East University in Nicosia. The campus does not have a contextual relationship with the city, therefore its monuments are only experienced by the campus population.

Comments on Existing Monuments in Nicosia

The monuments in the north part of Nicosia, having been analyzed with a discerning eye, do not reflect the era of their symbolic meaning because of their design, current locations, materials, and construction. Their status is an indication of poorly-managed urban spaces in North Cyprus. Thus young designers should focus on two questions: how the existing monuments will be sustained and how new monuments of North Cyprus, symbolic of new generations, should be designed. The documentary nature of this article makes data available for future studies on the city's public spaces, artistic expressions, and cultural identity. Additional research will permit comparison of these monuments with those across the United Nations buffer zone, in the south part of Nicosia.

Nowadays being "safe, clean, comfortable, convenient, easy to understand, and aesthetic" or having a "functional environment" are standard quality of life expectations and can be used to evaluating urban amenities, such as monuments. Finding various ways to create a unique atmosphere and accurately express the characteristics of a community within its built environment is getting more important. Monuments are complementary to such environments and serve as important elements of urban spaces. They help to birth and rebirth narratives while providing a place where many disparate people can gather. They are not independent elements, but have physical and psychological relationships with the environment and the people. Their supplementary elements – reliefs,

verses, lights, sounds, and et cetera – are applied relatively and carry aesthetic value. Together they are contributions to the fields of landscape, furniture, graphic design, and fine arts. Like architecture, monuments are products of interdisciplinary efforts and inherently inhabit the space around them.

Besides research, additional urban spaces and improvements to current urban spaces should be undertaken in the cities of North Cyprus. These urban spaces should be created for spiritual freedom, for broad public use, and in association with environmental functions. New monuments must be prepared by local artists in order to have designs which accurately represent the originality of Cypriots. When chosen via competitions, the newest generation of designers are encouraged to participate. There is substantial history of this working out for the best in Cyprus; especially for successful sculptors and other supporting artists. Too, there should be more representation of the current population which has been changed in recent years. Monuments should symbolize the existing independence and praise peace. Moreover they should illustrate hope and brotherhood to the next generations. Contemporary monuments should be designed accordingly to act as meeting places for anyone wishing to share memories or their future. Only in this way will these works of urban architecture serve as olive branches and jasmynes, not just for others, but for all Cypriots. By this, the monuments will face a peaceful future.

Notes

1. This importance can be understood from several studies on the relationship which look in two different ways. One concentrates on their similarities as they are complementary and interdisciplinary of each other. The other deals with their interaction and criticizes contemporary architecture examples which look like sculptures (Murray and Stevens, 1998, Sözeri, 2008).
2. Street sculptures for Olympic Main Stadium in Korea (Urban Environment Design Catalogue, 2003: 214-218).
3. The Statue of Lenin in Ulan Batur-Mongolia

(2012), Statue of Stalin in Gori- Georgia (2010), Statue of Saddam in Baghdad-Iraq (2003), Buddha's of Bamiyan rock sculptures in Bamiyan Central Afghanistan (2001). In addition there have been many discussions about the humanity monument in Kars, Turkey, designed by Mehmet Aksoy; it was demolished in 2011 by the government (<http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/-insanlik-aniti-artik-yok/gundem/gundemdetay/14.06.2011/1402439/default.htm>).

4. Anıtkabir for Atatürk in Ankara, Turkey; Muhammed Ali Jinnah Mausoleum in Karachi, Pakistan; The Massey Memorial in New Zealand; Abraham Lincoln's Tomb in Springfield, Illinois.

5. The obelisk of Theodosius I in Istanbul, Turkey; Parque Tezozomoc in Mexico City (Sutherland, 1991: 61).

6. The Grand Arch building (1989) in Paris, France was inspired of Arc de Triomphe (1836) which is a historical triumphal arch in the same city (Irving, 2007).

7. American Bicentennial Commemorative Monument at Four Corners (1974) in New Mexico, USA (Wolfe, 2005: 34-35); El Cedazo Park in Aguascalientes, Mexico (Holden, 2003: 108).

