

JCS

Journal of Cyprus Studies

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi



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The Center for Cyprus Studies at Eastern Mediterranean University was established in 1995 for the purpose of encouraging scholarly research on the cultural history and political problems of Cyprus. The fields of research supported by the Center range from archeology, anthropology and economics to history, linguistics and folklore.

In collaboration with the University Library, the Center is working to develop documentation resources on all aspects of the history of Cyprus, and, as part of its mission to establish collaborative projects aimed at the development and preservation of the historical and cultural heritage of the island, is fostering close contacts with other institutions involved in related research. As the Center grows, its resources will include online bibliographical services; audiovisual facilities and archives such as videotapes, diapositives, photographs and microfilm; and rare book and manuscript collections.

The Center for Cyprus Studies coordinates research projects and hosts scholars in fields of study of relevance to its mission. The Center also organizes an annual congress on Cyprus-related studies, and issues the biannual *Journal of Cyprus Studies*, *JCS*.

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Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi, Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi bünyesinde, Kıbrıs'ın kültürel tarihi ve siyasi sorunları ile ilgili bilimsel araştırmaları teşvik etmek amacıyla 1995'de kurulmuştur. Araştırma alanları arkeolojiden antropolojiye, ekonomiden tarihe, dilbilimden folklorlara uzanan geniş bir yelpazeye yayılmıştır.

Merkez, Üniversite Kütüphanesinin işbirliği ile, Kıbrıs araştırmalarını her yönüyle içeren bir kaynak arşivi oluşturmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu arşiv, olanaklar geliştikçe video-bantlar, dia-pozitifler, fotoğraflar ve mikrofilmler gibi görsel ve işitsel kaynaklar ile, arşivler, ender bulunan kitaplar ve el yazması koleksiyonlarını da içerecektir. Ayrıca, Kıbrıs araştırmaları konusunda faaliyet gösteren diğer kuruluşlarla Kıbrıs'ın tarihi ve kültürel mirasını korumak ve geliştirmek için ortak projeler geliştirmek de Merkez'in hedefleri arasındadır.

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi araştırma projelerinin gerçekleşmesinde eşgüdümü sağlamanın yanı sıra, misyonuna uygun alanlarda araştırma yapan bilim adamlarına ve akademisyenlere ev sahipliği de yapmaktadır. Merkez aynı zamanda, Kıbrıs ile ilgili araştırmaların sunulup tartışıldığı yıllık Kongreler düzenlemekte ve yılda iki kez çıkan *Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi*'ni yayınlamaktadır.

Editorial Policy

The *Journal of Cyprus Studies*, JCS, is a refereed, international, interdisciplinary publication whose primary purpose is twofold: i) to develop an authoritative archive and bibliography of sources for the study of ideas on social, cultural, historical, political and legal matters relevant to the past, present or future of the island of Cyprus; and ii) to provide a scholarly, academic forum for the analysis, development, exchange and critique of ideas on these matters.

The *Journal* is bilingual, publishes material in English and/or Turkish. Articles submitted for consideration must focus on subject matter specific to the island of Cyprus, and may include (but are not restricted to) the following topics and areas of interest: analysis of archeological artifacts; culture of the Egyptians, Romans Persians; the Eastern Roman Empire, the Crusades; Lusignans, Venetians and Ottomans; art, literature, music; cartography, military history and technology; trade routes, water and natural resources; the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, Cold War, EU and superpower concerns, contemporary developments in international law, conflict resolution, war; race, religion, ethnicity, nationhood, colonial and post-colonial perspectives, identity. Suggestions for other subject areas will be considered by the editor.

Material published in the *Journal* may include original critical essays or studies, statements of reasoned opinion, sustained critical responses to published material, book reviews, translations, photographs, reproductions of works of art or cultural artifacts, interviews, official documents, transcripts of media broadcasts, or reprints of significant texts.

Because of the unique legal and political contexts of the peoples of Cyprus, problems of ideological and methodological bias in the writing of history are a central issue for the *Journal*, and one of its primary objectives is to establish definitive and authoritative texts for primary source material in the history of Cyprus. Accordingly, an occasional issue of the *Journal* will contain an archive of significant historical, legal, political and cultural documents related to this history, meticulously copy-edited and authenticated, with annotations provided where significant textual variants exist. The purpose is to make these documents available to researchers, without censorship, and foregrounding problems of distortion caused by translation or other forms of interpretation.

The *Journal of Cyprus Studies* does not discriminate against contributions on the basis of the nationality, race, ethnicity, religion or gender of the contributors; nor on the basis of their points of view or conclusions, provided that they are conveyed by careful, reasoned argument and discussion. Submissions are sent anonymously for review to readers whose identities also remain confidential. The editor may, where complex issues are concerned, invite other contributors to submit critical evaluations and responses to an article, or alternative perspectives; and these may be published simultaneously.

Derginin Amacı

JCS-Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi içerik bakımından çok yönlülüğe sahip uluslararası hakemli bir dergi olup temel misyonu şöyle özetlenebilir: i) Kıbrıs adasının geçmiş, geleceği ve bugünü ile ilgili toplumsal, kültürel, tarihsel, siyasi, hukuksal konular ve sorunlar ile ilgili çalışmalara etkin bir arşiv ve kaynakça oluşturmak ii) sözü edilen konular ve sorunlarla ilgili fikirlerin geliştirilebileceği, tartışılacağı, görüş alışverişinde bulunulabileceği, bilimsel ve akademik bir forum oluşturmak.

Dergi İngilizce ve Türkçe olarak iki dilde yayınlanmaktadır. İncelenmek üzere dekiye gönderilen makaleler içerik bakımından Kıbrıs adası ile ilgili olmalıdır. *Dergi*'ye gönderilen makaleler, belirtilen konularla kısıtlı olmamakla birlikte şu konuları içerebilir: arkeolojik eserlerin incelenmesi; Mısır, Roma ve Pers kültürleri; Doğu Roma İmparatorluğu ve Haçlı Seferleri; Lusinyanlar, Venedikliler ve Osmanlılar; sanat, edebiyat, müzik; Doğu Akdeniz'in siyasal coğrafyası; Soğuk Savaş, Avrupa Birliği, süper güçlerin bölgesel çıkarları, uluslararası hukuk ile ilgili yeni gelişmeler, çözüm önerileri, savaş; ırk, din, etnik köken, ulus kavramı, sömürgecilik ve sömürgecilik sonrası yaklaşımlar, kimlik sorunu. Diğer konularla ilgili öneriler editör tarafından değerlendirilecektir.

Dergi'de yayınlanacak olan yazılar özgün eleştirel denemeler veya araştırmalar, uslamlamaya dayanan kişisel fikirler, önceden yayınlanmış yazı ve yapıtlara yönelik eleştirel yanıtlar, kitap tanıtım ve incelemeleri, çeviriler, fotoğraflar, sanat ve kültür eserlerinin baskıları, söyleşiler, resmi belgeler, medya yayınlarının kopyaları, basın açıklamaları, veya önemli metinlerin yeni baskıları olabilir.

Kıbrıs'ta yaşayan halkların kendilerine özgü yasal koşulları nedeniyle ideolojik veya yönetsel önyargının tarihin yazılmasındaki etkin rolü *Dergi* için ana meselelerden birini oluşturduğundan, *Dergi*'nin temel amaçlarından biri, Kıbrıs tarihinde kesin ve yetkin yazılardan meydana gelen bir ana kaynakça oluşturmaktır. Bu nedenle, zaman zaman *Dergi*'nin bir sayısı Kıbrıs tarihi ile ilgili, tarihsel, hukuksal, siyasal ve kültürel belgelerden oluşan titiz bir çalışma sonucu elde edilmiş, dikkatle kurgulanmış ve doğrulanmış bir arşiv içerecek ve gereken yerlerde çeşitli ve değişik belgelerle ilgili dipnotlar verilecektir. Amaç, bu belgeleri sansürden uzak bir biçimde araştırmacıların kullanımına sunmak ve bunu yaparken çeviriden veya yorum farklılıklarından kaynaklanan sorunlara da dikkat çekmektir.

Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi, milliyet, ırk, etnik köken, din veya cinsiyet farkı gözetmeksizin, bakış açıları veya vardıkları sonuçlar itibarı ile, itinalı ve mantıklı tartışma içeren yazılara açıktır. *Dergi*'ye gönderilen bütün yazılar, değerlendirilmek üzere incelenirken yazarın olduğu kadar hakemin de kimlikleri saklı tutulur. Tartışmaya açık konular söz konusu olduğunda, editör herhangi bir makaleye ilişkin eleştirel değerlendirmeler, yanıtlar veya alternatif yaklaşımlar için başka araştırmacılardan görüş isteyebilir ve bu konudaki bütün görüşler *Dergi*'nin aynı sayısında yer alır.

Editorial

This archival issue is entirely devoted to the text *Terrorism in Cyprus*, which has been out of print since being first published in 1956 by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. *Terrorism in Cyprus* is a compilation of documents that includes extracts from Grivas' Diary, the correspondence between Grivas and the EOKA organization, and the explanatory notes of the Colonial Office on these exposed documents. Doubtless, it is an important document from the modern history of Cyprus and surely needs to be read carefully. A short introduction by Jan Asmussen provides information on the content, intent and importance of the document. As these are "selected" extracts—and when seen necessary even commented on in italics in the text—they are partial but nonetheless shed light on the colonial policies of the British and, to a certain extent, reveal Grivas' mind and the dealings of the EOKA during a particularly stressful period. The translator of the documents is unknown. The text has been carefully edited in order to remain as faithful as is practically possible both to its first layout and to the language of the document. One major difference is that the photos are not included in this edition due to problems of their quality of resolution. For the sake of accuracy and future scholarship mistakes in place-names and personal-names appear as they did in the original document. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Jan Asmussen who contributed valuable time and expert knowledge to this project. As usual we would also like to thank the Center of Cyprus Studies and the staff of the Eastern Mediterranean University Printing House.

Özlem Çaykent

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Terrorism in Cyprus — The Grivas Diaries

Jan Asmussen

Eastern Mediterranean University

Following the start of the *Ethniki Organosis Agoniston*/the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, EOKA, activities on 1 April 1955, Field-Marshal Sir John Harding was appointed as Governor of Cyprus in order to (a) suppress the revolt militarily and (b) engage in negotiations with Makarios to defuse the crisis politically. During the negotiations—which were later joined by the Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd—the British Government offered democratic self-government: a Cypriot Government with a Prime Minister and a Parliament. The Prime Minister would be elected by majority vote but had to be acknowledged by the Governor. Foreign Affairs, Defence and Internal Security would remain the domain of the Governor. In the beginning Makarios appeared to be prepared to accept the principle of self-government, provided this would include a clear Greek-Cypriot majority and not exclude the possibility of later *enosis*.¹ The talks formally collapsed on 29 February since the British were not prepared to guarantee a Greek majority control of the legislature and would not agree to an unconditional amnesty for those EOKA members who were responsible for murder or attempted murder.

On 5 March the Archbishop explained his withdrawal from the talks, saying: "We are sincerely sorry to have found no understanding whatsoever in our talks with the British Government (...). In no case we should have the standard of self-determination. We shall fight to the end, by passively resisting the illegal sovereignty of our despot in the island."² He claimed that while he agreed that in most serious cases it could not be granted immediately, the total refusal of an amnesty prevented the return to peaceful conditions.

Lennox-Boyd accused Makarios for the breakdown and indicated the new line the British Government would take towards him by calling him "a man who refuses to use his influence to condemn violence." Thus, Makarios was "as guilty of violence as someone who promotes it."³

Harding was now convinced that Makarios's continued presence in Cyprus would be harmful and that he should be deported and kept "incommunicado" until Cyprus was pacified.⁴ After approval by the cabinet Makarios was arrested on 9 March 1956 and deported to the

Seychelles [See Appendix V for the official declaration]. The justification that the “Archbishop [had] himself been deeply implicated in the campaign of terrorism launched by the organisation known as EOKA” and that it was established “beyond all reasonable doubt that the Archbishop [had] not merely countenanced but (...) actively fostered, terrorism in order to promote his political aims” was not shared by all observers, let alone by the Greek Government.⁵ Greece accused Britain of having failed to abide by its promise to solve the problem through peaceful negotiations. Instead, one party would now end the talks by arresting and deporting the other party.⁶ In Britain the government was fiercely attacked by Labour MPs, who demanded the immediate release of Makarios.⁷ What the British Government need was clear proof that Makarios was actually connected to EOKA.

This proof seemed to be forthcoming during the summer 1956. On the morning of the 7 June 1956 the EOKA leader Georgios [George] Grivas⁸ was alerted in his hide-out in the Kykko area by the barking of a search dog belonging to the British Army. Fleeing in direction of the Paphos Forest Grivas managed to escape, but left behind some of his personal belongings, including a part of his diary.⁹ On 21 August 1956 a second chunk of his diary and other documents written by or addressed to the EOKA leader were found buried in a number of glass jars close to the village of Lyssi. After the documents were authenticated¹⁰ the British Colonial Secretary, Allan Lennox-Boyd, presented the Parliament with some selected quotations of the material intended to prove the involvement of Makarios in EOKA’s activities from its foundation, including operational planning and the selection of victims.¹¹ Even though many observers and notably even conservative MPs pressed for the full and unexpurgated publication of the diaries, this request was never met.¹² Out of 250,000 words only 10,000 words were ever published.¹³

Instead, the British Government decided to publish the selection of documents reproduced here under the heading “Terrorism in Cyprus: The Captured Documents.” The intention of the publication was clearly to implicate Makarios with the activities of EOKA, thus justifying the deportation of the Archbishop to the Seychelles. This argumentation had three major weaknesses. Firstly, the deportation of Makarios took place on 9 March 1956 before the first part of Grivas documents was captured. Secondly, the captured sections of the diary only concerned Grivas’s

relations with Makarios up to the beginning of hostilities in Cyprus (1 April 1955) but not beyond. Finally, nothing written in the diaries was considered by the Crown's legal officers as strong enough evidence against Makarios to stand in court.¹⁴ Despite these weaknesses, the publication of material from the diary, however selective, was something of a propaganda coup for the British Government and allowed it to regain the political initiative.¹⁵

This coincided with a surprise move by Grivas, who on 16 August announced a cease-fire to allow for diplomatic solutions. Grivas described this move later as follows: "I decided that it was my duty as a soldier to make a generous gesture. By creating an atmosphere of peace I would leave the field clear for diplomacy to find a political solution to our troubles."¹⁶ The British side interpreted this as a sign of weakness. *The Economist* commented: "The determined efforts of the British security forces and the apparently greater willingness of the Greek Cypriots to come forward with information have thrown EOKA forces and organisation into disarray. The cease-fire may well be designed to make the best of a bad situation."¹⁷ Governor Harding shared this view. On the 22 August he called on the "Terrorists" to put down their weapons. They would be allowed either to leave Cyprus for Greece or to face trial in Cyprus. Later there might be an amnesty. This offer would stand for three weeks.¹⁸ Grivas reacted with the issue of a pamphlet titled "Victors do not surrender!"¹⁹ In another rather interesting gesture of defiance, a donkey was paraded through the streets of Nicosia carrying a placard with the inscription: "My Marshall, I Surrender."²⁰ Grivas subsequently changed his orders to the slogan: "Freedom or Death."²¹ The cease-fire collapsed in late August and the fighting continued more brutally than ever, culminating in the so called "Bloody November 1956," in which forty people were killed including twenty-one British.²² The struggle for Cyprus had reached a new stage.

The documents reproduced here have to be read in connection with other works on the Cyprus Emergency.²³ Notwithstanding the propagandistic intent the Grivas diaries [Part I] as such are a vital source for the understanding of the EOKA movement, in general, and the mindset of its leader Georgios Grivas, in particular. The collection of orders and communications [Part II] provide a unique insight into the command structures of EOKA. Finally, the appendices are a good example how British propaganda skilfully contextualised the above

documents with the aim of not only underlining the criminal character of EOKA²⁴ but to link Archbishop Makarios with its activities. Thus, this valuable document is beyond doubt a vital source for any scholar working on the Cyprus Emergency 1955-59.

Endnotes

- ¹ Her Majesty's Stationery Office, *Cyprus. Correspondence exchanged between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios*, Cmd. 9708 (London, 1956).
- ² [Greek] Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *The Cyprus Question, Negotiations, 4 October 1955 to 5 March 1956* (Athens, 1956), 35-36.
- ³ *The Times*, 06.03.1956.
- ⁴ PREM11/1248 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 1 March 1956; Minutes of Cabinet discussion, 6 March 1956.
- ⁵ Daily Mirror, 10.03.1956: "How to lose Friends".
- ⁶ Royal Ministry, *Negotiations*, 1.
- ⁷ *The Times*, 15.05.1956.
- ⁸ Grivas used the *nom de guerre* Dighenis Akritas. His true identity became first known to the British Government by autumn 1955 through "East European sources"; CO929/455 Minute by Ward, 4 November 1955.
- ⁹ Georgios Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, edited by Charles Foley (Longmans, London 1964), 66-67.
- ¹⁰ See FO371/123921, RG 1081/1901.
- ¹¹ *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, 1955-56, vol. 558, 14 September 1956, 383.
- ¹² Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998), 152.
- ¹³ *Ibid*, 151.
- ¹⁴ FO371/132936, RG1081/1932 Minute by Ward, 5 September 1956.
- ¹⁵ Holland, *Revolt in Cyprus*, 150.
- ¹⁶ Grivas, *Memoirs*, 87.
- ¹⁷ *The Economist*, 25.08.1956.
- ¹⁸ CO926/427 Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 21 August 1956; *The Times*, 23.08.1956.
- ¹⁹ Grivas, *Memoirs*, 86.
- ²⁰ Nationales Komitee für die Selbstbestimmung von Zypern, *Aus den Ereignissen in Zypern* (Athens, 1957), 64.

- ²¹ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus* (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1975), 102.
- ²² *Ibid.*, 112.
- ²³ Apart from Grivas own memoirs, Foley and Scobie's work and Holland's excellent afore mentioned account see Doros Alostos, *Cyprus Guerrilla. Grivas, Makarios and the British*, Heineman, London 1960; Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt. An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (George Allen & Unwin, London 1978); François Crouzet, *Le Conflit de Cypre, 1946-1959*, 2 vols (Émile Bruylant, Brussels 1973).
- ²⁴ The original document contains a number of rather distasteful photographs displaying victims murdered by the organisation, which we choose not to reproduce.

TERRORISM IN CYPRUS

The Captured Documents

*Translated Extracts Issued by Authority of the
Secretary of State for the Colonies*

First Published by HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE,
London, 1956.

NOTE: These extracts have been selected to illustrate the growth of the terrorist campaign, its organization, methods and internal and external relationships. Wherever it seemed desirable, cross references have been inserted. The commentary, illustrations and appendices are intended to help the reader to appreciate the significance of the terrorist records against the background of events in Cyprus over the last two years.

PREFACE

As a RESULT of counter-terrorist operations in various parts of Cyprus during the summer of 1956, a large number of documents, photographs and equipment belonging to the terrorist organization EOKA* have come into the hands of the Security Forces. Such is the volume of the captured material that it is impracticable, within the compass of a booklet such as this, to publish more than a small fraction of the whole. Furthermore, the success of future operations depends partly on safeguarding our own information. For this reason it has been necessary to exclude from this publication parts of the Grivas diaries and other documents.

The authenticity of the Grivas diaries has now been established beyond all doubt. Not only has Grivas' handwriting been identified by a graphologist and a number of captured terrorists, but the diaries contain such a complete and detailed account of the build-up of EOKA that no one but Grivas—whom Athens has identified as Dighenis—could have written them.

Apart from these copious diaries, kept by the terrorist field commander, Grivas, from a date in the Autumn of 1954, when he and his fellow conspirators were impatiently awaiting the opportunity to leave Greece on their subversive mission, there are also several thousands of other interesting and important documents. These comprise copies of EOKA orders, memoranda and correspondence between Grivas, the operational commander and Archbishop Niakarios, his political chief. All of this, as is evident from those examples reproduced here, has yielded valuable intelligence not only about the EOKA organization, but also about the part played by Archbishop Makarios and Greek political leaders in their attempt to impose their will on the island.

The documents establish beyond all doubt that Archbishop Makarios personally took a leading part in the foundation and major operational planning of the EOKA organization. In a letter (see diary for 2nd April, 1955) Grivas talks of the Archbishop as having entrusted the struggle to him—it was the Archbishop who invited him to Cyprus. The diaries

* Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston—National Organization of Cypriot Combatants.

also show that Grivas sought the Archbishop's personal approval for the beginning of the campaign of violence which was to bring such horror and misery to the island's peace-loving population. The Archbishop also provided money for the smuggling of arms and the support of terrorist activities. There is more revealing evidence of the Archbishop's authority over Grivas in the latter's letter of 29th January, 1955 (p. 56). In this letter he acknowledges that he will only lay down his arms if the Archbishop commands it.