8. Memorial Pedestrian Bridge in Croatia (Vranckx, 2007: 175); Ayang Bridge and Seongsan Bridge in Korea (Landscape Architect Catalogue Issue II, 2003: 46, 136); Millennium Bridge in London (Murray and Stevens, 1998: 66-67).

9. Pershing Square in Los Angeles, USA (Broto, 2006: 107); Juche Memorial Observation Tower in Korea (Landscape Architect Catalogue Issue II, 2003: 154).

10. Water Culture Square in China (Vranckx, 2007: 93); Millennium Environmental Sculpture in Jinju (Landscape Architect Catalogue Issue II, 2003: 34).

11. Belvedere Sculptures by Martin Puryear placed on the Riverbank, NY (Broto, 2006: 11); Nocturnal Illuminated Landmark in Grammont Park (Vranckx, 2007: 155); Lighting Pylons in NY (Dixon, 2004: 115).

12. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the founder of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and accepted as the leader of Turks and Turkish Cypriots as well.

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Biographic Sketch

Devrim Yücel Besim received her Bachelor degree in 1992 and Master degree in 1995 from the Architecture Department at METU. In 2007 she completed her Ph.D. thesis at Ankara University, Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences, Department of Landscape Architecture. She worked in different scaled projects in Ankara. She continues her academic works at the Faculty of Fine Arts, Design and Architecture, Cyprus International University as since 2012.

Ayer Kaşif graduated from the Faculty of Architecture, Istanbul Technical University (1959). Worked as Senior Architect (1961-1964) in Turkish Communal Chamber. Served as the Director of Public Works, Under Secretary Ministry Planning and Housing (1976-1984) Secretary General Council of Ministers TRNC (1984-1987), Representative of TRNC in Islamabad (1987-1989) in Brussels (1989- 1994). Initiated preparation of Low cost Housing Law headed Technical Team of Nicosia Master Plan, sponsored by UNDP. One of the founders of Union of the Turkish Cypriot Engineers and Architects and the first president

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Otobiyografik Öz

Devrim Yücel Besim Lisans (1992) ve yüksek lisansını (1995) ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi Mimarlık Bölümü'nde tamamladı. 2007 yılında Ankara Üniversitesi Peyzaj Mimarlığı ana dalında doktor ünvanını aldı. Ankara'da birçok farklı ölçekli mimari projede çalıştı. Akademik çalışmalarına 2012 yılından beri Uluslararası Kıbrıs Üniversitesi Güzel Sanatlar, Tasarım ve Mimarlık, Fakültesi'nde devam etmektedir.

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Book Review/ Kitap Tanıtım

The “Return” of British-Born Cypriots to Cyprus, A Narrative Ethnography


(Janine Teerling. Brighton-Chicago, 2014, Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, ISBN 978-1-84519-5888-5 (h/b))

Netice Yıldız

This is an interesting ethnographical study related to the experiences of a group of Briton-Cypriots who were born from parents that migrated to Great Britain in the past and decided to immigrate to this island which they considered as their “homeland” but finally did not develop any the feelings of ‘belongingness’ or ‘at home’ in this island. Thus, the book is classified as an ethnography study which can be also sub-categorised under emigration and immigration; ethnic identity; national characteristics studies.

The book published by Sussex Academic Press in 2014 is originally based on the PhD thesis study of Janine Teerling under the guidance of Prof. Dr. Russell King and Dr. Anastasia Christou. As Teerling expressed in the “Acknowledgements”, it is also a part of a broader project funded by Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) in which she took part as a team member.