Neither the leading figures in the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, with Archbishop Makarios as the mainspring, nor the conspirators in Greece, from the then Prime Minister, Field-Marshal Papagos, down, can ever divest themselves of the responsibility for the tragedy which has befallen Cyprus.

The documents have come into the hands of the authorities in Cyprus in various ways, some of which can be revealed. In the first place, some of the Grivas diaries and the photographs were captured when they were hurriedly abandoned by Grivas, together with some of his personal kit (shaving gear, haversack, beret, etc.), when he fled from an army patrol during the mountain operations against the terrorists in June, 1956. (It will be seen that the diaries come to an abrupt end on the 9th June, 1956.) During these operations, heavy blows were struck at the EOKA mountain groups which were, as a result, seriously reduced in strength and partially disorganized. Other papers were found buried in glass jars in a field near the village of Lysi in the Famagusta District. This discovery follows from the alertness of two soldiers of the Royal Horse Guards who, noticing some men acting suspiciously, pursued and captured them, and the resource of the Cyprus police, whose subsequent investigations led them to the hiding places. The remainder came into the hands of the Cyprus police through sources which cannot be revealed.

These important discoveries will assist the Security Forces to destroy the EOKA organization, although this is bound to take time. It is, however, to the resource, tenacity and loyalty of the Security Forces that the people of Cyprus will owe their release from the nightmare of terrorism which was imported from Greece and unleashed by the spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriot community.

Examples of the brutal and cowardly crimes that have been committed in Cyprus are given in Appendix IV to this book, in order to

show to what ugly and bestial reality fine words and exhortations have been translated.

Perhaps the conclusion ultimately reached by Grivas on 1st June, 1956, and reproduced in this booklet epitomizes the situation. The struggle between the forces of law and order and those ruthless men who lurk in their hideouts, and emerge from time to time on their murderous and cowardly missions, is not yet concluded, but Grivas himself, although he was at one time thinking in terms of large-scale risings and rebellion, has now acknowledged...

We shall not be able to impose a solution by force. Accordingly we are obliged to exploit politically the excellent results of our dynamic activity up to now.

This then was the policy of Archbishop Makarios and his henchman George Grivas—to impose a solution by force, and when that became impossible, to exploit the threat of force in order to procure a settlement to their liking. Her Majesty's Government has consistently sought to reach, through peaceful means and in conditions free from intimidation and fear, a just and lasting settlement which will satisfy the honour, dignity and aspirations of all who live in the island and which will enable Great Britain to secure Cyprus as an effective base for the defence of the free world and the maintenance of stability in the Middle East.

Part I

EXTRACTS FROM THE CAPTURED GRIVAS DIARIES

The diary opens as the terrorist leader was preparing to leave Greece for Cyprus in the Autumn of 1954

26TH OCT., 1954: 16.00 hours. Departure for Rhodes by “Eyeon”.

27TH OCT., 1954: We arrived in Rhodes at 15.00 hours in the heavy rain....

28TH OCT., 1954: Awful weather. Departure postponed. I had my first meetings with Haris, studying the possibilities of organizing in Rhodes a centre which would work in our favour....

1ST NOV., 1954: No news about the caique. Agony....

6TH NOV., 1954: The whole morning it has been pouring “cats and dogs”. In the afternoon the caique entered the harbour and was refuelled.

The departure has been fixed for tomorrow evening.

We have agreed with Makris for the organization of a Centre in Rhodes, and we made the necessary arrangements for the expedition of a second load (arms)....

8TH NOV., 1954: Departure from Rhodes (Callithea Bay) at 00.15 with rather good weather.

9TH NOV., 1954: Stormy weather. We were all sick....

At 22.00 hours we arrived at the pre-arranged place of disembarkation, where we met those who were waiting for us and who have taken us to Khlorkas Village and we were taken into the house of Azinas Nikolaou....

12TH NOV., 1954: ... first, training and organization of a group. During this period we should not appear to anybody who could discover our mission and this until the arrival from Greece of the expected load of arms.

Second, preliminary during which we should contact the Ethnarchy and organize our activities.

Thirdly, the arms....

13TH NOV., 1954: In the evening the training of five men of the Khlorkas group was started with automatics and sabotage. Duration from 19.00 to 23.00 hours....

19TH NOV., 1954: We were busy organizing the Nicosia Groups.

PEON* three groups of six men each. Papastavros† also sent three men for training. Difficulties in finding houses....

22ND NOV., 1954: Azinas has been detailed to see Papastavros and the PEON group and to inform them that members willing to participate in fighting operations will receive the necessary orders from military leaders only, and they will have nothing to do with their organization. The PEON have agreed. Papastavros could not be found.

Makarios has sent notice through Kranidiotis‡ that we should not yet proceed to any act of violence and he is sending instructions by courier....

From Athens, Gazouleas has informed Azinas that the load of arms has departed from Greece on the 20th inst. Notis has arrived in Nicosia from Karavas....

26TH NOV., 1954: While discussing Sokratis Loizides with Azinas the latter told me the following:

“I had warned you not to bring him with you because I knew what was going to happen. I repeated the same thing to the Archbishop. He has political ambition. Even the day before yesterday he told me he is sorry he did not bring his wife with him to Cyprus.”

.... Apparently he thought we were going to a wedding....

30TH NOV., 1954: We wrote by code to Efstathopoulos in Athens to let us know what is happening to the caique used for the transportation of the load of arms....

14TH DEC., 1954: Kranidiotis, meeting Azinas, informed him that no instructions from Makarios had been received regarding the beginning of our activities, and this contrary to his promise....

See entry for 22nd November.

16TH DEC., 1954: The first news from UNO is unfavourable for Greece. America's position is against us and after this we should expect nothing from UNO. What is going to happen now? Our

* Pancyprian National Organization of Youth.

† Priest of Phaneromeni Cathedral—see biographical note page 91.

‡ Secretary to the Ethnarchy Council.

wise diplomats who were boasting that a solution would be found through UNO, what do they intend to do now?....

As I repeatedly stated I always had the conviction that there was nothing to expect from the UNO from the moment Churchill visited America. He had arranged everything with Eisenhower. It was obvious, and our diplomatic representative should have realized it, and from the time America was not favourable to us ... our struggle was lost....

23RD DEC., 1954: ... With Azinas I tackled the question of the Archbishop's arrival in Athens, and I pointed out that he should be put in the picture of the situation here. He asked me to make a note of whatever I want to be known to the Archbishop, so that tomorrow he could send this by diplomatic courier to Athens in an envelope which would be handed over to the Archbishop.

I wrote the following note:

“That between the 10th and 20th January, we will be ready to act with hopes of success so long as the expected arms from Athens reach us...”

26TH DEC. 1954: ... Yankou came back from his village. He reported to me that he met the Bishop of Kyrenia, who knows that both I and Sokratis are here...

29TH DEC. 1954: ... What was the reason for announcing through the Press that Savvas Loizides and Papagos had a meeting on the 27th inst., that is to say two days before Makarios' arrival in Athens? Have they got in mind to use pressure on the Archbishop to compel him to be more moderate?...

31ST DEC., 1954: ... Tonight the last sabotage group will go out for reconnoitring its targets, that is the CBS* at Athalassa and the nearby two military wireless stations....

3RD JAN., 1955: He then gave me a bulletin of information from the local authorities from which it is quite clear that they are aware of my arrival.

Here follows in the original the text of a notice relating to the illegal entry into Cyprus of Col. Grivas (p. 89).

* Cyprus Broadcasting Service near Nicosia which was attached on the 1st April, 1955.

5TH JAN., 1955: Azinas came back from Athens today. At 15.30 hours he visited me at home. He reported the following:

The following have been secured through Xintaras:

600 kilos Dynamite, 2200 Detonators, 2200 metres fuse.

The following through Gazouleas:

Pistols (18), rounds (700), automatics (2), automatic rounds (1 box), hand grenades (12).

Papagos is in favour of action and has asked why we have not yet started. The Archbishop also.

The Archbishop offered money for a caique and for purchasing of more arms and ammunition as long as these could be found....

6TH JAN., 1955: ... It looks as if my harsh language has impressed all present, and has brought results because they have realized that we have undertaken a struggle with a final decision to succeed and that I have no intention to play, so that I will execute all those who will not conform themselves to my instructions.

This is the first indication of internal friction, but, as the later entries will show, Grivas goes through a period when he begins to despair of his fellow conspirators, who continually let him down. It is only as the terror campaign gets into its stride that Grivas appears to have imposed something like military discipline upon the organization.

Archbishop Makarios and Grivas now start their intensive preparations for the opening of the campaign of violence.

10TH JAN., 1955: We are expecting the arrival of the Archbishop from Athens. He arrived at 16.30 hours; he was met at the aerodrome with great enthusiasm and by big crowds....Azinas put himself in touch with the Archbishop and he left afterwards for Zodia. He returned at about 20.30 hours and he told me that the Archbishop had arranged a meeting for tomorrow.

11TH JAN., 1955: Azinas came to my house at 10.00 hours and told me that the Archbishop wants to see me. Azinas took me in his car and we drove to Larnaca to the Bishopric where we were to meet the Archbishop. I saw the Bishop of Kitium with whom I talked until the arrival of the Archbishop. He congratulated me for my courage in coming to Cyprus. He told me that Sokratis must return to Greece. I told him about targets which I have

earmarked for attack, etc. He appeared to be aware not only of all my movements but also of our present position and future plans, and he told me that he had discussed these yesterday with the Archbishop. When the Archbishop arrived he told me that on his voyage to America he had met Kyrout in Paris and that they had agreed fully on the action to take. Later, however, the position had changed—they were hoping to get America's support, which would have meant a majority at UNO. Kyrout had then sent a telegram to the Consul here (I wrote about this in my diary on 29th November) without the Archbishop's knowledge. After America turned against us immediate action was necessary, but it was too late by then since they did not have the means of communicating with us quickly.

I told the Archbishop all about the work we had done and are doing; I also talked to him about the excellent morale of our men. The Archbishop told me that Papagos wants action; the Archbishop added that he (the Archbishop) had decided on the 25th March as the date on which operations were to begin. Azinas had objections as regards this date because he considered it to be too late. I too told the Archbishop that this date (25th March) ought not to be definitely decided upon, since the postponing of action until that date would have the following disadvantages:

- (1) The security risk of us not being able to keep our movements and activities secret until that date, the element of surprise representing 90 per cent of our chances of success. To date the British have taken no precautionary measures against action on our part, since all Government offices are completely unguarded and unprotected and even military establishments are badly guarded and we are easily able to approach these during the night.
- (2) We should take advantage of winter weather conditions (rain, snow, etc.) which work on our side—we should also take advantage of the fact that the nights are much longer and can cover all our movements and activities.

I asked the Archbishop about Papagos and the Archbishop told me that Papagos is now in full agreement with our activities. Until recently Papagos had stood out against us because he had

heard that in our movement Greek officers were involved and he feared that these officers might well organize themselves against him! What a terrible thing it is when politicians and, worse still, men in charge of Governments react in this manner to matters of national importance and make use of them for their own party interests! Instead of Papagos sponsoring us—behind the scenes at any event—he has been restraining us until today, and anything we have done we have done in spite of him since all has been accomplished by me and my collaborators (the assembling of arms, dispatches, hideouts, my departure, etc.).

When Papagos was put before the accomplished fact of all that had been done, and when he was faced with the impasse of the UNO decision, he was forced to change his mind. But what help has he given us? None!

The Archbishop also told me that he had arranged that our liaison with Papagos in Athens should be Savvas Loizides.

My interview with the Archbishop ended because we were told that a police car with wireless was stationed outside the Bishopric. The Archbishop left with the Bishop of Kitium. After half an hour I left with Azinas for Nicosia. On the way I expressed some of my fears to Azinas which my interview with the Archbishop had given rise to.

I told Azinas that it was probable that Papagos would want to make use of our movement and of our struggle to further his political ends. For this reason he would be sending us, as group leaders, officers who were in his trust.

These officers might be expected even to take on the leadership of our movement.

I told Azinas that Loizides was not the right man to be the intermediary between Papagos and ourselves, since Loizides intends to take up politics and in the next election to become a member of the Rally Party. For this reason Loizides will follow Papagos blindly and might even become an obstacle to our activities.

I then asked Azinas to mention this point to the Archbishop, and to point out to him that we will not tolerate an exploitation of our cause. Azinas agreed to do this and to look into the whole matter fully.

In connection with material from Athens, Azinas told me that the Archbishop had paid 65.000.000 on the fifth instant to Efstathopoulos and Gazouleas. Of this 65.000.000, 25.000.000 were paid to Gazouleas for the new material and the remaining 40.000.000 were paid to Efstathopoulos in respect of his instalment to the cargo ship. Another 40.000.000 to Valvis will be paid to the cargo ship as a final payment after the delivery of the material to us.

13TH JAN., 1955: I told Yiankos today to arrange at the earliest for the setting up of proper communications and liaison with all the groups of our organization. I have already asked Azinas to mention to the Archbishop that it is necessary that our organization should have a name, and I suggested EOKA.

14TH JAN., 1955: Azinas came to see me today at my house. He told me that he had seen the Archbishop. He added that he would talk to me later because at the moment Notis was present at my house. At about 14.00 hours Azinas called on me again and showed me a telegram from Gazouleas, by which he was informed that the caique with the material left on the 13th inst. Following this information we both left at 16.00 hours for Khlorakas as follows:

- (1) to keep watch along the coast where unloading was intended.
- (2) to watch for any possible police activity at Ktima.

I told Kosta that we would be back at Khlorakas on Sunday, when I would enlarge on the instructions which I had given him previously. We left Khlorakas at 19.45 hours, and got back to Nicosia at 22.40 hours.

15TH JAN., 1955: At about 11.10 hours Azinas sent me a message via Pangos to come to his house. Azinas informed me that the Archbishop, whom he had seen, had told him that a policeman had informed the authorities that a caique from Greece would be arriving in the Xeros area on the 19th or 20th inst. ...I have been worrying my head all day trying to think who could have been the traitor. Is he a Greek? My only hopes are now in God! He who has been my guide until today will continue helping me. I believe this. In spite of this treason I believe that the caique will arrive safely—God will see to this as well as to the safe arrival of the material.

17TH JAN., 1955: We are worried about the caique—will it arrive today? May God keep helping us!

18TH JAN., 1955: At 08.30 hours Yiankos brought me a code message which he had received at Limassol yesterday evening, at 23.00 hours. The message is as follows:

“Dear Leader, Nothing to report until noon today. In the afternoon we found definite information that the police have been alerted.

Five Special Branch policemen arrived from Nicosia in the afternoon. The Army’s radar is in constant operation, sweeping over a 15-mile radius. I have concluded that the Army are collaborating with the police. I have issued all the necessary instructions. I will inform Andreas tomorrow...”

I gave instruction to Yiankos to go and see Makarios and to tell him that it is necessary that he should send down to Xeros some of his own men on a diversionary operation and to explain to him that it would not be wise for me to use my own men from the sabotage groups for this purpose.

Yiankos returned at about 11.30 hours and informed me that Makarios had told him that it would be dangerous for this operation to be performed by his own men and that my own men should therefore be used.

Azinas telephoned to the office to say that he is coming to Nicosia.

He (Azinas) arrived at about 12.30 hours and reported to me as follows: “Early this morning at about 02.00 hours nine policemen were patrolling the area where the boat is expected-they left in the early hours. They were seen by our own men who were guarding the area. The police at Paphos are nervous. According to information we have, the state of the alert of the police at Paphos will end at noon today, at which time the police reinforcements will leave. On the road to Limassol police are stopping cars and asking drivers to produce their licences. In Nicosia too a certain amount of police activity has been observed.”

On the strength of the above information I have decided as follows:

(1) There is nothing more to be done at Paphos in addition to the instructions which were issued yesterday—i.e. observation of police movements guarding the coast. Caique only to be signalled if the coast is clear. Speedy removal of material.

(2) A diversionary operation is to be organized at Xeros so as to give the impression that something is really happening there. This operation is to be executed by members of the sabotage groups Masonides Christakis who will be given the relevant instructions.

19TH JAN., 1955: Yiankos has passed on to me a recommendation by the Archbishop to the effect that we should limit our movements until Sunday. In his message the Archbishop also asks whether we shall be going to Larnaca to inspect our groups in that town. To this my answer was “Yes”.

20TH JAN., 1955: At 16.15 hours we left for this reconnaissance and we visited a place near Boghaz-Trikomo, but it was getting dark and we had to put it off till tomorrow. We then went to Lysi, via Famagusta, and I visited there an officer of the reserve, by the name of Afxentiou.* This officer solemnly declared to me that he wished to place himself under my command with a view to his undertaking operations. I told him that I wanted him for sabotage missions in the Dhekelia-Pyla District and also in the Famagusta region.

21ST JAN., 1955: At 10.00 hours Yiankos brought me a note from Azinas to the effect that the caique did not turn up last night. What can be happening?

At 13.00 hours Azinas came to see me and I discussed with him the alternative conclusions which I had reached. I then asked him to prepare to leave tomorrow. He told me that he agreed as to the necessity of his departure and that he had already obtained the Archbishop's approval, though the Archbishop wanted then to delay it until next Monday.

22ND JAN., 1955: At 10.30 hours Azinas came to see me...still no caique. Azinas had seen the Archbishop and notified him that he would have to go to Athens about the caique, but the Archbishop

* Known as Zidros. See page 92.

had not agreed initially that it was necessary for Azinas to go. The Archbishop was worried in case the British got to hear of this and should jeopardize the whole business, but he agreed in the end that Azinas should go.

24TH JAN., 1955: Azinas is to leave for Athens TODAY with the following instructions: First of all he is to see the Admiral and Gazouleas in Athens and to make inquiries about the leakage. He is then to go to Rhodes—since it must be assumed that the caique is still there—and hand to the captain sealed orders which are to be opened and explained to him only just before he sails and in such a manner as to prevent communications by the captain or by members of his crew with anybody ashore. Two landing places have been earmarked as follows: —

Under the code letter A—Khlorkas-Paphos area.

Under the code letter B—Periovolia-Tou-Trikomo area.

Practicable landing times at A—between 8-9.

Practicable landing times at B—between 1-2 a.m.

The caique is, first of all to close in at A, and if the landing signal is not given, the caique is then to proceed to B.

The landing signals at both A and B are to be as follows—three dots and one dash in green followed by three dots and one dash in red. These signals will be repeated at intervals of 5-10 mins. The caique is not to give any identification signal. In the event of sudden danger and of the necessity to cancel the shore signal after this has been given, repeated greens will be signalled as fast as possible.

The caique is definitely to have an escort to control the captain and to be able to show him the landing places and to check him on all points that have been laid down.

Azinas furthermore, is to discuss with Haris arrangements for the future consignments of material from Greece to Cyprus, and to inquire into the possibility of shipments from Athens, via Rhodes as a check point or, better still, of direct shipments from Rhodes if it is possible to find both the material and equipment there.

Azinas is to obtain from Makarios the letter to Stephanopoulos for the replacement of the Harbourmaster at Rhodes by N. Standouli.

Azinas left by air at 13.30 hours after visiting me and discussing again the above.

At 20.30 hours I met Afxentiou at Yiankos' house and we discussed his mission. He reiterated his promise to obey my instructions implicitly....

26TH JAN., 1955: At 20.00 hours approximately I went to Palouriotissa to meet Afxentiou, whose training is about to be completed, in order to give him certain instructions. Whilst I was there, Notis gave me a written report to the effect that at about midnight on the 25th/26th January, a caique was intercepted off Paphos, with a cargo of sabotage material, arms and hand-grenades. The report went on to say that the crew of the caique were escorted to Nicosia at about three o'clock this morning, as well as the caique's cargo, which was taken in two trucks after being taken off the vessel. This afternoon three more men were brought in. What a misfortune!...

Who was it who gave us away? May our own curses and particularly those of Cyprus weigh heavily upon him! There will always be traitors, but I had not imagined possible that there could be in this particular instance Greeks whose love for money overrides all else.

We are stubbornly determined to continue the struggle even with our reduced means. I have charged Yiankos to inform the Archbishop accordingly. At about 21.30 hours Lefkios arrived at Palouriotissa bringing the arms with him. We stored the arms there.

I am closing my diary at this point and I shall hide it in case it should fall into enemy hands. Hard times these!

28TH JAN., 1955: Notis left at 06.30 hours for Nicosia. He returned at about 21.00 hours bringing with him to K arms and four young men from the Nicosia sabotage group who are to join a guerrilla band.

Instructions were given to the leader in charge at K to prepare for guerrilla fighting. He has already organized couriers,

earmarked safe houses in the villages and formed groups for the manufacture of bombs and for the supply of stores and food....

Notis arrived at K at about 22.00 hours, but he did not bring any arms because the right opportunity had not presented itself. A combat group had been formed and he talked to the members of this group, but had derived little satisfaction from his talk—they put forward a number of reasons to excuse themselves from attending training tomorrow. Finally Notis had dismissed them.

I have come to the conclusion that our security here is unsatisfactory—Our host is careless in letting in too many people to see me. I have therefore decided to move to L and I have instructed Notis accordingly to make arrangements for tomorrow...

Hereafter Grivas refers to the Archbishop as Genikos, Gen or G.—see Appendix II.

31ST JAN., 1955: In the morning our host asked us to leave because he was worried. I told him this was impossible and after a lot of trouble we succeeded in persuading him to let us stay. But what a dastardly conduct on his part! And because he is afraid there is real danger that he might give us away. Together with my two escorts—Papadopoulos and Droushiotis—I have spent the last 12 hours in agony.

At last, at 19.00 hours, Masonides arrived and took me to Nicosia, to Metochi Kykko, where I saw Gen. Gen criticized our security, after which he informed me of the statements which the arrested men had made. So far so good. Sokratis had been caught on board the caique. He had confessed that he had embarked at Perama, that he belonged to a National Movement in Greece campaigning for Enosis and that the cargo was intended for use in dynamiting operations in the event of UNO's decision being negative, etc.

Gen gave instructions in connection with operations. He precluded active guerrilla operations for the present, and said that military objectives should be attacked but without inflicting casualties. He did not approve of my suggestion of parallel action by guerrilla groups, and I was forced to comply. A display of activity to follow the sentencing of the accused.

1ST FEB., 1955: At 19.00 hours Notis came to the Strovolos house and he told me what he had done. He informed me that he had found a house in Nicosia by Kyrenia Gate. He had transferred two crates of ammunition from the house at Palouriotissa. I gave general instructions to prepare for action against the following targets:—Episkopi, Symvoulos, Dhekelia, the wireless station at Athalassa, Lakatamia and the Wolseley Barracks. Depending on the availability of explosives, it is probable that further targets will in due course be added to this list.

In connection with the question of us being able to select further targets, Lenas and Afxentiou should be contacted and before the attacks are prepared Notis should then go and join them in order to study the matter....

Episkapi and Dhekelia are the new military cantonments in Cyprus.

3RD FEB., 1955: At 19.00 hours I moved into the new house. My first impressions were good....

I submitted to Gen an estimate for this month's expenses.

Hire of one car	£4000
Expenses in respect of the movements and subsistence of an outside courier (and car)	2500
Rent of house where I reside	900
Rent of house for my assistant	900
Rent of a house by Yiankos	1300
Rent of a house which is to be reserved in case of need (the house has been found)	1500
Rent of one garage for the storage of	
Material	200
Rent of a meeting room	300
Expenses in respect of my own subsistence and that of my assistant, of one bodyguard and courier and of two other people	6000
Expenses in connection with storekeeper's board and lodging (he maintains and cleans the arms)	<u>2500</u>
	<u>£20100</u>

8TH FEB., 1955: Work on the excavation of my secret cellar has been started...

9TH FEB., 1955: Gen has returned to me the money receipts which I had given him, with the request that I should write these out in a different manner—i.e. simply to the effect that I have received sum, such-and-such.

Notis reported that he had entered Government House and made the necessary reconnaissance. He suggested two places; either near the...^{*} where the results would be poor, or somewhere in the centre of the building where the bedrooms are located. As regards the latter alternative, a further detailed reconnaissance will be necessary.

10TH FEB., 1955: Notis reported to me as follows:

(a) He had been told by Papastavros that he (Papastavros) had shown my article to Gen and that Gen had told him that it is not advisable that we should represent the people who were caught at Khlorakas, as being dynamite smugglers. Gen would be writing an article in this connection and, if I wished to do so, I could alter my own article as regards the point which he mentions.

(b) He has been offered 60 sticks of dynamite at 2s. each, 2 crates of dynamite, 1 crate containing pistols and two light automatics with 500 rounds. No price was quoted to him for these last items but they will let him know on the 13th instant, which is the date on which they expect delivery....

As regards (b), I have written to Gen asking him to make available the necessary funds.

11TH FEB., 1955: Gen has made £100 available for the purchasing of arms and with reference to my letter of yesterday's date.

13TH FEB., 1955: This evening according to Notis, police are patrolling the Trikomo area up to Boghaz, where Intelligence Agents have since established themselves. They are obviously looking for me in that district, since it also happens to be my place of birth....

* Interpretation of the abbreviation "lev" which appears in the original has not been possible—Translator.

15TH FEB., 1955: Gen informed me that he would be arranging to see me soon....

17TH FEB., 1955: More progress with the cellar—a cement floor has been laid....

I also received reports from Orestis to the effect that Gen, whom he had seen, had promised to help him with the mission with which I had entrusted him....

I then prepared a full report for Gen, whom I put completely in the picture as regards the above, including the gist of the reports I had received from Evagoras, Polos, and Cicero* and a copy of the report from the man in charge at Paphas. I shall be sending this report tomorrow morning through the usual channels.

18TH FEB., 1955: I sent to Gen the report which I had prepared last night for his information....

19TH FEB., 1955: I wrote and sent to Gen a report in connection with the publication of the unauthorized newspaper, *Enosis*....

21ST FEB., 1955: I sent to Gen a receipt for £200 which is to be set aside for the purchase of armaments.

Notis came home at 23.00 hours and told me that he had taken delivery of only 17 mines, as the remainder were unsuitable. He also submitted to me a report about target reconnaissance at Limassol. He will be leaving again for Limassol tomorrow to finish the work in hand.

He has found a place suitable for the preparation of a mountain hideout, and he asked for my permission that work should be started on it and in accordance with the instructions which I have already issued. I approved....

24TH FEB., 1955: At 17.00 hours Gen sent a message to the effect that he wished to see me at 20.00 hours. I replied that I could not see him today but that I would meet him tomorrow at that same time and at the same place where we had met on the last occasion...

25TH FEB., 1955: Gen advised me that he would be unable to meet me today and that he would be getting into touch with me again to arrange a meeting on another occasion. At about 15.00 hours Notis returned from Limassol. His excuse was to the effect that

* Polykarpus Georghiades. See page 93.

he wanted to take all the necessary security precautions in person, for the meeting with Gen. I reprimanded him. He did not appear very pleased with the Limassol men, four of them definitely lacking spirit....

1ST MARCH, 1955: Notis had departed in low spirits after saying that he would be submitting a report. I often think that this man is either irresponsible or else something has happened of which I have no clue, because his conduct is often unjustifiable—a sensible man could not possibly behave in this manner, appreciating as he would the gravity of our situation and the seriousness of our mission. But he takes advantage of the fact that I am restricted in my movements. Were it not for this, I would tie him to a post and dismiss him from all responsibility in the ranks of our Organization.

2ND MARCH, 1955: Having thought things over, I have decided either to remove Notis for good or, at any rate, to limit his responsibilities. This would mean that I would have to take a more active part in target reconnaissance and thereby run the obvious risk of being discovered....

I instructed Hermis as follows:

He is to take charge of all the work in Nicosia town, including the direction of both combat and killer groups. One of the targets for the latter group will also be the Cyprus Mail offices. The managerial staff are to have their homes reconnoitred and their habits observed, and the killer group is to be in readiness. There is to be a re-distribution of the hand grenades, in view of the reshuffling of the groups. Hermis is to receive his orders exclusively from me and he will be coming under my direct control. In answer to his query as to whether Notis would be intervening, my answer was an emphatic “No”....

4TH MARCH, 1955: I recommended to Zidros that he should clean out the dead wood from the sabotage group with a view to retaining only the brave and spirited men. I stressed to him the necessity that our first attack should be crowned with success, since apart from other considerations, it will be a matter of prestige to us and will raise the morale of our people. Zidros strikes me as being a man of determination and I am expecting excellent results from him. We shall see.

5TH MARCH, 1955: Averof* advised me that a meeting had been arranged between myself and Gen for next Monday, 7th instant, at 20.00 hours....

Paschalis reported to me that the grocer of whom we buy supplies has not been paid, that we owe him about £99, of which £30 in cash taken by Notis. He also added that Notis has not paid the rent of the house and this had to be paid from his own money.

To me this is incomprehensible. Why hasn't Notis paid? What has he done with the money he has taken?

Why has he not delivered the cash to Averof and the account of the administration of all the money he received, although the fixed date for doing so expired last night?...

7TH MARCH, 1955: At 20.00 hours Notis came to fetch me for my meeting with Gen. I asked him why the grocer had not been paid and he replied that he had paid him. Also, why Averof had borrowed £70 from Christoudis for paying our debts? I reprimanded both of them for doing so without my being informed. I saw Gen. He informed me of the following; as long as the Government of Cyprus know very well from several different sources that the caique was transporting ammunition and arms and that a revolution was being prepared we should not keep it secret any more.

He also had a letter from Savvas Loizides whose opinion is identical with his for the following reason: if we will still maintain the excuse that the caique was smuggling dynamite then his brother Sokratis would appear in the eyes of Greeks and foreigners as a smuggler, and this should be avoided.

It appears that Gen spoke of the above owing to unfavourable remarks made in the unlawful newspaper *Enosis* in its issue of the 10th February.

Gen asked my opinion on the above and I replied as follows: I am against the opinion of making such a statement today because this will hamper our action, meaning all the planned sabotage.

The opposite version is to our advantage so that we can allay all British suspicion and to give them the impression that we will do nothing, and as the British know of my presence here it is better

* Yannakis Drousiotis.

that I should let it be known purposely that I am completely discouraged and I am looking for a way to get out of Cyprus by some clandestine means.

After the outburst of the struggle in Cyprus then we can let the truth be known regarding the caïque. Gen has agreed with my opinion....Savvas again. For the satisfaction of his brother and himself let the earth burst in fire. Then, we discussed targets and the date of the beginning of our activities.

Regarding the date, I suggested that this should be after the 25th March....

8TH MARCH, 1955: At noon Notis came to the house. We discussed the account which he submitted to me and I made remarks on some expenses which should not have been made. Money was overspent and beyond our calculations.

I asked him why the grocer had not been paid, and he still insisted that he had been paid. (The above statement was made in the presence of Paschalis who reported that he was informed by the grocer that he had not been paid.)...

In the evening, and on Paschalis' suggestion, I wrote to Hermis to ask the grocer if he had been paid....

I sent a note to Hermis to entrust one of the Nicosia execution groups with the reconnoitring of the following targets: the Secretariat and the Office of Education. It is already possible to undertake these targets because we have obtained more material. We brought sixteen more mines and there is more material which is offered. Thank God at last. Something important will be achieved with God's help....

Hermis came to the house. I gave him instructions for sabotage plans on the targets of the Secretariat and Office of Education. He should also take delivery from Notis of the necessary sabotage material for all targets....

11TH MARCH, 1955: I submitted to Gen a report of all expenses as from the 27th Jan., 1955, to the 9th March, 1955, as well as of all money received. I also applied for £110 for the purchase of mines and one barrel of amatol....

12TH MARCH, 1955: No reply from Gen regarding the car, etc., etc. I was compelled to send Paschalis with a note to Averof, so that the latter should ask to meet the courier and apply for a reply.

At 09.00 Notis came to my house. He reported that the material for Famagusta and Nicosia has been prepared and delivered as follows:

In Famagusta (Zidros):

- 25 bottles of petrol of the 3 fuses type.
- 3 explosive fillings, slow burning, of 7 kilos each.
- 1 time bomb of 7 kilos.
- 30 detonators.

For the above the following material was available:

- 31 kilos explosives.
- 75 dynamite sticks.
- 5 sticks Nobel 808 (sic).
- 20 metres fuse.
- 30 okes* of petrol.
- 25 bottles.

In Nicosia (Hermis):

- 5 explosive fillings slow burning of 6 kilos each.
- 2 explosive fillings slow burning of 4 kilos each.
- 2 time bombs of 6 kilos each.
- 34 offensive hand grenades.
- 10 bottles of petrol.
- 4 bottles of petrol.
- 4 bottles of petrol with detonators and naked fuse.

For the above the following material was available:

- 50 kilos explosive.
- 75 detonators.
- 9 sticks Nobel 808 (sic).
- 16 metres fuse.
- 38 sticks of dynamite.
- 12 okes of petrol.
- 18 bottles.

I gave the following instructions:

For the use of the remaining material in Limassol.

* An oke is about $2\frac{4}{5}$ lb.

The written instructions (today's) for all work to be done in Limassol.

14TH MARCH, 1955: On my invitation Averof came to my house at 19.39 hours so that I could give him my instructions. He was compelled to admit that Notis had received from Christoudis about £150 and that he himself had not received money from Christoudis, whereas in the beginning he had admitted receiving £70.

He also said that the foodstuffs had not been paid for, and that the van had not been returned to its owner.

Yet he was unable to explain why he had covered him for such a long time. He begged me not to mention this to Notis.

I advised him to find out either through Masonides or somebody else what happened to all the money taken by him from Christoudis, as well as what excuse he gave about the van. What am I going to do with that rogue I got entangled with?...

Those who gave him money without my authority are bearing great responsibility for such abuse.

To prevent even Notis repeating such abuse and especially when Gen gave him money without any authority from me, I had to write a letter to the latter asking him that he should give money to no one unless he has authority from me and a duly signed receipt. But even Christoudis, why did he give him money?

This incident has greatly upset me, not only because of honesty but also because it has a bad effect on all of our members who heard of it.

Should I execute him with my own hands? But then our struggle will be discovered....

19TH MARCH, 1955: At about 20.30 hours we went to Michaelopoulos' house where we met Christoudis. We discussed the functioning of a duplicator for the issue of leaflets by our organization....

21ST MARCH, 1955: I am reporting to Gen that I AM READY and am awaiting orders to begin. Any delay in the actual waiting period means danger. I submit an inventory of all arms and ammunition which have been purchased and how these have been disposed of in the different districts for the first sabotage operations. I am also asking permission for the hiring of cars during these days and purchasing of material as a reserve, because

our dynamite operations must continue intensively. I am also asking for the purchase of pistols. All my efforts tend to convince everybody of the necessity to be discreet and keep complete secrecy of our intentions and movements....

22ND MARCH, 1955: I am preparing myself for the start of the struggle. I am studying details. I am preparing my hideout as S. Command. Arms and ammunition. I am arming my bodyguards. I am sorting my files....

At eight o'clock I left for Saittas to meet all the group leaders there (guerrilla and sabotage) and make the necessary arrangements, this meeting having been pre-arranged by Notis whom I sent yesterday. I first met the Amiandos sabotage leader and then Avramis in charge of the Amiandos guerrilla group....

Grivas is now ready to begin his operations and it only remains for Archbishop Makarios to name the actual date when Grivas is to be free to launch the campaign of violence.

At 14.00 hours I left for Nicosia where I arrived at about 16.30 hours. I do not feel tired, although I have been working hard since yesterday. Our efforts and our fight must give results. I am glad to see the results obtained after so many months of intensive work, perseverance and method, and this only with the help of Notis who, in spite of all his defects, works hard but not without reprimands and advice from me....

26TH MARCH, 1955: At noon, Evagoras came, having just returned from Limassol. He reported about all the work he has performed. He handed in nominal rolls of all guerrilla groups and the mission of each group. Arms and ammunition have been distributed to all men of Amiandos and Pyrgos groups.

He gave instructions to the youths in connection with the writing of slogans, etc.

I gave instructions for today and tomorrow:

To inspect all groups under Zidros to find out if they are in order and to recommend discretion. The Yeri group, with Polos, to be entrusted with the target of the Governor's House and a reconnaissance to be made. To come in touch with the Zodhias group, to recommend discretion and if we need them we will let them know. The machine-gun and Breda to be transferred to Kyrenia....

27TH MARCH, 1955: Averof reported that Gen wants to see me on the 29th inst. and at 20.00 hours at the same place...

29TH MARCH, 1955: 20.00 hours. I saw Gen....WE CAN START. He gave me his blessing. God is with us....

At 22.00 hours I went back home. I am thinking of when to start. The night of the 31st March or the night of the 1st April? I must start as soon as possible because as we go along the moon will hamper us. The moon is six days old today.

Tomorrow I see the section leaders and if they are ready we will start on the night of the 31st March.

I close my book now because I am preparing to bury it.

THE NEXT VOLUME OF THE DIARY RECORDS THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE.

30TH MARCH, 1955: At 20.30 hours I assembled Hermis, Orestis, Zidros and Evagoras in the house of Michaelopoulos and announced to them my decision for the beginning of activity in the night of 31st March-1st April at 00.30 hours. They agreed....

31ST MARCH, 1955: I examined the question of my HQs. I thought that I was not safe in the house where I am staying and so I would not be able to lead the struggle. I was thinking of moving to Kyrenia, but finally decided to stay in Nicosia in order to communicate more easily with the various Centres and intervene more actively in Nicosia where the Centres did not seem to be active. I made this decision against the exhortations of Evagoras who wanted to go to Kyrenia for the purpose of finding a building. Finally Evagoras did not go there because Papaflessas had not met him as pre-arranged. So I have definitely decided to stay in Nicosia.

Evagoras left for Limassol at about 12.30 hours. He will be in charge of all sabotage groups in Limassol District. I wished him success.

At 13.30 hours I left for the house in Strovolos where I temporarily established my HQ, so that I could communicate more easily with the Centres, and where my frequent contacts with the couriers would not betray my permanent HQ....

The time of activity is drawing near. At 00.30 hours I noticed a short interruption of the current but without any other result. What has happened? Has the attempt to cut off the current failed?

Some minutes after 00.30 hours the first explosions are heard. They are followed by others and finally the last one, which was also the biggest.

We went to bed at 03.00 hours. We shall know the results tomorrow.

1ST APRIL, 1955: The first news from the newspapers shows that the results were satisfactory. Information which I received in the evening says:

NICOSIA: Athalassa Radio Station: It was burning. It seems that the group who made this attack was successful.

LAKATAMIA RADIO STATION: Nothing.

WOLSELEY BARRACKS: Insignificant damages.

The same with the Secretariat and the Education Office.

LARNACA: All targets were attacked satisfactorily.

FAMAGUSTA: Results not satisfactory. I have no more information.

LIMASSOL: Two targets only were attacked in the town; they are: Police Headquarters and Ayios Ioannis Police Station. More information is wanted about Episkopi, Polemidia, etc.

ARRESTS: Orestis with the leaders of two other groups and two more persons were arrested.

Zidros is wanted by the police. It is said that he has been arrested.

Atromitos abandoned his position and came here to allege that while going to his targets he was met by the police and was thus obliged to leave the material. This is why two attacks in Limassol did not take place.

No information at all about Evagoras.

One of the members ordered to cut off the electric current was electrocuted; this explains the short interruption of the current at about 00.30 hours without complete cutting off of the current in Nicosia.

I came in contact with Averof and ordered that terrorist attacks should continue in the evening.

The Athens Radio Station has broadcast a report from Paris about terrible explosions in Cyprus.

“The Voice of the Fatherland” has said nothing at all about the events and has confined itself to praising Sokratis Loizides. This was certainly done after instructions from his brother Savvas in Athens. After this I was obliged to submit a report to Gen expressing my bitterness at the attitude of the Radio Station and Loizides who by bad luck appears on the scene again to exploit for himself the work of others.

Loizides brothers seem to bring bad luck in the struggle again.

2ND APRIL, 1955: I have issued an order on the way in which the sabotage groups must act; i.e., the continuation of terrorist attacks in the town so that the police may be unable to cope with the situation. This will oblige the Government to use military forces for its security and I shall be later able to organize the rebel struggle which is already being prepared. I have also given orders for the recruitment of new members in the sabotage groups, the finding of material and the selection of leaders....

The “Voice of the Fatherland” broadcast was something for which the word “Shame” would be the least to be said about it. After this I was obliged to address to G the following letter:

“I am obliged to return to the question of the contents of the broadcasts ‘Voice of the Fatherland’. Today’s broadcast was worse than yesterday; it went so far as to say that Freedom is not gained with terrorism, as Gandhi did not succeed in liberating India with means like this! Those who listened to it were petrified and were asking themselves whether they should continue the struggle. Mr. Loizides, who yesterday spent half an hour eulogizing his brother, could well today spend a few minutes in strengthening the morale of the people of Cyprus, who are today carrying out a bloody struggle. As I have many times told you, I shall conduct the struggle, which you have entrusted to me, *even if I am left ALONE*; but if I survive I shall have many things to speak about everybody and about what he has contributed in this struggle. If I die I shall leave them in writing.”

At this stage Grivas complains bitterly of lack of support on the Greek radio, but later, as the diaries reveal, as a result of the Archbishop's influence the Greek radio gave its complete support to the encouragement of terrorism in Cyprus. As a result, and after months of toleration Her Majesty's Government decided in March, 1956, to jam these pro-terrorist transmissions.

Averof reports that Zidros has not been arrested. It seems that he is in Akanthou or Kyrenia where he has been ordered to go in case of danger of arrest. Attack on Dhekelia failed because the driver refused to carry the group there....