The first edition of the book consists of 205 pages, and the book is divided into seven parts which are as follows: Introduction; 1. The British-Cypriot Migration Experiences; 2. Childhood Memories of the Parental Homeland; 3. Motives for “Return” and Adjustment upon Relocation to Cyprus; 4. ‘Home’ and New Spaces of Belonging; 5. British-born Turkish-Cypriots ‘Returnees’; Conclusion. The book begins with the “Foreword” part written by Prof. Dr. Russell King, from the Department of Geography, University of Sussex, who was the supervisor of the author’s PhD study, which is expressed in the “Acknowledgement” that follows this “Foreword”. As Prof. King remarked, the comparative nature of the study, including interviews with both Greek and Turkish Cypriot returnees, is the originality of the book.



Janine Teerling based her research on some interviews and group discussions with 42 randomly selected actors who told their stories about the inclination to select Cyprus as a new home merely due to their past childhood holiday memories or some

other concerns they had developed due to living conditions in big cities. She is an ethnographer who is a Dutch native with no ancestral tie with Cypriots which makes her completely an objective outsider although from time to time she had some worries in this notion since it was sometimes inevitable to establish intimate bounds with the participants of the project. The actors of the research are mainly the second or third generation of those Cypriots who migrated to Great Britain in 1950s, 1960s or 1970s due to economic reasons. Almost all of the interviewed actors mentioned about the same reason relevant to their parents' migration to England who were seeking for a better life style for their families. Thus, as she described, her methodology is epistemological based on "sample-as-you-go" or snowball and convenience sampling method.

Teerling began her book in the classical manner by providing a political history of the island, particularly emphasising 1974 events and the division of the island. Like most of the books written by the Greeks or people who select an accommodation in the South part of the island for their research, she is frequently referring to North Cyprus as the 'occupied' part of the island. Thus, she is in a way ignoring the first migration trend that took place during the British Colonial period. It is an important issue to keep in mind that the migrants after 1963 mainly from Turkish community and 1974, both from Greek and Turkish community selected England, particularly its capital city London, as a new home because of their family ties already existing in England. It is even today a common trend that one migrant would end up encouraging at least four or five members of their family to follow the same path like the recently settled workers from Philippines to south or from Turkmenistan to north parts of Cyprus.

Also, although the author expressed in her introduction that her research was based on the Greek community living in the south part of the island, her cases reveal a cosmopolitan identity, with actors selected from Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as those upbringings of mixed marriages.

The responses given by the actors during the interviews mainly pronounced similar life styles, experiences,

memories and emotions. Almost, all of them refer to their growing up years in Britain to have been under strict discipline. They complained for being kept mainly at home apart their school hours and not to have been allowed to play with the children of their neighbours as well as having little opportunity to establish friendship contacts with their peers at the schools. All female actors complained about the expectations of their parents or relatives merely to have them married as soon as possible with a matching person of their own environment, principally from relatives or friends of their local village in Cyprus. Yet, almost all of them described their Cyprus holidays with more happiness since they were yielded with much more freedom since their parents find the environment more secure in their home land or the protective attitudes of their relatives. The descriptions of the female respondents contained complaints about the gender discrimination practices of the parents towards their children and mostly they expressed their restricted outdoor experiences in England home town while their brothers were given more opportunity to play out-door or go out to entertainment places or going through unquestionable pre-marriage sexual experiences, such accustomed traditions that never changed since the days they had migrated from Cyprus. Their childhood memories in England are almost the same for those who live in certain areas such as North London where the majority of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are living. These families are knitted to each other and they almost share everything together while they show no interest in a next door non-Cypriot neighbour. The way they were grown up was the similar to the manner of growing up of their parents in Cyprus since they were insistent to keep up their traditions. Teerling cites the book of Eve Makis, *Eat, Drink and be Married* to draw up similarity between the stories narrated by her actors and those actors of the novel who are from a background of Anglo-Cypriots who experienced diaspora. Almost one can read similar life stories which were also described in other works, like the articles that were published in a collected volume, *The Turks in Europe* (Küçükcan & Güngör, 2009). In this collected articles, almost all females under interview expressed their boring life in and being treated indifferently by their parents as well as their 'identity' problems both in

the new homes and in their homeland when they went back for holidays or to settle down. So, this brings to mind that family structures, mode of living and the manner of growing up children of Greeks and Turks who migrated to Europe are almost very identical. However, the author only drew this comparison with the Irish families.