I have not yet come in contact with Larnaca, because all of our active members have been arrested.

Four pupils of the Gymnasium, members of our Organization, have been arrested for pasting proclamations on walls....

3RD APRIL, 1955: I ordered group-leaders to assemble as I want to see them.

Averof came to my house in the evening and handed me a letter from Genikos in reply to a letter sent to him in connection with "The Voice of the Fatherland".

This letter, also captured, is reproduced on page 60.

4TH APRIL, 1955: ... Evagoras came from Limassol in the afternoon. It seems that he was afraid. I sent him away impolitely and I did not let him speak to me. He dissolved the groups, and it seems that he lost the arms and ammunition. As he is afraid that he has become known to the police he has come here to seek asylum. I knew that he was a mean fellow but I thought that he was a bold man. **He is cowardly and a dastard.** I have issued orders to all groups here not to approach him because he has been expelled from the Organization. I have also given orders that he should be driven away from the house in Ayios Dometios where he is staying. It seems that he was afraid to go to Strovolos.

Averof has informed me that Zidros is in Lysi and not in Akanthou. Bad luck again. Now that he has been proclaimed he wants us to take him away. To previous appeals to him, through his friends, to tell us where he is so that we might carry him away, he did not reply; neither did he ask for contact with

us as he had been ordered before the commencement of the fight.

How can you work and draw a plan against the English when two of your chief leaders have the mentality about which I have spoken above? I am now alone. God will help me, it is on Him that I base myself and not on men.

And as if this was not enough, the Gen sends me a letter and gives his opinion that our activities must stop in the towns so that we may re-organize ourselves!! I must take lessons now from the various faint-hearted fellows who surround Genikos and give advice to him because they are afraid of their skins and are interested in their leisure. Because such are the men who give their opinions to Genikos who, although it is only yesterday that he wrote to me, "Go ahead, you are doing well...."

It is a critical turn of the struggle now....

7TH APRIL, 1955: I have given two proclamations to be duplicated; the one is about the English soldiers and the other about the English bases in Cyprus.

I have prepared a report to the Gen on the situation and on the re-organization of groups for future activity....

I am also in danger in the house where I am staying. Evagoras is walking about in Nicosia and is staying in a pension with his mistress. I am afraid that, he is a coward, he may disclose everything if arrested. His mistress also knows a lot of things.

Kris came to me in the evening and reported to me on the activities of Evagoras in Limassol and on his cowardice. He was responsible for the failure in Limassol. During the explosion in Episkopi he was in the car trembling, and it was Krassides who made the attack. Also in the explosion in Troodos he gave orders for it only at about 22.30 hours and so the members had not time enough at their disposal. For the explosion in Polemidia there were no members to cause it. After the explosion at Episkopi he drove towards Polemidia but he later changed his mind and returned to Limassol. He returned to Limassol using the public road and this was done against **my repeated orders on this subject**. The result was

that Krassides was discovered because Krassides' car was ordered to stop by Yermassoyia police and it failed to stop. The result was that Krassides and the men with him were arrested on the following day....

An information bulletin by Cicero says that there is a traitor among us in Limassol....

10TH APRIL, 1955: I regret to see that there is no enthusiasm in Greece. Nothing can be expected from them. In Rhodes somewhat more serious events occurred but again without much fighting spirit. What can we do? We shall go on alone; but I am certain that when praises are awarded after the end of our struggle, we shall be given crumbs whilst others will claim the victory. At least this is what happens in Greece....

Both the Athenian and the local press are expecting a change of the English attitude after the filling of the Foreign Office with Macmillan (Churchill has retired and Eden has succeeded him as Prime Minister). The press also carries reports that the Cyprus question is causing great headache to England.

11TH APRIL, 1955: I sent an order to Tselingas* demanding a report on our members in Limassol District.

I sent an order to Zidros demanding:

- (1) The submission of a report on the events of April 1st.
- (2) The place where he is keeping the sabotage material which has been given to him.
- (3) To start sabotage activity in Kyrenia District and say what material he needs.
- (4) Whom he suspects of being a traitor in the Famagusta Groups.
- (5) Training of rebel-groups and the forming of new groups *must be expedited. He must first execute the missions which have already been entrusted to him.* When he is ready he is to report.
- (6) To keep me aware of the progress of the work, which he has hitherto failed to do. He has so far reported nothing on what he was ordered to do in Kyrenia.

* Constantinos Lefkosiotis.

I have sent a letter to Genikos, asking him to take an interest in the families of those arrested....

I strongly suspect that *Evagoras is betraying us*. He is the man who can do anything. He is a thief and rake and he can do everything; he can even betray his fatherland....

13TH APRIL, 1955: Owing to the arrest of Evagoras I left the house of Pasch. at 07.30 hours and went to Sofoklis' house....Cicero reports that Evagoras was arrested at 16.00 hours and was interrogated until 22.00 hours when he was left free. He made them believe that he was a man of the underworld. His attitude is strange; why does he not hide himself since he can? And why do the police not arrest him? These are two questions to which I find it difficult to give an answer. I think that Evagoras is a traitor. If he is not, then the police do one of two things; they either let him free to see with whom he comes in contact or they want to make him their agent. I have given orders to my men to follow him and see what happens so that we can take our measures. Polos has left for Amiandos. The recruiting of Government Officials has failed. I shall issue a proclamation to the Government employees tomorrow, calling them not to submit to the force used by Government.

14TH APRIL, 1955: Averof came to my house in the evening and I gave him orders. I also gave him a proclamation to Government officials for publication and distribution.

16TH APRIL, 1955: Hermis came in the evening. I appointed him as in charge of all sabotage groups in the Island. His assistant in Nicosia will be Eleftheriou and Eleftheriou will be assisted by Markos....

17TH APRIL, 1955: 14.00 hours. Averof came to my house. He reported to me that the Communists are preparing dynamite explosions in Lefka and that they have proposed to one of our members in Paphos to carry out these attacks. Averof gave him orders to find out if this is a serious effort emanating from AKEL. He will pretend that he accepts but he will demand of them to support him if he is arrested. If they agree he will ask them to give him time to learn how to use the material; he will then take it and report to us.

We must take more serious measures. So I have issued an order to the sabotage groups and the EOKA Youth, in which I demand

organized and systematic watching of the Communists. I have also asked Genikos to dispose the sum of £500 for the purchase of pistols with which the sabotage groups will be supplied....

Here follows the first indication of a clash of interests with the Communists, whose organization AKEL was proscribed in December, 1955.

I wrote a warning to leading Communists and AKEL officials to cease reacting in any way to our work; otherwise we shall punish them and report their acts to the Greek and Cyprus people.

19TH APRIL, 1955: I drafted a letter to Genikos returning to my old proposal that the competent authorities in Athens should not grant visas for Cyprus to Communists in Greece....

At 12.00 hours I saw Azinas and gave him instructions for acts of sabotage in the Court premises in Ktima. I told him that the acts of sabotage should take place before 2nd May (date of the start of the trial of the 13). I also gave him instructions to organize the youth and prepare an armed group. He reported to me that he had advised Sokratis Loizides on the night of his arrest not to go to the seashore to receive the ship. He however, replied that he would go and if the ship came he would leave Cyprus by it. I am greatly concerned with the suppression of every Communist move. I am examining the question.

20TH APRIL, 1955: In the night I saw Hermis and Averof and gave them orders. Averof reported to me that a representative of the students, Renos Kyriakides,* arrived here yesterday and wanted to see me. I fixed a meeting with him for tomorrow.

21ST APRIL, 1955: A group of students (Cypriots) who have been trained in sabotage in Crete are ready to help us....

He suggested that a group of Cypriot students trained in the use of arms (about six) should come to Cyprus at once and if possible until the end of this month. They will fight with rebel-groups. The rest (about four) will come later.

If they are in possession of arms these arms must be sent here by a very quick ship so that she may not be in danger of being caught. About this he will consult Sakellarios (Admiral). He will

* Known as Romanos. See page 92.

also consult Evstathopoulos and Gazouleas for the coming of one or two officers of the reserve.

I agreed with him and he will depart from Cyprus on 25th....

25TH APRIL, 1955: Hermis also reported that a person was sent by the Bishop of Kitium wanting members of our Organization to be recommended to him for training. As regards this report I have sent a letter to Genikos in which I report what has happened and make it known to him that I shall not permit others to give orders in the Organization. Nothing will be done without approval. Neither are we in need of trainers.

27TH APRIL, 1955: I have sent a letter to Genikos requesting that the Athenian newspapers should be advised to censure the pressure exercised by the Government on its employees to enlist in the Special Constabulary. As all means used have failed, forms have been sent by the Government to them which they have been ordered to fill and state why they do not wish to enlist....

28TH APRIL, 1955: At 13.00 hours Hermis came and gave me reports of Nicosia groups. I instructed him to expedite the organization of groups in Nicosia, Morphou and Trikomo. I also instructed him to organize in a better way the groups in Famagusta and Larnaca and form youth-groups in these two towns. I told him that the group-leaders must start organizing groups in big centres of their areas so that we may prevent any movements or reaction by the Communists.

The organization of the country is difficult. Neos is unable to undertake the organization of the youth outside Nicosia. I am not satisfied with Tselingas' work. I am trying to face the situation created by the Communists with temporary measures until I find the fit persons.

Unfortunately I do not find the proper persons; most of them have lost their courage....

29TH APRIL, 1955: X^{*} has informed me that Genikos has written that no activity should take place now as "very important national interests are risked." He stresses that we must wait for instructions.

* A symbol, which appears as a diagonal cross, with a bishop's crook vertically down the centre, denotes Papastavros. See page 91.

This letter is reproduced on page 62.

2ND MAY, 1955: I saw Dafnis (Hermis) at noon. He reported to me on his contacts in Famagusta, Larnaca and Limassol. Work in Famagusta is satisfactory. They have about twelve members of sabotage groups. Reports on targets will be submitted....

3RD MAY, 1955: I saw Averof in the evening. He reported on his mission. He said that two students arrived today from Athens but they reported to him that on their arrival they were recognized by relatives of theirs. He told them to stay here as he will decide what to do tomorrow. He also told me that two more students will arrive tomorrow and the rest, between four and six, will come by sea on Thursday.

4TH MAY, 1955: I have sent an EOKA oath to Averof which he will give to the students who have arrived. He will ask them if they agree before they are detailed to do work....

5TH MAY, 1955: Christodoulos reported to me that Averof has announced to him the arrival of four more students. *16.00-18.30 hours* I saw five students. The sixth is in Paphos. I talked with them. There are some difficulties. The most important is whether they must start underground activity from the very beginning or not. I think that they must go to their villages and work in secret. All of them said that they could do so, with the exception of Romanos*, who said that he cannot on account of his parents. After this I ordered Romanos to work unlawfully and be responsible for the organization of the Amiandos groups.

6TH MAY, 1955: The Athens Broadcasting Station ("Voice of the Fatherland") has broadcast that, after the rejection by the Government of England, in today's debate in the House of Commons, of any proposal for negotiations on the Cyprus question, and as the English Government has said NEVER again, then the people must wait for the results of the Elections of 26th May and, if the new Government adopts the same policy again, **THE CYPRIOTS MUST RESORT TO ARMS AND FIGHT UNDER THE FLAG OF DIGHENIS†.**

* Renos Kyriakides. See page 92.

† Grivas himself. See page 92.

8TH MAY, 1955: The nationalist papers are only interested in their pockets. None of them has protested either at the curfews or at the order that the Government officials must guard their offices themselves. And this is done when the Communist mouthpiece *Demokratis* is militantly attacking the Government and is thus indirectly serving us! The Mayor of Famagusta protests at the law for curfews while none of the other Mayors has protested.

(Grivas had written about this to Gen on 6th May—see page 64.)

9TH MAY, 1955: In reply to a report from Neos I have given orders for the holding of a demonstration of youth during the trial of Artemiou, pupil and member of the Youth. The trial will take place on 11th May, and it must be militant. Sacrifices or arrests must not be taken into consideration....

16TH MAY, 1955: Cicero informs me that in a three-storied house at Palaea Sphaghia [*Old Slaughterhouses*] in Athens a centre of espionage is operating for the Cyprus police. I have informed the Gen to inform Athens through the Greek Consulate....

17TH MAY, 1955: Order for completion of preparatory work for the execution of traitors and for submission to me of the necessary reports....

22ND MAY, 1955: I am preparing a report to the Gen for the continuation of our activity....

The report is reproduced on pages 65-7.

I sent to X a report on the situation, measures proposed, and a general plan of activity. I also sent him a report against Principal Spyridakis which he must give to the Gen after his arrival (he is expected to arrive next Tuesday 24th inst.)...

X (Papastavros) was of course an obvious person to keep it for the Archbishop on his return.

24TH MAY, 1955: The demonstration of Nicosia pupils which I ordered has been held. I am waiting for the results.

The demonstration of the pupils was very good and militant. About 600 boys and girls participated in it. It was held in accordance with my orders. The route followed was the one I wanted. The police were stoned and they are on the alert.

25TH MAY, 1955: I was informed that an attempt was made against the Governor in the Pallas Cinema. A time-bomb exploded at

23.10 but only damage was caused because the Governor had left at about 23.00 hours.

Thalis reports that the time bomb was planted by members of Astrapi group. He did not inform me beforehand because it was late when he heard that the Governor would also go. He thought that the performance would be over at about 23.20 hours, as usually; but it was over at 23.00 hours.

Averof informs me that one of our members was arrested. At midday another member of the group which committed the sabotage was arrested....

27TH MAY, 1955: Arch. arrived from Egypt at about 12.30 hours without previous notice.

I gave orders for the formation in the towns of groups specialized in fighting in the towns. They will be used for action against military and police patrols.

I saw Dafnis. He visited Larnaca, but the situation there is not good. The man in charge is not active; he seems to be afraid. I ordered him to show special interest in Famagusta and Limassol.

Nemesis was released on the day before yesterday....

28TH MAY, 1955: I ordered Thalis to study the possibility of placing a time-bomb during the parade in Nicosia on the occasion of Elizabeth's birthday.

29TH MAY, 1955: Zidros submitted a report on the attack on a company encamped in Boghaz (Kyrenia). I studied it and returned it to him with my remarks....

30TH MAY, 1955: I was much tired today; or rather I am tired because they do not know how to work. They are all willing to work, but there is no system and they do not have the required knowledge. What shall I do? I shall go on to the end. I shall succeed in spite of all difficulties. I am alone in this effort. God is on my side.

31ST MAY, 1955: I studied plans submitted by Heron (Nicosia). I returned them with remarks.

The Gen has brought me a letter from Evstathopoulos which reads: "I am well. My sister-in-law was married. The child was baptized. The power of attorney expires on June 30th."

He sent me a copy of the power of attorney which was made in Athens....

2ND JUNE, 1955: On this question I have made a report which I shall forward to the Gen.

The authorities do not seem to have noticed yet my presence here, and they want to know who Dighenis is.

3RD JUNE, 1955: X has written to me that the Gen wants to meet me and to give him the place of meeting. I have replied....

4TH JUNE, 1955: I received a report from Cicero on the question of arms from Egypt. He came in personal contact with one of our men who is in correspondence with the Cypriot in Suez who made the proposal in April, and the latter invited him to go to Egypt as the question has been settled. Both his friend, a general and two officers, are willing to reinforce us. I have asked for approval by the Gen to send this person to Egypt.

The Gen has fixed a meeting with me in the Met. on 7th inst. at 18.30 hours.

Met. are the first three letters of the word "metochion" (in English, "annexe", and it must mean the Kykko Annexe in Nicosia.

6TH JUNE, 1955: Disaster! A fire broke out near my house. I came near to becoming a prey of the fire. Great anxiety. I was compelled to throw into the hiding-place all documents and arms and close the hiding-place which is useless for the present. The police came, but fortunately nothing more happened. The fire was put out. It was caused by firewood burning near a near-by house....I received a note from X instructing me to meet the Gen at the Kykko Annexe tomorrow at 06.30 hours.

7TH JUNE, 1955: The meeting was held. He spoke to me about the youth movement and Spyridakis. My impression is that he approved of the youth movement but he would like everything to emanate from him. He has found everything ready, but he does not know how to handle them. As regards Spyridakis, his opinion is that he is a cowardly man. He asked me about the arms of which we are in need. It is only now that he has understood that we need arms as well!! Oh! If only I had before the brains which I have now!! No one wanted to listen to me when we had the chance. Now he wants arms!

About Egypt (the sending of arms from there), he does not believe that we shall succeed and so he does not approve it. He

wants us to start. Papagos asked him why he stopped!! Another one who wants everything ready for exploitation! I told him that I shall start after the end of the old moon and that I am making preparations to place a time-bomb in the Government House on the 9th June, at the celebration of Elizabeth's birthday. We parted with his blessings: good success.

8TH JUNE, 1955: The Athens Radio Station commenting on the reasons which have compelled England to reconsider its policy towards the Cyprus Question, gives the following three reasons: (1) American pressure. (2) The situation created between Greece and England and its consequences on NATO. (3) The activity of EOKA.

At 19.30 hours Heron, Thalís, Dafnis came to the house and I gave them orders. I spoke to the first two on the attempt in the Government House on 9th June and 10th June in the house of Chief Justice Hallinan, where the Governor has been invited for dinner. The first attempt with the time-bomb will take place in any case (in spite of a desire of the Gen that the placing of the bomb should be made under certain reservations). As regards the second attempt, three ways were discussed (a time-bomb, hand-grenade and automatic guns). I ordered them to make inquiries and report to me tomorrow, which is the best way.

9TH JUNE, 1955: No attempt was made in the Government House. The man detailed to place the bomb says that he was not allowed to take his bicycle in which he had the bomb. The bicycle was left in the yard and far from the building....

10TH JUNE, 1955: Last night's events were favourably commented on by the Athens Radio Station, which praised the policy adopted by EOKA, a policy of blows at the English without weakening its forces....

17.00 hours. I saw Romanos in the house of Ayios Dometios, and I gave him order concerning the preparation of the struggle, selecting targets and the tactics to be adopted.

I ordered Thalís to try to attack the house of Chief Justice Hallinan tonight, when the latter will give a dinner to the Governor....

14TH JUNE, 1955: Last night four members of Nicosia groups were arrested while carrying explosives....

At 22.30 hours I noticed suspicious movements outside my house and I was compelled to take out my automatic gun to defend myself if required....

16TH JUNE, 1955: I issued an order to Zidros fixing the 20th June at 23.30 hours, as the day of attack on targets.

I made arrangements for a general attack on targets in the whole island.

I fixed day X as the day of beginning of new activity. This day is next Sunday, 19th inst.

I informed Thalís to murder Kyriakos on...next Sunday because he will leave for England shortly.

Assistant Superintendent Kyriakos Aristotelous went at this time to England for police training. He was murdered by EOKA at a nursing home in Nicosia on 15th April, 1956.

We are making preparations for the operations. I gave instructions to Averof concerning the distribution of material to the various groups in the towns.

My only effort is to take them by surprise, which is the best factor to success. If we do not take them by surprise our success is doubtful, if not impossible. For this reason I have issued orders and drawn their attention on this point....

18TH JUNE, 1955: We discussed the question of ambushing the car carrying explosives to Amiandos. I gave instructions how the attack will be made and how the material will be concealed. I demanded that the ambush should take place on 20th inst. (Monday), if he was ready, so that it might be synchronized with dynamite attacks in the towns which will begin on the night of 20th inst., (three attacks against bars will be made on 19th inst.). If, however, Romanos is not ready, the ambush will take place on Monday after the next, 27th inst. (The car carries explosives to Amiandos every Monday only.) I also gave general instructions to Romanos for the preparation of attacks against police stations. I also told him that all sabotage attacks be made by men of sabotage groups and that he must not use members of rebel-groups. I advised him to spare our forces so that we could continue working.

In the evening, before the time fixed, hand-grenades were thrown in Nicosia into an English bar. There were no victims but only material damage. This was so because the man who threw the

grenade did not throw it into the hall but behind a sofa. In Famagusta only one of the two refreshment places was attacked, without victims. The second one was not attacked because, according to Melas, the car did not come to carry the men to the place.

20TH JUNE, 1955: The results of the dynamite attacks were not the expected ones.

Famagusta: Results satisfactory. Only one attempt failed.

Nicosia: Fair. One attempt was satisfactory; the attack on Ayios Dometios Police Station. The attack against the Military Police failed.

Kyrenia: Rather a failure. Zidros did not raid Boghaz. I do not know why. He also did not raid Ayios Epiktitos Police Station and the store on the west of Ayia Erini. He only attacked Kyrenia Police Station with fair results. The attack on Lapithos Police Station was rather a failure. One of our men was seriously wounded, and one gun was abandoned. Two hand-grenades were thrown at the house of the British Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Forces.

Paphos: Results good.

21ST JUNE, 1955: I have communicated an order to Heron and Thalys, saying that I am not satisfied with the results of the Nicosia groups and demanding the intensification of activity, particularly against the police traitors, no matter if they are Greeks or Turks. My design is to terrorize the police so that we may be given more freedom of action. Unfortunately Zidros' (Kyrenia) failure does not give me the opportunity to start an armed struggle. I want to intensify terroristic measures. We shall see the results of tonight.

22ND JUNE, 1955: According to reports in the Press, last night's dynamite explosions were a success. In Nicosia a time-bomb went off in the Central Police Station with one townsman dead and a lot of others wounded (policemen and civilians, especially Turks). A hand-grenade was thrown at the English in Varosha. It was good work. In Larnaca a hand-grenade was thrown at the house of an Englishman. In Limassol a dynamite explosion took place in the Ayios Nikolaos Police Station. In Amiandos the police station was raided and the result was that the Sergeant in charge was killed and another policeman was seriously wounded.

The situation is developing favourably.

I called Thalys, Heron and Dafnis to see them at noon. My plan is: "The police must be attacked first." This will paralyze it. It seems that these attacks bear fruit.

I sent an order to Ramanos to prepare the operation against the car carrying explosives. The operation will be organized on Monday, 27th inst. He must also study the possibility of attacking the Governor by ambush next Sunday (26th inst.), while he is going to his summer residence in Troodos. About this I shall send Averof to Romanos tomorrow with special instructions. I shall direct this operation personally.

I saw Heron and Dafnis (Thalys did not come). I reviewed the situation and told them that the next turn will be against traitors. I emphasized that the promotion of the Cyprus Question will depend on the favourable development of our operations. All of us must work even if we are in danger of being killed.

I have written to the Gen to ask for time-bombs from Athens.

23RD JUNE, 1955: I have sent for duplication a proclamation to the police.

I sent an order for ruthless attacks on police traitors and judges sentencing Cypriot patriots.

I have sent an order to Kimon to study the possibility of attacking police stations and submit a report....

24TH JUNE, 1955: I have sent a letter to the Gen advising him to take measures for the protection of his life, following information that the Turks are organizing his assassination.

This letter is referred to in the marginal note Grivas made on the letter reproduced on page 67. The letter to the Archbishop is reproduced on pages 67-8.

I have given a sharp order to Heron and Melas to make their chief mission the execution of police traitors...

This order is reproduced on pages 68-9.

I called Averof and ordered him to go to Boghaz area and find good places where ambushes can lie for the purpose of murdering the Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Forces. Zidros' group will participate with a machine-gun....

Nothing of importance took place last evening. It seems that our men in Nicosia were afraid. In spite of all my encouragement

they have done nothing for the murder of traitors. One pupil was arrested in Paphos for carrying a Sten-gun. I have sent an angry letter to Kimon asking on whose order the removal of the Sten was made from its hiding place. I characterized this action as treason....

26TH JUNE, 1955: Nothing was done last night. Our men in the towns lost their courage. Shall I not expect more or are the local leaders not fit ones? Most of the objects were achieved except the execution of traitors. None was executed and no attempt was even made against the life of anybody.

I sent Averof with Elias last night to Boghaz to find places for ambushing the Commander-in-Chief Middle East.

I saw Averof who has come back from Boghaz. I was not satisfied with the results of his efforts to find places for ambushing. I shall go there, myself, to find the proper places. I have not yet come in contact with Zidros. Papaflessas did not want to bring him in contact with me, fearing that he was followed....

I gave orders that no arms will be removed and used without my orders. I sent order to Romanos reprimanding him for raiding Agros Police Station, without previously reporting anything to me, the result being that the raid failed.

I gave orders that the combat groups should stop activity, except the groups of executioners. Activity will be continued against traitors....

This order was actually dated 27th June, 1955—page 71.

I reported to Gen that I have ordered suspension of activity and that I am preparing something more serious after the new recourse to the UNO. I ask for approval to execute by ambush the Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Forces.

At 14.00 hours I went to Boghaz to find the proper place for ambushing the Commander-in-Chief. I found two places.

I received a report from Heron saying that an unsuccessful attempt against the life of Poullis was made last night at 23.00 hours.

27TH JUNE, 1955: I was informed by Christodoulos that a police search was carried out in the near-by village of Orta-Keuy. As I

was afraid that the search might be extended to our area, we were obliged to put our arms and documents in the hiding place.

28TH JUNE, 1955: My plan for future operations is as follows: The sabotage groups in the towns will have the police as their special target with a view to paralyzing and terrorizing them. They will be neutralized and the Army will have to reinforce them and thus scatter.

The rebel-groups will raid police stations, execute police traitors and seize their arms. They will also organize ambushes for trapping isolated policemen and depriving them of their arms. They will also seize the arms of isolated soldiers (couriers, motor cyclists).

This plan is set out in the order reproduced on pages 76-7. By the spring of 1956 the Security Forces had been reorganized and reinforced. The Archbishop and other leaders of the campaign of violence had been deported and the terrorists themselves were under very heavy pressure. The remainder of the diary illustrates how Grivas and his men were harried in the early summer of 1956, during which period heavy losses were inflicted upon them.

16TH MAY, 1956: At about 18.00 hours Ipsilandis came and met me. He came after I had told him to come, but Athanatas was not with him. (His whereabouts are unknown.) I gave him 37 instructions how to escape from encirclement and, in case of raids, how to face any attacks. He left about 19.00 hours.

At about midnight our courier came back from the school. There was no serious movement.

We stored food supplies and put everything in order in the hiding places.

An English soldier was killed and another one was wounded in the Nicosia airport.

20TH MAY, 1956: We got up at 04.00 hours. With the exception of five or six persons moving on a hill to the north of Lykourgos* no serious movement was noticed.

Yesterday evening a soldier was wounded in Rizokarpasso. This morning a soldier was wounded in Limassol.

* Markos Drakos. See page 92.

Everything is quiet in our sector during the whole day. The searches in the Lefka-Kambos area continued. The Radio Station reported the discovery of shotguns and a machine-gun. We are without link with the other branches and Nicosia. I intend to set up a link on the 11th inst. I shall send a link to the school in the evening of the same day to see what is happening.

25TH MAY, 1956: This day is the worst of the struggle for me; I am quite estranged from the sections and without information. I'll try to come into contact with them again soon.

At this stage of the campaign the deaths of Turkish Cypriots led to a serious development—outbreak of rioting between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots who are implacably opposed to Enosis.

As the result of the murder of a Turkish policeman on the night of the 24th inst., anti-Hellenic demonstrations of Turks and clashes occurred in Larnaca and Limassol with wounded men on both sides. Looting and acts of vandalism by Turks against Greek shops took place in Nicosia and Ktima.

At 20.00 hours two military jeeps passed below our camp. They were on the road leading from Peravasa to Milikouri. We took security measures, fearing lest they had laid some kind of ambush by the road.

27TH MAY, 1956: At about 01.00 hours two couriers arrived with Benakis. When I got up I met Benakis in the new area of our hide-out (high up between the road Milikouri to Vassa and Kykko to Panayia). The question of our link with Nicosia and with the food suppliers as well as all other questions were solved.

My intention is to come out of the encirclement. I shall first choose a hilltop and then move to Ay. Arkha from where we shall be able to go to the Limassol District.

At about 19.00 hours we left for the new hide-out approximately 1 mile SW of height 4014. After a tiresome and extremely dangerous march, on account of the steep ground, we arrived there at about 11.15 hours of the next day. This march was the most tiresome of the struggle, and perhaps the most tiresome and most dangerous march of my life. At 02.00 hours we had a rest until 06.00 hours at a place about 500 metres east of the secondary road and then continued our way until 07.30 hours

when, after having a lunch and rest until 10.30 hours. We continued our march until 11.15 hours.

We arrived there exhausted. The radio set was out of order as it is knocked here and there, and so we lost the only contact with the outside world.

29TH MAY, 1956: Disturbances have taken place in Nicosia between Greeks and Turks with two dead and fifteen injured...

1ST JUNE, 1956: I have been informed of the arrest of Sevastianos on 26th May, 1956.

No link has yet been re-established despite all efforts. I received from Lykourgos a letter...sent through the school. He asks for my opinion on new negotiations on the basis of the Makarios proposals, after being sounded on the subject. I replied that I agree under the condition that no deviation at all should be made from these proposals.

2ND JUNE, 1956: The Cyprus Radio Station reported the arrest of Palykarpos and Georghis last night. They were responsible for Nicosia. Benakis returned at 18.00 hours. He reported on the unsuitability of the new camp by Ay. Arkha.

Harding left for London for discussions with the English Government.

4TH JUNE, 1956 [*May in original*]:

Grivas here makes a curious mistake over the date for several days.

The Cyprus Radio Station and "Voice of the Fatherland" repeated today the results of the searches carried out on 19th May, 1956, on the NW part of the Island. During these searches Bouboulis and Batsaris* were arrested as well as 15 rebels; 41 shotguns, 3,000 rounds of ammunition and some automatic weapons were discovered—(they had with them three automatic weapons; one Bren, one Sten and one Tommy-gun). The number of the arrested men seems to be exaggerated because the groups of both men were no more than fourteen, of whom two escaped. We have no exact information about the losses.

5TH JUNE, 1956 [*May in original*]: We went to find hiding places in the afternoon. The results were not favourable. It was decided

* Poliviou.

that they should be made with barrels which we shall ask to have....They will be placed in the ground with foodstuffs in them. The whole work will finish on the 14th inst.

Harding made statements in London saying that he believes that he will suppress terrorism by the end of the year. He also does not advise the Government to re-start negotiations with Makarios.

8TH JUNE, 1956: About 02.30 hours after the departure of the sentry, I was woken up by the barking of a dog and as at such a time it is impossible for a dog to be in the area of the hideout, I came to the conclusion that SF were in the neighbourhood. I woke up my men and at about 3.00 we left the hideout. When we reached the crest, and as soon as it was light, we observed four two-ton military vehicles full of soldiers going towards Milikouri. We saw them drop off on the way traitors Baouboulis and Botsaris (Cairo Broadcasting, etc., heard that ops were taking place NW of the Island). Then I decided to move south as far as road Peravasa—Panayia and thence via the saddle to Ay. Arkha. First stop.

About 10.00 hours we reached the heights overlooking the road to Peravasa-Panayia. After a rest I sent at about 12.00 hours two scouts to a height which stands to the east of the saddle, from which they could observe the road from Peravasa to Milicouri and to report to me if it was clear so that we could cross it. They set off and at about 13.00 hours we, the remainder, moved. At about 13.30 hours the scouts returned and reported that they met vehicles on the road and there were soldiers on the surrounding heights. At last, at about 16.00 hours, they succeeded, in returning unobserved.

After this I decided to shoot across the road Peravasa-Panayia, which we succeeded in doing. Although I noticed traces of fresh footmarks on the way and new empty English cigarette-packets and realized that soldiers had passed that way, I decided to continue the march because there was no other way out. Fortunately by about 19.30 hours we reached the high ground to the south of the road, where I decided we should remain and then very early the next day get up and occupy the forested heights further east of my present position, and from where we could

watch the road Peravasa-Milikouri and arrange to cross it in the evening.

We turned in. At about 20.00 hours we heard two bursts from automatics more or less from the direction of Lykourgos.

9TH JUNE, 1956: About 03.00 hours we woke up and continued our march towards a height in order to check our position, which we reached about 04.00 hours. There we observed a motor car SE and at a distance of three kilometres we observed a helicopter landing-ground...cars going on the road to Arminou.

Part II

EXAMPLES AND EXTRACTS FROM THE MASS OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

LETTERS, ORDERS AND MEMORANDA *A COPY OF A LETTER FROM DIGHENIS*

29th Jan., 1955

*Makariotate**

REVERSES cannot be excluded from any struggle. We can even say that a struggle is always made up of successes and reverses and whoever has finally more successes, he is the one to win.

In our struggle, which is an unequal one, we have always expected reverses. Yet, we have faith in the final result.

The caique's misfortune has not affected our courage, but on the contrary, it has hardened our hearts so that with greater will-power, self-sacrifice and stubbornness, we will proceed forward to liberate Cyprus and take our revenge.

I am not only speaking for myself but also on behalf of those whom I had the honour to command and amongst whom I now happen to be.

With all those whom I was able to communicate I have met the strong decision to proceed forward.

I give you my word of honour that I will not rest as long as I breathe, but on the contrary, I will never stop striking the occupier. I promise you that in spite of the poor means at my disposal I will cause him great difficulties, and that I will not lay down my arms unless you yourself ask me to do so because it will mean that our object has been fulfilled.

This, my promise, please consider it as coming from an honest soldier.

The loss of the caique's load has compelled me to change our original plans. These plans now consist of combined guerilla and

* The Greek work "Makariotate" is a form of address reserved for the Archbishop.

sabotage action. This guerilla action by upsetting the armed forces and all movements of the British will play the greater part of the combined action, owing to the fact that our material possibilities from such activities are greater than those which are in our possession for sabotage action.

My actual efforts tend to find here the necessary material for sabotage operations and if I am successful in finding such material I intend to use it for carrying out the struggle inflexibly.

You must have complete trust in me and I hope you will grant me complete freedom to carry on the resumption of our struggle. I will await your instructions to start the struggle. Anyway, my opinion is that we should not postpone operations beyond the 20th February.

For this purpose I beg of you to put at my disposal all necessary financial means, because Andreas, who was dealing with all financial matters, is now away.

My needs are as follows:—

- (1) To pay out daily 15 persons and three or four families.
- (2) The purchase of 100 okes of petrol and 200 empty bottles, 100 okes of dynamite and a certain quantity of fuse. (If such materials may be obtained, as I hope.) The above materials will be used for sabotage operations.
- (3) For the movement of couriers, etc., and the transportation of arms and ammunition.

Please reply to me on the above matters through the same channel.

(Signed) Dighenis.

EOKA HQ INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE ORGANIZING OF THE OUT-OF-TOWN
POPULATION,*
DATED-8TH FEB., 1955

This organizing will be done in secrecy within the framework of EOKA.

* From the context of this document, taken with the context of other captured documents and the Grivas diaries, the addressee cannot be any other than Archbishop Makarios.

(1) AIMS

The initiation of persons in order that they should be able to offer the following assistance:

- (a) by taking part in mass demonstrations in villages, mass protests, etc.
- (b) concealing and giving asylum to members of the Organization.
- (c) participating in acts of violence and, if necessary, with arms.
- (d) obtaining and passing information as regards the object and nature of any movement of troops and police.
- (e) observing Government agents.

They are not to be used for any political or party purposes.

(2) ORGANIZATION

The organization will be temporary and is to be modified in due course.

In every province there is to be a section of the Organization with District HQ in the capital of the province. At the head of this section there will be a District Leader, who is to be assisted by a staff which, for the present, he himself will be able to pick at his discretion.

District Leaders will have the power of appointing Local Leaders who will be responsible to the District Leader for the organizing, etc. in each town, locality or village.

District Leaders will be responsible exclusively to the Leader of EOKA from whom alone they will receive their orders.

(3) SELECTION AND INITIATION OF MEMBERS

The initiation of persons must be done in absolute secrecy in order that the existence of this Organization should not be revealed to the authorities or to unauthorized persons.

The persons will be bound by oath to obey all orders issued by the Organization and to keep absolute secrecy.

The members must be made to realize that any disobedience will be severely punishable.

At every locality (town, village), a nucleus of one or two persons will be formed to start with, and according to local requirements. This is to be done in absolute secrecy and these nuclei are then to undertake

expansion by initiating further members of their communities and in accordance with local requirements and conditions.

But the object is not NUMBERS but QUALITY.

The initiation of new members will be limited to nationalists who have proved themselves reliable or whose trustworthiness and courage can be relied upon.

The persons who are taken into the Organizations in each locality must be divided into categories A, B, C, D, E, according to the work it is intended to use them for (see under sub-heading "Aims").

Steps must be taken to prevent indiscretions even between members, so as to preclude the possibility of leakages which can give our members away, as well as information about our purposes. For this reason and in so far as this may be practicable, one member should not know any other member in the same locality or elsewhere, particularly as regards members who have been given responsible tasks such as the concealment of wanted men. In this case it is particularly important that both the members themselves and their work should be unknown to the other members.

As for the members directly concerned, they are to be very careful in their conversations with other people and in their various other activities, so as not to give grounds for the slightest suspicion which could result in attracting the attention of the authorities.

(4) In order to make good and rapid communications possible and in order to ensure that members can be contacted at short notice, it is essential that quick and safe couriers should be established. This will be the responsibility of the District Leaders.

The setting up of the Organization will be initiated at once. The Leader of EOKA is to receive every Sunday evening from his District Leaders their reports on what was accomplished in their respective districts in the course of the preceding week, and also any recommendations that they may have to put up.

*The Leader,
Dighenis.*

LETTER ADDRESSED TO "THE LEADER". *The sender's name is not given and there is no date on the letter, but a note by Grivas on*

it says that it was received on 3rd April, 1955, and there is a reference to it in his diary entry for that day. He there says it was received from Genikos—the Archbishop.

Leader,

I share your views concerning the broadcasts of the “Voice of the Fatherland”. I have also listened to two such broadcasts; they have not only not pleased me but moreover they grieved me very much. For the purpose of facing the situation I am sending one of my men to Athens tomorrow with instructions to those in charge of the Broadcasting Station.

You will certainly carry on the struggle with courage and confidence without being affected—although it is natural for you to be sorry—by acts of meanness which are completely temporary and will be surmounted soon.

I am sending you my warmest wishes and sincere congratulations. One thousand bravos to you! The rulers have realized that we have entered upon a serious stage of struggle.

Extract from the report on the political situation in Paphos by Agapenor. There is no date on the report and the addressee is not given.

The question of the Bishop [i.e. of Paphos] remains as it was. Unfortunately we have no concrete evidence. The only evidence we have had is from his deacon, who has stated that the Bishop is a traitor, and that if the Archbishop asked to see him he will report everything to him. The same statement has been made by the Archimandrite. He is, however, closely followed by fanatic members of the Organization and as soon as we have concrete evidence we shall submit a report.

See also memorandum—pages 73-4.

UNDATED REPORT FROM GROUP LEADER PANAYITOU

The Archbishop agreed that pupils should organize strikes and demonstrations and take part in national activity, but he insisted that this should be done only after consulting the Leaders of the Church, and every action by the pupils should be organized beforehand with

tact and care so that it might have a good repercussion not only in Cyprus but in the foreign countries as well.

UNDATED NOTE BY GRIVAS

Melas has reported to me through Dafnis the following:

Material Bought

19 mines of which 16 are black. The black mines may be no good and he should not have accepted them. We accept white mines only.

1 pistol.

160 sticks of dynamite.

50 pipes.

He received from Nicosia

450 detonators.

70 feet fuse.

32 sticks of dynamite.

From Kouklia

2 black mines.

20 sticks of dynamite.

3 amatol—.

5 hand-grenades.

2 pistols.

30 feet fuse.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR "HERMES" FROM THE LEADER DATED 17TH APRIL, 1955

For Hermes.

Work to be carried out. Attention to the following:

(1) Reorganization for the explosive squads. Recruitment of new ones. Take care about the newly recruited ones.

(2) Organization of the administration of squads in each city or area. Appointment of replacements. Care is needed so that if by chance leaders are arrested there remains an administration which can carry on action and keep touch with the leader of the organization.

- (3) Check if my orders have been understood about the coming attack on targets.
- (4) Concentration of study on the attack on targets.
- (5) On the basis of tried study, provision of the necessary material in accordance with my orders.
- (6) The workshop of trainers to take on the training of new members, etc. It should be in a position to go into the districts for this purpose.
- (7) The safest way of transporting material from the districts should be studied.
- (8) Finding and purchasing new material for sabotage (pistols, dynamite, etc.).
- (9) Workshop for the preparation of hand bombs.

(Signed) *The Leader,*
Dighenis.

LETTER TO “THE LEADER” FROM X^{*}, DATED 27TH APRIL,
1955

My Leader,

First of all—although formally this is somewhat late, in the divine service in which I officiated I offered a special prayer for your health—I wish you many happy returns on your name day and full success in your plans for a happy end of our struggle. Let us pray to God to help us celebrate free Cyprus next year....

7. *Newspapers.* I admit that their attitude is deplorable. However, steps are being taken and we hope that something will be done....
9. **“A” has written that no activity should take place now. He stresses that very high national interests are risked. We must wait for new instructions from him....**

Yours,
X

* Papastavros. See page 91. Receipt of this letter was mentioned in the diary for the 29th April, 1955.

LETTER TO THE "LEADER" FROM ZIDROS, DATED 4TH MAY,
1955

To Leader,

Receipt of order of 3rd May, 1955, is acknowledged, as well as General Instructions for guerilla warfare.

My movements are very restricted and have to be made with great prudence. The information given is a figment of the imagination.

At all events, the fact that I have not been transferred hinders the carrying out of the missions which have been assigned.

From the training point of view, the men are in good shape.