Nevertheless, for those whose families preferred other cities such as Birmingham or Surrey and had mentioned about their occasional contacts and happy memories with other Cypriots, mainly in their descriptions relevant to family visits to the capital city London, particularly to the North London, where a dense population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots are living. These memories contained happy nostalgic stories equal to those ones that tell Cyprus holidays. In addition, those actors of the research who were the children of mixed marriages had other stories to tell such as no contact with the Cypriots, longing for Cypriot food, regrets for not being able to learn their native language although the stories related to the reason of migration of their parents were almost the same obligations due to their replacement from hometown after 1974 war or settling down after having university education and getting married with a native British or other nationalities.

The last two chapters of Teerling's book are reserved for the second generations' settlement to Cyprus which is considered as a "third cultural space" for these Briton-Cypriots as well as to others from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. For those Briton-Cypriots, the things did not turn out to be like the days of their childhood holiday times in Cyprus. The island had gone global changes with enhancements implemented by people who had studied abroad and more significantly due to the rise of economic standards besides the new immigrants that created a multicultural society. But still these returnees feel protected since criminal cases are not significant. However, some of the actors did not neglect to mention about the racism of the local people towards these foreigners. In addition, there are many problems they encountered. One of them is the bureaucracy in the offices that put them off. Finding jobs is a difficult task while establishing friendship with Cypriots is more difficult which keeps them mainly among the Briton-Cypriots most of the times and prefer English schools for their children

since they aimed to have them educated in England.

As the author expressed frequently, this study is based on the Briton-Cypriots. So, the ideas of the locals or even their parents related to these newly settled second generation Briton-Cypriots are not included in this study. Teerling is trying to discuss how the participants have shaped and articulated the meanings and boundaries of their identities, their sense of "who they are" and "where home is?" However, she claimed that after some interviews, she realised the necessity to remove the word "identity" from her explanations and emphasised on the concepts of "home" and "belonging" which she considered as being similar concepts. Thus, she preferred pragmatic over semantic and explains that belonging is a multi-dimensional term which means attachment and feeling at home as well as feeling secure.

Cypriots growing up in England always complained for their being raised up in Cypriot culture which is in fact a way of life based on conservative or traditional values, such as religious matters, limiting their social environment with the Cypriots, or eating habits, although using native language even at home is something that was neglected for the second or third generations in many families. Thus, the returnees did not feel comfortable in their social life in Cyprus since their Greek or Turkish knowledge is not adequate for their daily life in a Greek or Turkish speaking environment. Thus, as one of the returnees expressed, "I didn't feel myself English in England and when I came here, I didn't feel Cypriot either" is merely the cause of language problem. Also, Teerling's research reveals another interesting fact for those returnees who got married with native Cypriots that they usually mentioned about their partners not to have been "typical Cypriots". However, the desire for a better quality of life was the cause for the migration to England in 1950s, 1960s and 1970s while the same feeling as well as the wish to live in a familiar environment in terms of culture, language and geography led the first and second generation to come back home while the second generation preferred a secure life to raise up their children who would continue their education back in England and thus decided to established their new home in Cyprus.

It is agreeable that as Teerling stated, there is not much ethnographic study made about the lifestyle or

other matters related to the Turkish Cypriot community living in England so far, except Robins and Aksoy's important paper that brought the Turkish Cypriots more to the foreground in the British context. Thus, she reserved a short part about the Turkish Cypriots who returned to Cyprus with an aim for a better quality of family life to raise-up their children. However, her comment on behalf of Turkish Cypriot actors who made frequent allusions to the political conflicts of 1963 or 1974 as one of the reason to migrate is worth to study from different perspectives to see how these memories shaped their prospect life both in England and back to the island.