Organization. Informers and food suppliers have been established in various villages. We are encountering difficulties on the southern side of the mountain range, because there are many Turkish villages there.

If there is a group at Trikomo, I beg that it should be entrusted with the organization of food suppliers and informers in the villages of Mandres, Flamoudi, Ardana, Ayios Nikolaos, Ayios Elias. If there is no group, then Melas from Famagusta must be appointed to organize the district, because he originates from that part and he knows persons and objects.

The police stations as far as Trikomo are as follows:

1. Myrtou	7 policemen
2. Lapithos	6 policemen
3. Kyrenia	30 policemen
4. Ay. Epiktitos	4 policemen
5. Ay. Amvrosios	3 policemen
6. Boghaz	2 policemen
7. Lefkoniko	8 policemen
8. Trikomo	7 policemen

I was not able to approach the company at Boghaz. In my opinion, however, it is only by a night operation that we can ascertain the position of sentries.

If it is possible, the sentries should be captured and this should be followed by an attack with automatic weapons and hand-grenades. If our aim is seen we will attack them with hand-grenades, rifles and machine-guns, their electric light having been cut off beforehand in order to create confusion.

This is a very rough plan until I receive details of the camp.

(Signed) Zidros.

LETTER FROM DIGHENIS TO GEN, DATED 6TH MAY, 1955

Copy

The attitude taken by ALL the national Press causes me astonishment. In spite of my warning to you and my written warning to the Press, its attitude continues to be not only luke-warm but even suspicious about our struggle. Another example of this is its attitude towards the illiberal law about curfew which is aimed against our organization in particular. While the national Press publishes simply a summary as newspaper information the Communistic paper "Demokrates" inveighs against the Government in a leading article against this law. So the Communists gain ground. So it can be explained why Communism has become gigantic in Cyprus....

(Signed), Dighenis.

This subject is referred to in Grivas' diary for 8th May—Grivas was clearly becoming very worried about the Communists.

LETTER FROM DIGHENIS TO MELAS, DATED 9TH MAY, 1955

EOKA

In consultation with Agras undertake quickest the organization of the region: Trikomo—Mandres—Flamoudi—Davas—Ardana—Ay. Nikolaos—Ay. Elias from the following viewpoints:

- (1) The finding of houses which will receive persecuted members.
- (2) The finding of persons as food suppliers and informants for our men in hiding.
- (3) Organization of the Youth into EOKA.
- (4) Organization of population into EOKA.

The above work would be possibly executed better and speedier if it could be achieved to create a group in Trikomo to undertake this work.

Report result of your efforts.

*The Leader,
(Signed) Dighenis.*

THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS REFERRED TO IN THE DIARY
FOR 22ND MAY, 1955
COPY OF A REPORT ADDRESSED TO THE GEN BY
DIGHENIS, AND DATED 23RD MAY, 1955

I wish to acquaint you on the situation as it is presented today, as well as with the repercussion of the events, which started on April 1st, on the decisions and actions of the Government of Cyprus and the Turks of Cyprus.

I thought it necessary to bring this to your knowledge so that you, as the real Leader of the National Liberation Struggle, may make decisions, after having known the events and not under the influence of men of politics or of the party. I do this because it has come to my knowledge, or rather I have been informed from Greece by a person with whom I have no connection at all, that there have been various behind-the-scenes activities in Athens in connection with the continued militant struggle, and that my removal from here was demanded...

The experience of the national struggles, which I have been conducting for 15 years, has made me capable of seeing clearly the things connected with them and of looking at their results with rationalism not only on the military field but also on the repercussions which they have on the political and diplomatic fields.

I shall not try to speak to you on the past and on the mistakes made simply because of the intervention of certain persons, but I shall confine myself to speaking to you on the present, how the situation is developing today and what are my plans for the future. You will then be the competent person to decide.

The Government Measures.

In addition to the *repressive* military and police measures which are taken by the Government, and which it is doubtful could be effective in case of a general rising, preventive measures are also taken, the

object of which is to paralyze our activity in advance so that it may not be allowed to be expressed or be mild enough if it is. These measures are as serious as the repressive ones, if not more serious, and we must think seriously how to face and neutralize them. These measures are the following:

(a) Assassinations of leaders of the movement **and especially of Yourself**. In a letter which was sent to the Turkish leaders in Cyprus, and which I rather think has been sent by the Government, the following is written:

“Instead of shouting, you had better murder the Archbishop because then the Greeks will be occupied with the election of a new Archbishop and refrain from the Enosis movement...”

What should be the Future Plan of Action?

Our plan must include a total and co-ordinated use of all of our means, i.e. sabotage in the towns and the countryside. Cutting off of communications and attacks on rural police stations, and if possible on army camps. Simultaneous rising and disturbances by the pupils and the people in the country. The struggle must be organized in such a way so that it may **last at least** until next October, when the Cyprus question will be discussed in the UNO.

This plan will be executed **in stages**. On the one hand we shall disperse, fatigue and irritate the enemy and on the other hand we shall see how we can reach the final stage of the plan without running the risk of seeing our struggle suppressed prematurely and before October.

So: At the beginning we shall organize acts of sabotage in the towns and in important communication centres, with simultaneous attacks on police stations, especially on mountainous areas, in order to compel the enemy to disperse its forces.

If this effort is crowned with success, then we shall go on with activity by small groups of armed men in mountainous areas which will make sudden attacks and then hide themselves. The targets will be police stations and Army camps.

Finally, if the above are crowned with success, we shall organize a general rising of the youth in the towns and the country with 51 militant demonstrations. The organized population will also participate. These militant demonstrations are being organized by us.

These are my views on general lines on the present situation in Cyprus and on our potentialities.

Of course, the above general plan, and the means which will be used for its successful execution, require more detailed study and, after they are connected with diplomatic demands, we could make the necessary modifications. The thing, however, which does not accept any modification is the need for continuation of the **militant struggle which has started, because its abandonment will mean the interment of the Enosis question.**

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM DIGHENIS TO ROMANOS,
DATED 25TH MAY, 1955

Your comrades are working well. I have granted leave to Makriyannis who has left for Athens to bring his family. Eight men have come already and they are all used.

THE FOLLOWING LETTER REFERS TO THE OPERATIONS MENTIONED IN THE DIARY ENTRIES FOR 21ST AND 22ND JUNE. *Grivas noted in the margin next to the last two paragraphs—Report to Gen has been made.*

21st June, 1955

To Leader,

With the first explosion which will be heard, British soldiers will immediately descend into the town from Wolseley Barracks.

Although the postponement of the move of the Governor to Troodos has not been officially denied, it is certain that he will not leave Nicosia and has also cancelled a visit to the house of Dr. Marangas.

The police have been ordered to keep the lights out in their station and to watch every movement outside.

A British Major has said to an employee of his office that within twenty days the Archbishop will be killed definitely by the Turks.

ORDER ISSUED BY DIGHENIS ON 24TH JUNE, 1955

To: Person unnamed.

From : "D".

It is necessary that you should take precautionary measures for your personal safety.

The English, faced by an "impasse", are planning your murder, using the Turks as their instruments.

An English Major told a clerk in his office that within a few days you will be murdered by Turks.

I believe that the first measures that you must take are the following:

- (1) When you are going anywhere, do not tell anyone beforehand, not even in your own circle, right up to the last moment.
- (2) A second car must follow your own.
- (3) When you are going to conduct Divine Service take special care when going in and coming out of Church. I think that in the entrance to the Church there should be people who should keep an eye on suspicious persons.
- (4) Be careful when at the Archbishopric that people don't enter and place dynamite [*at night*]* beneath your bedroom.

D.

This letter is referred to in the diary for 24th June as addressed to the Gen (the Archbishop) and in a marginal note in the letter reproduced on page 67.

ORDER ISSUED BY DIGHENIS ON 24TH JUNE, 1955

ORDER

The results of our continued struggle, when we think of what we intended to do, are very poor. As I have repeatedly stressed, both orally and in writing, our main target is: the execution of police traitors who will be followed by English military men. Second target: the blowing up of Government buildings.

Till now no traitor has been executed and no attempt has been made against any of them.

* These words are deleted in the original.

The groups continued throwing hand-grenades without results against various targets. They are thrown without study and without system. This tends to destroy the first good impression which the people formed after our first attack in April. These men, who sympathize with our struggle, are asking themselves if we are in a position to do something serious.

After this, I declare that the targets of all groups will be police traitors and judges who have imposed heavy sentences on our fighters.

It is only after the execution of these traitors that the groups will turn against English Army men.

The groups must have in mind that the traitors must fall, even if all of us are in danger of being killed.

I shall not order "cease fire" unless the heads of traitors, which each group should execute, fall.

*(Signed) The Leader,
Dighenis.*

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM "X" TO "THE LEADER"
DATED 26TH JUNE, 1955

D. informed me last night that Kyriakos Aristotelous (Kyriakos) has returned from England on Friday night for the purpose of dissolving EOKA. D. thinks that he must be killed as soon as possible.

I enclose a note with information given to me by D. Arrangements must be made for a group of persons to guard D. at night. What do you think about this?

*Yours,
(Signed) X.*

Assistant Superintendent Kyriakos Aristotelous was killed on 15th April, 1956. See diary and note for 16th June, 1955.

ORDER ISSUED BY DIGHENIS ON 26TH JUNE, 1955
EOKA ORDER

I cannot offer any congratulations for the recent period of fighting activity, because I have not seen the self-sacrifice and audacity among everyone which characterized the fighting activity of the 1st April.

The results were superficially impressive and not what I had expected. Of all groups Famagusta showed the most zealous effort, in spite of the fact that all its groups were newly formed. Nicosia, although composed of old groups that had been active on the 1st April, did not come up to my expectations, and the heads of groups did not control the activities of their members, so that they acted as they wished.

Larnaca was simply a spectator, although she had been supplied with material. There was faintheartedness there. Limassol, as had happened during the general attacks of the 1st April, only produced the most mediocre results.

Paphos, active for the first time, produced something. However, the leaders were carried away by their enthusiasm and did not act within the framework of the orders that had been given, with the result that material was lost. The Organization will impose punishment for this.

Kyrenia accomplished practically nothing, in spite of so much preparatory work. There was faintheartedness there too, for which punishment will be imposed.

Generally, however, everybody omitted to carry out the most important mission which had been entrusted to them: **the execution of traitors**. So that not only was not a single one executed, but there was not a single attempt against anyone. I cannot attribute this to anything else but **faintheartedness**.

I wonder therefore, if, with such a situation and with the behaviour shown by the commands and groups, it is possible for me to make progress.

If everyone made the genuine effort that was shown by all on the 1st April, it would be possible for me to forge ahead, in which case **we would have the initiative in the situation**.

Unfortunately I am now obliged to clear up the situation within the Organization, and get rid of the fainthearted so that I may go ahead

with the courageous members. This kind of struggle requires men who do not fear death and who do not love life....

The groups must be re-organized and their number must be reported to me, as well as the strength of each....

Details of the re-organization of the groups must be reported to me by the 18th July.

*The Leader,
Dighenis.*

ORDER ISSUED BY DIGHENIS ON 27TH JUNE, 1955

ORDER

I order the following:

- (1) Full black-out of the movements and activities of the groups of attack so that nothing may be discovered by the police.
- (2) The groups must stop activity and re-organize themselves in accordance with an order by me communicated to you on 26th inst.
- (3) The groups of executioners must continue to be active so that they may execute **police traitors and judges** when they are given the opportunity.
- (4) The purchase and storing and proper preparation of material for hand-grenades.
- (5) The groups must always be ready so that, when the resumption of activity is ordered, they may be able to act.

*(Signed) The Leader,
Dighenis.*

This order is referred to in the diary for 26th June, 1955.

LETTER FROM "THALIS" TO "THE LEADER",

DATED 27TH JUNE, 1955

Leader,

I bring to your knowledge that to the detriment of all, the relations between Averof and Taki have become worse. They now quarrel in public. I was present during the scene when one of them, while they

were quarrelling, said “If we go on like this they will catch us all”. There were a few people about who were strangers....

This, I must report with regret, happens also with others. It seems to me that only with understanding each other and collaborating can we go forward. Officers, title-holders, rankholders and subordinates don't fit here. When a few think that they are made to order about others and others are there to worship them we won't get anywhere. I'm writing this because some people's brains have got too much air. They seem to have forgotten that we are a secret conspiratorial organization and not the regular Army where the simple soldier has to shine the sergeant's boots and anything he might be ordered to do. If you think that I am wrong please tell me because there are many who think like me and the situation of some others is discussed in disparaging terms.

Thalis.

LETTER TO “UNCLE” FROM “ROMANOS”, UNDATED

My revered uncle,

Firstly I would like to inform you that nothing happened with Agros. We never went, nor did we get near. What happened (a lie) was the fear of the policemen who saw a shadow and fired. The shadow was the shadow of an acacia tree and in order not to lose face they said that it was masked men. Maybe they did the whole thing on purpose so that the troops would come to protect them. This happened because now there are two large vehicles. One is with eight soldiers and barbed wire at one end of the village and the other one on the other end. Tonight we heard that they have left. We are thinking of attacking on Friday. I can't tell you about plans because conditions might change before then. In any case it will be difficult at night. Probably between seven and eight in the evening. We might hit them in the road. But as they are afraid they always take a child or two with them on their motorbikes. I don't know what will happen. If I can get one of the vehicles on its own I think that I will attack. An order of yours from today says that no arms should be used, what do you mean? The affair at Amiandos is quiet. Only one man did not go to work and he is hiding. Yesterday, on Monday we nearly killed ourselves waiting for the vehicles with the dynamite, but it didn't

come because they had told him not to go. We will see on Monday. But this scheme has tired me out. I will write later in this connection. An old problem is the food on the mountain. Please send £25 0s. 0d. so that they can be prepared quickly. Half at Trooditissa and half on top of Karvouna. The places are nearly finished. I have no more money left. Please send £30 0s. 0d. for our expenses. Also the first aid kit ought to be ready. I think we ought to give something to the family of the man who has become a partisan. They have just told me that at Amiandos opposite the police station they will make an Army camp very quickly. They took the site today....

How will I notify about all this in time? The best of all would be that you should come and give us your orders from near, otherwise we will be losing golden opportunities.

Romanos.

PS Yesterday I went to Kakopetria with Mr. Papas LOK. The Kakopetria group has been disbanded. To my requests that they should help me with the dynamite, they replied that as long as Polos is there they would not do anything. They are all angry. Please intervene because otherwise we will lose the best group, or send my comrade or if you think it right, I will go down there. It is enough that I see them once. When they believe that I am their group leader they will start again in the struggle. Nobody wants to see him.

Romanos is the Bishop of Kyrenia's younger brother, Renos Kyriakides. This letter was addressed to Grivas who is sometimes referred to as "Uncle" by the terrorists.

MEMORANDUM (UNDATED)

As regards our sacred struggle, my humble opinion is that the following tactics should be followed for the purpose of achieving satisfactory results: (a) Primarily, the internal front should be purged. The traitors and those reacting should be identified and denounced in statements addressed to the people of Cyprus; and the more dangerous of them should be eliminated. The result will be that the patriots will be able to act with greater freedom, and lesser

dangers and the traitors and those inclined to become traitors will be terrorized and thus stop their sinister activities and their close co-operation with the oppressor. Any such person as, notwithstanding this, may wish to continue his disgusting co-operation and treason should be remorselessly punished and his punishment should become an example. (b) The success of our fight is fully and quickly secured if we pay particular attention to the question of the Mukhtars. This class of Government employees, such as they are at present, constitute the backbone of the Government machine. Their collective resignation would naturally lead to complete disintegration of the Cyprus Government machine. This would be feasible if those known for their treacherous co-operation with the Government and their servile attitude were first dealt with and then the Greek Mukhtars should all submit their resignations. At the same time the Greek population should be warned to reject any offer of appointment in the place of those dismissed. Anyone disobeying and not prepared to comply with this should be punished in an exemplary manner...

Now we must touch on another chapter and this is the present situation in Paphos which is suffering "physically" more than any other district. Paphos has been unfortunate, in these critical times, to be deprived of leadership and their religious leader (The Bishop) and the political leader (the Mayor) inspire no confidence and have not the slightest national activity to show; on the contrary they have been reactionary and treacherous to our cause. First, the Bishop who, unfortunately, by his position happens to be the national leader of the district, is the subject of talk and discussion amongst the people of Paphos for his contemptible acts. No person in Paphos has ever had any lower reputation than his, and his moral, religious and national misconduct is widely commented upon....

In any case it is a common conviction in Paphos that the Bishop here is closely co-operating with the Government and passes on all the information that comes to his knowledge. Therefore, we are obliged to recommend that no secret should be confided to him either by the Ethnarchy or by the Greek Consulate.

This memorandum, which was found with the diary, is unsigned and undated. See also letter reproduced on page 60 about the Bishop of Paphos.

LETTER TO "THE LEADER" FROM "CICERO",
DATED 28TH JUNE, 1955

To the Leader,

General Keightley leaves Kyrenia every morning around 7 a.m. and returns to Kyrenia a little before 1.30 p.m. His motor car bears the number 60NB63. It is a black limousine, a Humber.

See reference in diary to C. in C. Middle East Land Forces, dated 26th June, 1955.

LETTER TO "THE LEADER" FROM "KRIS" (UNDATED)

Leader:

I see with sorrow that you are dismissing me from the organization after the last misunderstanding. I am sorry. I also sincerely seek your pardon, because I know that I am in the wrong.

I ask you to forgive me, and take me back into the fold of the organization, and I promise you that there is no question of the same things happening in future.

*With respect,
Kris.*

LETTER TO PAPASTAVROS* FROM I.K.

Kakopetria,
28th June, 1955

Revered Father,

I am writing to you from Kakopetria where we have come since 12 days approximately....

The day before yesterday we went to Kalokhorio to see the weapons of the Group there, but for reasons of safety they were not brought out as some police movements had been observed. My wife undertook to carry here from Romanos one pistol, a hand-grenade and three detonators for Sunday's operation.

* Deported to the Seychelles in March, 1956.

I beg of you to pass on to the Leader the conclusion I have arrived at about the Kakopetria group which has been doomed to inactivity and degeneration because of Polos. Nobody wants him and they are quite right because all he wants is to show off, like a pirate. It appears that he has been influenced by the magazine he reads....

We must all be proud of Romanos' group. They are all fine chaps and determined. In the persons of Romanos and Skoufas the boys have found two fit and capable leaders. God helps us, Father Stavros, but let Him help more those who feel more strongly the anxiety and agony of engaging in such an attack....

I thank you, Father Stavros, for everything and my wife and I are always at your disposal.

Yours respectfully,
I.K.

28th June, 1955

EOKA

ORDER

The second period of our operations has been brought to a conclusion. The material results were lower than I expected. Each local leader is to summon his Group Leaders, and they must make a self-criticism together, to discover the mistakes that have been made, and to take measures to ensure that they are not repeated. What I distinguished in some groups was a lack of militance and impetus, due to which the results were not satisfactory.

If from a material point of view the results were not satisfactory, from the point of view, however, of the consequences on the international horizon, and especially on English public opinion, they were highly satisfactory.

Our activity showed the world that there exists in Cyprus a focal point of agitation and excitement against the English administration, with self-determination as its creed. A focal point which cannot be wiped out, which the Government of Cyprus is not in a position to wipe out, in spite of the measures it is taking. This attestation on the part of international personalities is an honour for us, and it

contributed to the fact that warm advocacy of the principle of self-determination was heard. As a result, English diplomacy began to discuss the Cyprus question, and the English Government is thinking of changing its rigid policy, the policy of "Never". I do not know what may emerge during the interval before the expiration of the time limit of the submission of the new Greek appeal to the United Nations Organization if, that is, English intransigence is going to yield and be willing to discuss the Cyprus question, or if it will keep its former rigidity. It is our duty to be ready to face the worst, and to take up our activity again, which will finally tend to influence not only the English but diplomatic circles of UNO, when the Greek appeal is submitted or discussed.

Below I give general instructions, where exactly our next activity will extend, so that each man may be prepared. And I shall have the opportunity of stating my thoughts orally to local leaders.

The object of our next operations will be to terrorize the police and to paralyze the administration both inside cities and in the country. If this object is attained, the results will be as follows:

Disillusion of the police with the prevailing state of affairs, so that, most probably, if they do not help us openly, they will tolerate our actions, or they will not be in a position to prove them.

Active participation of the Army in security, a thing which will deploy it, and tire it out excessively. Such a thing will react on the morale of the Army, which will influence its leaders as well.

More generally, in the face of our insistence and persistence, and the abnormal state of affairs, it is almost certain that UNO, and even the interested members of NATO, will seek an understanding.

The sought-for results will be attained:

- (1) By murderous activities against members of the police, **who do not sympathize with us, or who hunt us down.**
- (2) By ambushes against police patrols in the cities and attacks on police stations in the countryside.
- (3) By obstructions of the movements of police forces in the countryside, by placing ambushes (whether it is a question of single persons or groups of policemen).

Written and verbal instructions of mine will determine the method and means by which the above will be pursued. However, what I have to emphasize particularly is this: that nothing serious

can be attained if all are not inspired by a feeling of self-sacrifice and love of dangers which emanate from great works.

Consequently, before any other work, the meaning of our struggle and what we expect from it must be stressed to the men. I think we are approaching the end. Boldness and impetuosity will give us the best results.

*The Leader,
(Signed) Dighenis.*

This is the plan referred to in the diary entry for 28th June, 1955.

OATH OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF CYPRIOT COMBATANTS

I swear in the holy, honest and liberation struggle which is carried out for the freedom of the Island of Cyprus, under the following conditions:—

- (a) I will obey the orders of my superiors in whatsoever difficult, hard and risky job I am to undertake.
- (b) I am ready to sacrifice my life for the sake of the freedom of my country.
- (c) Serving in the organization I have to obey all orders and set aside any obstacles.
- (d) I will not divulge the secrets of the organization and the “code names” of the other combatants.

The people who do not obey the aforesaid rules will be executed, and also those who divulge the secrets of the organization or who fail to obey the orders. Any member who feels that he is afraid or a coward should not take the oath.

Each member who has taken such oath has to sign with the new name of the organization EOKA.

*Signature of Member,
Achiovos.*

This is a translation of a captured Oath form signed with the initiate's code name.

GENERAL ORDERS

Our aims during the present period are as follows:

- (1) Re-organization and preparation of our militant groups (training, EOK, OKT*), for co-ordinated action, following my orders.
- (2) Re-organization and preparation of the Youth for militant demonstrations, following my orders.
A Girls Student Branch to be organized, likewise the children of the Elementary Schools who will also take part in demonstrations in accordance with my orders.
- (3) Liquidation of traitors.
- (4) Attacks on isolated servicemen.
- (5) Stimulate the hoisting of flags on all the elementary schools.

*The Leader,
Dighenis.*

28th Feb., 1956

Farazouli,

You must attack Kinousa. In order to avoid casualties and bad results for you a recce should be made one night before. We must ascertain the following:—

- (1) Number of sentries and their positions.
- (2) Lighting, what exists?
- (3) and habits of the English sentries.

We must also find out beforehand the positions you will take up and the weapons you will use, and they are to have such field of fire so that even if the commandos return the fire, it will be impossible for them to hit you. If you think you can find suitable positions do so today, as Lennox-Boyd is here and it will be a greeting for him. On the other hand, if you wish to go tonight and attack tomorrow, so much the better....

* Believed to mean "Shotgun Assault Groups".

30th March, 1956

From Dighenis to Kimon.

I approve the placing of time bombs at the Airport, yet you do not indicate what length of time you want. I ordered that you should be given a time bomb of one hour which I calculate will explode after two hours because of the reduction in temperature. Take great care in preparing the filling so as not to be unsuccessful.

Several acts of sabotage have occurred at Nicosia airport since the date of this letter, including one incident in which an aeroplane exploded a few minutes before about 60 people, including women and children, were due to board it.

LETTER FROM "ASKLYPIOS"
DATED 22ND MAY, 1956

My esteemed Chief,

I kiss your hand.

It is with a great degree of emotion that I write to you, to inform you that they have found all the hide-outs. They had a traitor whom they took up in a helicopter and he pointed out all of the hide-outs. All communications by road have been totally cut off for the last five days. No one is allowed to enter or leave Kambos. There are approximately 2,000 soldiers. They set off from the school and proceed as far as Ambelikou.

They arrested Botsaris* and one other at Kambos. There are soldiers at Aghia; at Milikouri they have encamped in the gardens. From Yerakes they have descended—from Lefka ascended and have surrounded all the hills, thus cutting off all supplies and captured them†. They came to arrest me personally 4 times but never found me. Is it possible they will come to where you are? There are more troops at Panayia than ever before.

I am unable to forward the mail as I have no means of communication whatsoever. The searches which are taking place are

* Poliviou.

† EOKA supplies.

fantastic. No motorcar can come to Kykko or depart from there without undergoing the most minute search. We are in a very dangerous position to forward the mail and I beseech you to make arrangements for me to forward to a place which is closer to you.

I believe they will set up camp at the school. They are with us every minute. The searches which have taken place have been very thorough. At the spot where we had our gun position until recently there are now about 200 soldiers.

When I feel there is no longer any danger I will ascend to the road accompanied by two of my assistants and if they allow me I will raise my arms and then lower them—you will know that all danger has passed. I hope to be able to do so after the elapse of a few days.

They have arrested both our chauffeurs, also our cook and two monks. We are in very grave danger. Be careful of all roads—they control them all—do not make use of any roads. They are watching all roads and heights.

Do not inquire again about anyone here—he will be in danger of immediate arrest. At this very moment there are soldiers outside—only the Virgin Mary will save us.

This is what I write to you and wish you good-bye. We call on the Virgin Mary for help.

(Signed) Asklypios.

This and subsequent correspondence reflect the heavy pressure being exerted on the terrorists at this time—see diary for May and June, 1956.

FROM — TO THE LEADER, DATED 30TH MAY, 1956

It is necessary for a liaison to be established very soon in order that we may discuss some burning questions. Damon is, in my opinion, the most suitable person for the purpose. He is a person of sterling character and wholly trustworthy. I hope you will agree with me about this person, the more so because it is dangerous for us to entrust this very pressing matter once more to a woman. I should like to be informed of your views on the political solution of our Cyprus Question. We have indications that the English would be ready to accept the Makarios proposal. On the strength and persistence of the

Organization depends the resumption of negotiations with the British Government in this direction. I await your news on this point. Personally I think we should *not* reject the offer to which the English may be gladly ready to go forward on the basis of the Makarios proposals. This opinion of mine is based on the serious dangers which may well arise (1) from a general spreading of the divisions between Greeks and Turks, and (2) from the traitorous stand taken by the left wing. In any case I shall be glad to be informed of your views very early.

It is understood that after the preparation of such a constitution on the basis of the Makarios proposal, Makarios would be released to come to London for final consultations.

I consider we should stop the boycott against Coca Cola.

The Press publishes information that three Turks from Turkey, one general and two officers, have recently come to Cyprus and are carrying out a tour round the Island in civil dress, as commercial travellers.

I await your early views on the question of the person whom I suggest we should use as liaison over the political question.

The terrorists are still exercised about the Communists and now about the Turkish attitude—communal rioting is taking place.

1st June, 1956

From Dighenis,

As regards the political matters my opinions are as follows:

I agree that the discussions should be resumed on the basis of the Makarios proposals. The question is, however, where the discussions will finally end. I do not think that there should be any concession on our part on the essence of these proposals; on the contrary we should insist on their complete acceptance.

The Organization will do its duty as it has done up to now. As long as I live there is no question of our yielding, but we shall continue the struggle until we fall or are victorious. I do not know how much longer it will be possible to win the battle because of the following uncertain factors:

Whether Harding will receive or not yet other reinforcements? I think that the strength of his army now greatly exceeds 20,000, and that he has received a little while ago other reinforcements.

What is the reaction of the Turkish minority?

If I am going to get reinforcements from inside and how many? Until this moment I am working practically with what I brought from Greece and they are very little to support me.

In conclusion, taking into consideration the great numerical strength of our enemy, we shall not be able to impose a solution by force. Accordingly we are obliged to exploit politically the excellent results of our dynamic activity up to now. And our efforts should be directed to that end.

EOKA
TO THE CHIEF

Yours of the 1st June, 1956, received. I have received no previous order of yours appointing me to command ZIGHI in the Limassol area.

I beg you to brief me further on this matter.

I will send you a report as soon as I have taken over the automatics from Nikiforos.

I have been very worried about you during the recent searches. Unfortunately—I personally have not been able to do anything, because as yet, I am not capable of long marches. I made an attempt to leave with the group, but terrible pains forced me to give up.

One of the groups failed to blow up the road: Limassol-Nicosia by means of electrical detonation, because detonation failed to go off. The other has been sitting in ambush for over a week continuously towards Amiandos, but have had no target.

I have given orders for them to attack the guard at Mitsero with Brens and rifles—whereas the light automatics will reinforce groups OKT which will be laying ambushes.

The above actions have been ordered as a result of your verbal orders to step up activity as soon as Harding arrives in London; Cicero passed these orders on to me prior to his arrest.

Do you agree to the kidnapping of British padres? If so please give your orders—please note that they are armed and take part in searches and road blocks.

I am of the opinion—Chief—that you should take shelter somewhere and not expose yourself to so many dangers. The loss of five or ten of us would not be a serious loss to our struggle but your loss—God forbid—would mean deterioration of the struggle immediately with the result that we would break up in a very short time and then everything would be lost.

(Signed) Aris.

6th June, 1956

EOKA
CHIEF

We sent them three shotguns and a supply of ammunition. Only the priest knew where they were.

Mitas and Pippilitus who followed the boys and who have never co-operated, took all their equipment and when we demanded it back they said they would not take orders from anyone but would work alone. Mitas has the shotgun which he obtained at Amiandos Station. I have taken the decision that if they do not co-operate I will execute them.

*Aris.
(Mars).*

MALVOS TO THE LEADER, DATED 6TH JUNE, 1956

Received yours of 1st June. Happy that communications have been restored. Have sent a report to the centre but don't know whether this has been forwarded to you or destroyed. We will stubbornly continue the fight against all the reactions of our opponents. In our area the ambushes will be less frequent because in all the roads garden walls, fences and trees have been cut down and cleared 10 metres deep from the side of the road, so that the organization of ambushes becomes problematical. In other places they are using

sudden small road blocks and auxiliary police in closed cars, usually vans. That is why we concentrate on striking on roads where the traffic is light, and on sabotage. I have also asked Koraes to send us time bombs.

APPENDIX I

CYPRUS: SOME FACTS

The Island of Cyprus, which has been under British control since 1878, occupies a key strategic position in the north-eastern corner of the Mediterranean. Geographically, it is an extension of the Anatolian mainland, lying only 50 miles south of Turkey; 60 miles to the east is Syria, 240 miles to the south are Egypt and the Suez Canal, while Athens is 500 miles to the west.

For 2,500 years Cyprus has been a crossroads between east and west, ruled in turn by Phoenicians and Egyptians, Persians and Arabs, Romans, Lusignans, Genoese and Venetians. Alexander the Great conquered it and so did Richard Coeur de Lion. In 1571 the island fell to the Turks who held it for more than 300 years until, in 1878, they surrendered control to Britain under a convention by which—

if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of further (Turkish) territories in Asia...England undertakes to join the Sultan in defending them...In order to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, the Sultan consents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.

In 1914, when Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, Britain annexed the island. This annexation was recognized by Turkey and Greece under the Treaty of Lausanne and, in 1925, Cyprus became a Crown Colony.

Since the British occupation of Cyprus, progress has been most marked in the economic and social fields: a measure of this is the steady increase in population from 186,000 to over 500,000. About 80 per cent of the people are Greek-speaking (although the island has never at any time belonged to Greece) and about 18 per cent are Turkish-speaking.

APPENDIX II

[Identification of Archbishop Makarios [in the later documents] and the code names of some of the leading terrorists.]

It is obviously important to establish the identity of Genikos, Gen or G, who is Grivas' superior. It is clear from the following that these code names refer to Archbishop Makarios.

In the earlier diaries Grivas refers to the Archbishop as "The Archbishop" or "Makarios". Other members of the organization are also referred to by name. After the capture of the caique *Ayios Georghios* (*St. George*), which incidentally coincides chronologically with the beginning of the third Grivas diary, Grivas decided to tighten his security and a whole series of code names emerges. Thereafter the Archbishop is referred to as "Genikos", "Gen" or "G". This is evident from the following examples:

(a) In the third and all subsequent diaries, and in the correspondence dated after the 28th January, 1955 (the date of the caique incident), Grivas refers to "Genikos", "Gen" or "G" in the same contexts and in connection with the same subjects as he referred to the "Archbishop" or "Makarios" in the first two.

(b) In an entry dated 11th January in the second diary Grivas records that he asked the "Archbishop" to fix a date for the start of active operations by EOKA. He also records that the date decided by the Archbishop was 25th March, 1955. Grivas wrote a letter which he entered in his fourth diary as having been sent to "Gen" in which he repeated that he was ready and in which he asked for a final confirmation of the date on which EOKA operations were to be started.

(c) Before 28th Jan., 1955, Grivas clearly referred all his supplies of arms to the "Archbishop". Under 11th Jan., 1955, for instance, there is an entry in the diary which states that the "Archbishop" paid 65,000,000 on 5th Jan., 1955, to Gazouleas and Efsthathopoulos for the purchase of arms. After 28th Jan., 1955, and in a letter on 13th Feb., 1955, Grivas applies for the purchase of 50 pistols to "Gen" and no longer to the "Archbishop". Grivas could hardly have found both a new Chief and a new Arms Supplier between the two dates in question (viz. 11th Jan., 1955, and 13th

Feb., 1955), particularly since Grivas continues after 28th Jan., 1955, to report to “Gen” the movements of group leaders under his command and general information as regards EOKA, exactly in the same manner as he reported this to the “Archbishop” prior to 28th January, 1955.

(d) In his diary for 22nd May, 1955, Grivas states that “Gen” is expected to arrive on Tuesday 24th May. On Sunday 22nd May, 1955, the Archbishop was in Cairo and on that date a report appeared in the local Cyprus Press originating from Cairo that the Archbishop was expected to return to Cyprus during the following week—probably on Tuesday 24th May. In the event the Archbishop returned to Cyprus, without notice, on Friday, 27th May. Grivas noted this in his diary on that day.

(e) There are references in Grivas’ diary for the 3rd June, 4th June and 6th June to his meeting with the “Gen”: at the Kykko Annexe just outside Nicosia on the 7th June—and an account of that meeting (held on the 7th) appears in Grivas’ diary entry for the 7th June, which ends with the words

“We parted with his blessing: good success.”

The Archbishop, who served his novitiate at Kykko, frequently visited the Annexe, and is known to have been in Nicosia on the 7th June, 1955.

(f) In his diary for 23rd June Grivas records: “I have sent a letter to the Gen: advising him to take measures for the protection of his life, following information that the Turks are organizing his assassination.” A translation of this letter is reproduced on pages 52-3 and the items numbered 2, 3 and 4 all indicate that it was addressed to the Archbishop.

(g) In a letter dated 23rd May from Grivas to “Gen” he refers to “Gen” as “the real leader of the National Liberation struggle”. It is inconceivable that any Enosist should attribute this appellation to anyone other than Archbishop Makarios.

(h) The same letter (g) contains further reference to the rumoured assassination of “Yourself” and of “You and Mr. Dervis” and quotes the rumour in the following terms:

“Instead of shouting you had better murder the Archbishop because then the Greeks will be occupied with the election of a new Archbishop and refrain from the Enosis movement....”

Note the use of the capital letter Y in “Yourself” and “You”; this is a feature of such references throughout most of the documents—such would only be reserved for someone who was a high dignitary of the Church.

The identification of Grivas with Dighenis has not been seriously challenged, but the documents, in Grivas’ own handwriting and the photographic evidence put this beyond all doubt. Furthermore, two further important points emerge from the text of the captured diaries:—

(a) In his diary for 13th February, 1955, Dighenis says that Trikomo was his place of birth. That village is also where Grivas was born.

(b) The entry in the Grivas diaries dated 3rd January, 1955, could have been written by no one but Grivas, as the writer states that he has been given a bulletin of information from which it is quite clear that the authorities are aware of “my” arrival. Then there follows a copy of the bulletin referred to. This relates to police information that Colonel Grivas had returned to Cyprus. It is inconceivable therefore that the writer could be other than Grivas himself. The full text of the diary for this date is as follows, the language of the English portion being as in the original: “He then gave me a bulletin of information from the local authorities from which it is quite clear that they are aware of my arrival.” The bulletin reads as follows:—

“The fact that organization in Greece might take an active part in Cyprus over the Enosis question was brought to the fore when information was received on November 24th from a previously untested informant that Colonel Grivas a Cypriot-born naturalized Greek subject who had been refused entry visa in June this year had succeeded in landing secretly in Cyprus earlier in the month. The report added that Grivas was likely to be in the Paphos district that same night.”

The following are some of the code names used in the diaries identified with members of the terrorist organization:

Genikos, Gen or G	Archbishop Makarios
Dighenis, the Leader or Uncle	George Grivas
Cicero	Polykarpos Georghiades
Lykourgos	Markos Drakos
Romanos	Renos Kyriakides
Botsaris	Poliviou
Tselingas	Constantinos Lefkosiotis
Zidros	Gregorios Afxentiou
X (Diagonal cross and bishop's crook)	Papastavros
Averof	Yannakis Drousiotis

APPENDIX III

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS III (GENIKOS, GEN OR G)

The Archbishop was born at Pano Panayia, Paphos, on 13th August, 1913. He was entered as a novice at Kykko Monastery in 1926 and finished his theological education in 1942 in Athens. He was ordained in 1946 and in the same year he went to America to study sociology and religion at Boston University.

He was elected Bishop of Kitium in 1948 and Archbishop of Cyprus in October, 1949.

He was arrested and deported to the Seychelles on 9th March, 1956, because of his part in the terrorist campaign.

BISHOP OF KYRENIA

The Bishop of Kyrenia was born at Kakopetria in 1908 and commenced his theological training at Kykko Monastery in 1920. He was elected Bishop of Kyrenia in April, 1948.

He was deported to the Seychelles on 9th March, 1956, because of his association with the terrorist movement.

BISHOP OF KITIUM

The Bishop of Kitium was born at Lazania in 1905, and received his early theological training at Kykko Monastery. He was elected Bishop of Kitium in January, 1951.

In August, 1956, he was placed under restriction because of the part he has played in the terror campaign which was disclosed in the captured diaries.

PAPA AGATHANGELOU (PAPASTAVROS)

Born at Ayios Varvara (Nicosia) in 1910. He became a priest in 1939.

He was deported to the Seychelles in March, 1956, because of the leading part he had taken in the terrorist campaign.

GEORGE GRIVAS (DIGHENIS)

Grivas, a naturalized Greek, was born at Trikomo in Cyprus on 23rd May, 1898. He served as an Artillery Officer in the Greek Army during 1940-41. After the German invasion, Grivas returned to Athens where he remained throughout the occupation. He never joined the resistance and it was in Athens that he first met Makarios who was then deacon of the Irini church. Later he controlled and organized the underground movement "KHI" in Greece, a fanatically anti-Communist and Royalist movement. During 1946-47 a number of murders and other acts of brutality in Greece were attributed to "KHI" and it earned a very bad name with the Greek people. It did not operate against the Germans, nor was its leader, Grivas, trained or assisted by the British. He came to Cyprus to lead the terror campaign at the invitation of the Archbishop in 1954.

GREGORIOS AFXENTIOU (ZIDROS)

Afxentiou was born at Lysi in Cyprus in 1928. In 1948 he went to Greece and served with the Greek Army until 1952. He then returned to Cyprus and worked as a motor bus driver. He joined EOKA early in 1955 and soon became a group leader.

RENOS KYRIAKIDES (ROMANOS)

He is the younger brother of the Bishop of Kyrenia. In 1955 he was acting as a Staff Officer to Grivas in the Troodos area. He took part in many raids but was wounded and captured by the security forces on 12th December, 1955.

MARKOS DRAKOS (LYKOURGOS)

Drakos was born at Kalopanayiotis in 1930. He was employed as a clerk at Xeros in 1952 and subsequently joined the Hellenic Mining Company until May, 1955, when he was dismissed. He had been a member of the Organizing Committee of PEON, and, as did all the other members, became one of the first EOKA group leaders.

He was arrested on 16th July, 1955, and detained in Kyrenia Castle, whence he escaped on 23rd September, 1955.

POLYKARPOS GEORGHIADES (CICERO)

He was born at Palekhori in 1931. From 1950 until his arrest on 20th October, 1955, he worked at the Nicosia Chamber of Commerce. He was one of the original members of EOKA. On 19th January, 1956, he escaped from detention and joined Afxentiou in the hills. He later moved to Nicosia where he was recaptured on 1st June, 1956.

On 31st August, he escaped during a gun battle at Nicosia General Hospital, where he had been taken for X-ray treatment.

APPENDIX IV

DETAILS OF TERRORIST ATROCITIES

Deaths and Injuries caused by Terrorists up to 3rd Sept., 1956

POLICE KILLED			CIVILIANS KILLED			
UK	GREEK CYPRIOT	TURKISH CYPRIOT	UK	GREEK CYPRIOT	TURKISH CYPRIOT	OTHERS
4	9	7	6	68	3	1 AMERICAN 2 ARMENIANS 1 MARONITE 1 MALTESE
TOTAL 20			TOTAL 82			

POLICE WOUNDED			CIVILIANS WOUNDED			
UK	GREEK CYPRIOT	TURKISH CYPRIOT	UK	GREEK CYPRIOT	TURKISH CYPRIOT	OTHERS
6	21	28	34	102	27	14
TOTAL 55			TOTAL 177			

MILITARY

KILLED
42

WOUNDED
181

Let us now bring reality to these figures by giving the details of ten terrorist murders or attempted murders—the victims are of various nationalities and include women and children.