Thus, the outcome of this study reveals an important fact that both Greeks and Turks, whatever lifestyle they had in Cyprus, experienced feelings that they are 'different' and feel their British identity rather than feeling being Cypriots and have an open-mindedness to make their benefits as long as they stay and to go back to England whenever conditions are unfavourable. Thus, for most of the second and third generation, Cyprus is a place for a safer life to raise-up children although they feel the lack of a real 'civilised' life here in the sense of big malls for shopping or food facility, or local people's conversation which usually do not include polite words such as 'please', 'may I' or 'Would you mind...?'

However, it could be said that there is not much research in the way of living and economic status of these returnees in the study to show their quality of life and behavioural differences in their life in Cyprus although some conflicting attitudes with the locals of these returnees are mentioned. Such rivalries are mentioned regarding the case of professional experiences since those coming from Britain felt more confident and superiority towards their local peers. Some actors even mentioned of the local women's attitudes towards them as if they were seen as threats for their marriage. Another fact is discovering unexpectedly how the living style in Cyprus turned into an individualistic society due to the rapid globalisation and consumerism, something they had not noticed in their past childhood holiday visits. In fact, some of the issues are not at all mentioned in the study. It is a known fact that with the money they brought from England, particularly after selling their property in the UK, buying huge lands, and building houses with 5-7 bedrooms

with large swimming pools in the villages, of course is one of the reasons that many relatives and neighbours in such cases would keep a distance that would lead them finally into a kind of isolation. Due to the lack of adequate Greek or Turkish language, as well as their high-income rates, most of them could send their kids to private schools, which of course, is another important issue not to be able to mix-up with the local children even with those studying in the same school. Using cockney English accent is another problem in communicating with the locals even if they are addressing to an English-speaking local since English accent used by the locals is based on more grammatical, formal English, which has never been mentioned in the interviews. Military obligations for the male citizens of Cypriot born parents, even if they are British citizens, is another factor that some boys at certain age and sent back to England.

Finally, it could be said that, Janine Teerling's book about the British-born Cypriot 'returnees' is a valuable study and one of the first of its kind to recall some important issues about the 'culture', 'Cypriotness', 'home', 'others' as well as the problems of the increasing migration to the island from different parts of the world which has increased multi-cultural, global identity as well as problems of adaptability into the new environment. The sources given at the end of the book is of course the most valuable part since it will give so much feedback to the new studies. Thus, it would be nice to see new studies, particularly comparative ones, such as the returnees from Greece or Turkey, or the conflicting matters between the Briton- Cypriot returnees and the locals.

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Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi 1995 yılında Dođu Akdeniz Üniversitesi çatısı altında, Kıbrıs'a ilişkin, Arkeoloji, Antropoloji, Mimarlık, Kültürel Miras, Tarih, Sanat, Sanat Tarihi, Dil, Edebiyat, Müzik, Hukuk, Ekonomi, Sosyoloji, Halk Bilimi, Cinsiyet Araştırmaları, Psikoloji, Politika, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Çevre vb. konularda araştırmalar yapmak, araştırmaları desteklemek ve teşvik etmek amacıyla kurulmuştur. Merkez çatısı altında kongre, sempozyum, panel ve sergi düzenlemek; kongre, sempozyum bildiri kitapları ve dergi yayınlamak; görsel sanatlar arşivi oluşturmak vb. etkinlikler gerçekleştirilmekte olup, 1996 yılından bu yana her iki yılda bir Uluslararası Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Kongresi ve biyografi ve sosyal tarih alanında yeni bilgiler sunma hedefi ile İz Bırakmış Kıbrıslı Türkler Sempozyumunu dönüşümlü olarak düzenlenmektedir. Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi'nin yayın organı olan *Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Kıbrıs ile ilgili disiplinlerarası Türkçe veya İngilizce özgün ve evrensel boyutta çalışmalara yer veren hakemli bir dergi olup yılda iki kez yayımlanmaktadır.

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Illustrations must have captions and numbers and they must be indicated in the text as (Table 1), (Fig. 1). The captions of the tables must be written on the top, and references and explanations related to the diagrams and pictures must be written below.

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Article in a book

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Kitap

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