1. MURDER ATTEMPTED IN HOSPITAL

Mrs. Ariadne Constantinou, a Greek Cypriot midwife who had worked for many years in the villages of Larnaca and Famagusta Districts, was denounced by Athens Radio on 26th November, 1955. Her alleged crime was the appropriation of funds collected for EOKA. Two days later, on 28th November, a masked gunman

entered her house at Famagusta and shot her. She was hit by three bullets, but survived. Five weeks later, she was recovering in Nicosia General Hospital, though her mental condition was such that a transfer to the Mental Hospital was under consideration. On the night of 4th January, 1956, a masked man sneaked into the dimly lit ward where Ariadne and some thirty other patients were sleeping. He fired three shots at her, then ran off. Ariadne miraculously survived this second attack, though one of the bullets lodged over her left eye under the scalp, but without penetrating the skull.

2. ABBOT MURDERED IN HIS MONASTERY

On the night of 11th February, 1956, Epiphanius Georgiades, Abbot of Chrysoroyiatissa Monastery since 1950, was sitting in his room, listening to the radio news with two other members of the community. Two masked men, wearing black robes, entered and motioned the monks away from the Abbot. One of the gunmen covered the monks with a revolver, as they stood facing the wall and with their hands above their heads. The other then fired two rounds with a double-barrelled shotgun at the Abbot, who collapsed as he made for the door.

3. MOTHER INJURED WHILE SHIELDING HER CHILDREN

On the evening of 12th January, 1956, a home-made bomb was thrown through a bedroom window of a house in Larnaca, occupied by Sgt. Smith of the British Army. In the room, Mrs. Smith was putting their two children to bed, a boy aged 7 and a girl aged 6. Before the bomb exploded, Mrs. Smith jumped to shield the children from the blast. They were unhurt, although one was thrown from the bed by it. Mrs. Smith received severe injuries in the leg, as a result of which her right foot had to be amputated.

4. MURDER IN CHURCH

On 18th March, 1956, the usual Sunday morning service was in progress in Ayios Georghias Church, Kythrea. Singing in the choir was Manoli Pierides; in the congregation were two of his four children. Four masked men burst into the church, forced the

congregation to face the wall while they singled out Manoli and shot him dead in the choir stall.

5. MURDER IN A MATERNITY HOME

On the evening of Sunday, 15th April, 1956, a young Greek Cypriot police officer, Assistant Superintendent Kyriakos Aristotelous, went to a private maternity home in Nicosia to pay his daily visit to his wife and first-born son, born only five days before. Three gunmen, masked and armed with two pistols and a Sten gun, shot him dead in the doctor's office within calling distance of his wife, wounding the doctor also. Aristotelous was well known and liked among all communities in Nicosia.

6. EIGHTEEN-YEAR-OLD BOY BOUND AND SHOT

In the early evening of 3rd June, 1956, two members of the Security Forces went for a bathe with the 18-year-old son of a third. As they were returning on foot to their camp at Dhekelia, they were ambushed by two gunmen. One of the soldiers was killed outright, but the other managed to escape. The boy, Roy Garrett, was captured and taken some distance away by the terrorists, who tied his hands behind him and then shot him in the back. He pretended to be dead and they left him. His cries for help were ignored by a shepherd and three youths who passed by and, though wounded and bound, he managed to crawl to a nearby church, where he was later found still alive.

7. AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICIAL MURDERED

On the evening of 16th June, 1956, the Hungarian-owned "Little Soho" restaurant was, as usual, largely patronized by Americans. Shortly after 9.30, two youths appeared in the doorway and threw two water-pipe bombs at a table where four Americans were dining, then disappeared. The missiles exploded at once, killing William P. Boteler, 26-year-old Vice-Consul, and injuring his three companions.

8. DOUBLE MURDER ON PICNIC OUTING

On Sunday morning, 8th July, 1956, five months after their arrival in Cyprus, George Kaberry (a Customs official) and his young wife

set off to picnic on the Kyrenia coast. As they drove through the hills, their car was stopped by an obstruction on a sharp bend. Gunmen lying in ambush opened fire with automatic weapons and shotguns, and three grenades were thrown at the car. When the car came to a standstill the attackers, who fired from close range, could not have failed to recognize the passenger as a woman. Mrs. Kaberry, who was expecting her first child, was killed instantaneously by Sten gun fire. Her husband managed to reverse some 30 yards back from the point of initial attack, where he was found lying in the road beside the car. His body down to his knees was one mass of shotgun wounds and bruises. It seems that the Cypriot “patriots” (to whom Athens Radio next day attributed the attack) beat him up before ending his life with a shotgun, fired at point-blank range into his stomach.

9. SHOP MANAGER MURDERED

A young Maltese shop manager, Edward Bonici Mompalda, was on his way to meet his Greek Cypriot fiancée, 22-year-old Drosoulla Demetriades, at lunchtime on 25th July, 1956, in Nicosia. When only fifty yards away from their meeting place, Bonici was shot in the back five times and killed outright. His only “crime” was supposedly that of being a special constable.

10. MOTHER OF THREE KILLED

Mrs. Melani Omirou Neofytou, mother of three young children, was alone in her grocery shop in central Nicosia, sleeping in a deckchair during the afternoon of 26th July, 1956. Two men entered her shop and one of them shot Melani five times in the head, neck and chest, killing her instantaneously.

APPENDIX V

WHY ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS WAS DEPORTED

(An Announcement issued in Cyprus on 9th March, 1956)

The Governor reached his decision to order the Archbishop's deportation in the light, not only of his overt seditious activities, but also of a large volume of evidence indicating that the Archbishop has himself been deeply implicated in the campaign of terrorism launched by the organization known as EOKA. In recent months, as the Security Forces have penetrated further into the terrorist organization, evidence of the Archbishop's complicity has accumulated from many different sources. The Governor has scrutinized the information thus collected with the greatest possible care, and has reluctantly reached the conclusion that it establishes beyond all reasonable doubt that the Archbishop has not merely countenanced but has actively fostered terrorism in order to promote his political aims. While overtly and in apparent good faith conducting negotiations for a political settlement of the Island's future, the Archbishop has surreptitiously encouraged and abetted the terrorists in order to improve his own bargaining position in the negotiations.

2. The Archbishop's association with the elements out of which EOKA has emerged dates back to 1951, when, soon after his election as Archbishop, he personally undertook the formation of the extreme Nationalist youth organization known as PEON.

3. When establishing branches of that organization, the Archbishop said that it would be modelled on the lines of the National Youth Organization established under the Metaxas regime in Greece. He spoke of the need for secrecy and for sacrifices, for the boycott of British goods and the British way of life, for the destruction of shops displaying English signs, for the production of a clandestine newspaper, and for establishment of contributory funds for the national struggle. In July, 1951, Colonel Grivas (now reported to be the leader of EOKA) arrived in Cyprus at the Archbishop's invitation to advise on the organization of PEON which was to follow that of Grivas' extremist "KHI" organization in Greece.

4. During the period 1951-1953 evidence accumulated that this organization, to which the Archbishop continued to give his personal

patronage, was being used for subversive purposes and was preparing for a resort to violence. It developed contacts with irredentist agencies in Greece. Its members were involved in the dissemination of subversive propaganda and in illegal demonstrations resulting in damage to property. In June, 1953, the organization was rendered illegal by withdrawal by Government of its registration under the Clubs Law.

5. It continued to function underground, and it provided the organizational basis and staff on which EOKA was later built. Its ex-General Secretary (Stavros Poskotis) and several persons who had been leading members were among a group of terrorists who perpetrated the first EOKA outrages at Larnaca on 1st April, 1955. They were later sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from three to nine years. Another person (Evghenios Cotsapas) who, as District Secretary, had taken a leading part in establishing the branch at Limassol was caught red-handed on 18th November, 1955, carrying bombs in his car, and was later sentenced to three years' imprisonment. He is the son of an Ethnarchy councillor who is himself now in detention. No fewer than three out of the five members of the former Nicosia district committee of the organization (Christor, Eleftherion, Evengelos, Evangelakis, and Markos Drakos) are now members of the terrorist gangs at large in the Island and one of these was a personal protégé of the Archbishop. Such were the men to whom Archbishop Makarios entrusted the formation of a Youth Organization under his personal patronage.

6. In August, 1954, a certain Zaphirios Valvis visited Cyprus at the Archbishop's request. This man is a Greek national and by profession a lawyer practising at Athens. He is now known to have been one of the principal lieutenants of Colonel Grivas and a member of an organization in Greece which has been responsible for arranging shipments of arms and explosives to the terrorists in Cyprus. He had a number of meetings with the Archbishop and attended a meeting of the Holy Synod and of other leading Enosists, held at Mesopotames Monastery and presided over by the Archbishop. There is reason to believe that at that meeting the plans were laid which later bore fruit in the organized violence and terrorism of EOKA.

7. Over the past two years information has been received from a number of different sources indicating that the Archbishop has

personally supplied funds to Agents in Greece for the purchase and supply of arms and explosives for use in terrorist operations in Cyprus. In particular, it is reported that a large sum from the moneys which the Archbishop collected from Greek communities in the United States during his visit there in 1954 was handed over by him in Athens to Valvis for the purchase and delivery of the explosives which were later seized while being smuggled into Cyprus in the Greek schooner "Ayios Georghios". The Governor has carefully examined these various reports and is satisfied that they establish beyond doubt that the Archbishop has provided large sums of money to irredentist agencies in Greece, and in so doing was aware that they would be used for the shipment of arms and explosives to Cyprus.

8. Funds under the Archbishop's control are known to have been used to pay fines imposed by the Courts on persons who had taken part in illegal political activities in Cyprus. Members of the Greek-Orthodox community requiring the services of the Archbishopric have been required to contribute to a fund for the "National struggle" and the various fees and dues charged for such services have been increased with the same object.

9. The Archbishopric has been used for the production of EOKA leaflets on a scale which would have been impossible without the Archbishop's connivance.

10. The Archbishopric has also been used for the temporary storage of arms and grenades.

11. There is strong circumstantial evidence to show that the timing and intensity of terrorist activities have been adjusted to strengthen the bargaining position of the Archbishop during the course of his negotiations with the Governor. It is also noticeable that during his absences from the Island in April-May and October-November of last year a marked lull occurred in terrorist activity.

12. Besides his contacts with Grivas and his lieutenant Valvis, the Archbishop's personal relations with known members of the EOKA organization are such as to provide strong corroboration of his complicity in the activities of the terrorists. The organizer of the "Ayios Georghios" gun-running venture was Sokratis Loizides, brother of the Ethnarchy Councillor Savvas Loizides who frequently has acted as the Archbishop's spokesman in Athens. Certain of the detailed arrangements for this shipment were made by Andreas

Azinas, a personal protégé of the Archbishop, who had previously been elected as Secretary-General of the Pancyprian Farmers Union, with support from the Archbishop. This man is now wanted by the police for his part in the “Ayios Georghios” case. The convicted terrorist Stavros Poskotis, whom the Archbishop selected as Secretary-General of the Youth Organization PEON, was employed in the printing works belonging to the Archbishopric. It was there too that the Archbishop’s close kinsman Charalambos Mouskos was employed, before he absconded and embarked on the career of murder and violence which terminated in his being shot dead in a gun battle with a member of the Security Forces. It was on the Archbishop’s orders that this man was given shelter and medical treatment in Kykko Monastery (where Archbishop Makarios had served his novitiate). When Karaolis, the convicted murderer of a police constable, was arrested it was another employee of the Archbishopric printing works who was taking him in his car to join the terrorist gang then operating in the Kyrenia hills; the driver of the car absconded and is still wanted by the police.

13. Finally, one of the most significant and surely one of the most culpable aspects of the Archbishop’s conduct is his persistent failure, despite his position as the religious leader of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Christian community, to condemn the wickedness and brutality of EOKA’s methods. At once, on the outbreak of terrorism last April, he was urged by the then Governor to denounce violence. He failed to do so. He failed even to comment on the patently irreligious oath which the terrorists were urging schoolchildren to take. Further attempts to induce him to give his community a lead against terrorism were also fruitless. He has remained silent while policemen and soldiers have been murdered in cold blood, while women and children have been killed and maimed by bombs, while a Cypriot woman was shot and wounded for the second time as she lay in hospital recovering from a previous terrorist attack, and even while he stood by the coffin of an Abbot of his own Church who was brutally murdered by terrorists in his own monastery. His silence has understandably been accepted among his community as not merely condoning, but even approving, assassination and bomb-throwing. He has confirmed that interpretation by referring in sermons to convicted terrorists as patriots and by urging his fellow-countrymen to take the

law into their own hands. And now in the last few weeks he has sought positively to exploit his power to influence the members of his Church against violence by seeking to bargain this against concessions from Her Majesty's Government on the form of a constitution and on the grant of an amnesty to terrorists convicted of crimes of violence.

14. On this evidence the Governor has decided that the example and influence of Archbishop Makarios is so detrimental to public safety and public order that his continued presence in the Island can no longer be tolerated. He has taken this step only after the most careful and deliberate consideration. He is well aware of the pain and dismay that this measure will cause not only among the Greek-Orthodox community in Cyprus but in the world at large.

15. So long as there were grounds to hope that the Archbishop might be induced to use the influence which he possesses among his community to lead them away from violence, disorder and fear and back to the path of peace and democratic rule the Governor was of the opinion that the good of the people of Cyprus as a whole compelled him to overlook the shameful record of the Archbishop's complicity in bloodshed, intimidation and the tyrannous suppression of free opinion. The Archbishop has chosen to reject the offer of a new and constructive approach to the Island's political problems and to continue to seek to gain his ends by force. With that he has finally removed any compunction that the Governor may have felt against dealing with him, not as a responsible political leader, and still less as the head of a Christian Church, but in that character which he has himself chosen to prefer, the leader of a political campaign which relies on the use of ruthless violence and terrorism.

Guidelines for the Submission of Manuscripts

1. The *Journal of Cyprus Studies* publishes articles in English and Turkish, and in accordance with the principles expressed in its Editorial Policy. It is understood that manuscripts submitted to the *JCS* for consideration have not been published previously, in part or in whole, and are not simultaneously under consideration for publication elsewhere. The ideas and opinions expressed in articles published in the *Journal* are the sole responsibility of the author(s), and do not reflect the views and policies of the Centre for Cyprus Studies or Eastern Mediterranean University. Responsibility for copyright permissions rests with the author(s).
2. A manuscript will be accepted for publication only if the editors and/or the editorial board, as well as the referee(s) agree that it should be.
3. Manuscripts should be sent to the editor either i) on a disk as a Microsoft Word (or a Word compatible) document or ii) as an e-mail attachment.
4. The following should be included in the body of the e-mail: title of the paper, your name and postal address, your institutional affiliation, daytime telephone and fax numbers (if available). An abstract (maximum 200 words) should be included as a separate document. Please provide, under the abstract, between 3 and 8 keywords for your manuscript.
5. There is no strict word limit for articles, but we prefer to publish articles that are between 6,000 and 10,000 words (including notes).
6. The manuscript should be prepared for blind review: The author's name and institutional affiliation are not to appear, so described, in the manuscript. Such information should appear only on the cover letter, which must be on a separate page. References to the author's own work must be cast in such a way that they do not reveal the author's identity. We recommend simply replacing the entire reference, including title and facts of publication, with an expression such as *Author's article*, *Author's book*, *Author's book 2*, etc. Acknowledgements that could allow a reader to deduce the author's identity must be removed for the initial review.
7. The Manuscript should be properly formatted. The entire manuscript (including notes, quotes, and formulae) should be double-spaced. The entire manuscript should be in 'Times New Roman' font, 12pt. All pages must be numbered. Notes should be placed at the end of the manuscript. Manuscripts should conform to *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. See our style sheet below.
8. **Style Sheet**
 1. Use endnotes, not footnotes.
 2. Use *italics*, not underlining, for book and journal titles.
 3. For well-known cities, omit state/country name from facts of publication.

4. Omit the abbreviations 'p.' and 'pp.' for page numbers.
5. See the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edition, for detailed information; examples of reference types are shown below.

Journal article

Stephen Yablo, "Mental Causation," *Philosophical Review* 101 (1992): 245-80.

Book

Samuel Scheffler, *Human Morality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 25-30.

Article in a book

John W. Houck, "Stories and Culture in Business Life," in *A Virtuous Life in Business: Stories of Courage and Integrity in the Corporate World*, ed. Oliver F. Williams and John W. Houck (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), 129-38.

Note:

For repeated references, do not use 'op. cit.' - use a short title instead (e.g., Yablo, "Mental Causation").

You may use 'ibid.' (not italicized) where appropriate.

If you make many references to a single work, you may (and are encouraged to) give bibliographic information in a note at the first such reference, and then, for subsequent references, give page numbers only, in parentheses, run into the main text.

The subsequent references are run into the text, enclosed in parentheses, like so: (Yablo 1992, 248-52). The author's name may be omitted if it is clearly implied by context.

Note the distinction between 'Yablo 1992', which refers to a work, and 'Yablo (1992)', which is a reference to Yablo the person, followed by a parenthetical reference to one of Yablo's works.

Abbreviations. Most abbreviations should be spelled out and rendered in English.

Emphasis. Use italics, not underlining.

Quotation marks. Use double quotation marks for quoted material run into the text, and for irony and other literary purposes. Use single quotation marks for quoted material *within* a quotation and to mention linguistic expressions.

Spelling. Use American spelling.

For further information see: <http://jcs.emu.edu.tr>

Yazı Göndermek İsteyen Yazarların Dikkatine

1. *Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Derginin Amacı bölümünde belirtilen ilkeler doğrultusunda Türkçe ve İngilizce makaleler yayınlar. *Dergide* basılacak yazı ve makalelerin içeriğinin özgün olması, daha önce hiçbir yerde yayımlanmamış, hali hazırda başka bir dergide değerlendirme aşamasında olmaması ve yayın haklarının verilmemiş olması gerekmektedir. *Dergide* yayınlanan makalelerde ifade edilen inanç, görüş ve fikirler tamamen yazar veya yazarlara ait olup, Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi veya Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi'nin görüşlerini ve genel politikasını yansıtmaz. Yazının içindeki malzemelerle ilgili telif haklarının elde edilmesi yazar veya yazarların sorumluluğundadır.
2. Bir yazı ancak editör, yayın kurulu ve hakemler tarafından uygun görüldüğü takdirde yayınlanacak.
3. Yazılar editöre ya Microsoft Word, ya da Microsoft Word uyumlu bir programda yazılmış olarak i) cd üzerinde, ya da ii) e-posta bağlantılı gönderilmelidir.
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5. Kesin bir kelime kısıtlaması olmasa da metin ve notlar birlikte 6000-10000 kelime arası olması tercih edilmektedir.
6. Değerlendirmeye alınan makalelerin yazarları ve hakemlerin karşılıklı olarak isimleri gizli tutulur. Değerlendirmedeki gizlilik esası için makalede yazarın adı ve çalıştığı kurum geçmemelidir. Bu bilgiler sadece gönderilen elektronik posta mektubunda yer almalıdır. Değerlendirmeye gidecek makalede yazarın kendisine yaptığı referanslar yazarın kimliğini açığa çıkartmayacak şekilde verilmelidir. Bütün referansları aynı şekilde verip yazarın adı yerine sadece *Yazarın makalesi*, *yazarın kitabı* ve *yazarın kitabı* 2 gibi verilmesi yeterli olacaktır. Yazarın kimliğini açığa çıkartacak teşekkür notları makalenin ilk gönderiminde yer almamalıdır.
7. Değerlendirmeye gönderilen yazılar aşağıdaki belirtilen format ölçütlerine uygun olmalıdır: Ana metin: 12 punto, "Times New Roman" karakterde, iki (2) aralıkla yazılmalıdır. Kaynaklara göndermeler dipnot olarak makalenin sonunda verilmelidir. Yayın için gönderilen makaleler *Chicago Manuel of Style*, 15inci Basım, uygun olmalıdır. Bütün sayfalar numaralandırılmalıdır.
8. Kaynaklara referans
 1. Dipnotları makalenin sonunda verilmelidir.
 2. Kitap ve dergi isimleri için *italik* kullanılmalıdır.

3. Basım bilgilerinde bilindik şehirler için eyalet ve devlet isimleri yazılmamalıdır.
4. Bibliyografik notlar için aşağıda verilen bazı örneklerde olduğu gibi *Chicago Manuel of Style* (15. basım) kullanılmalıdır.

Sürelî yayınlar:

Stephen Yablo, "Mental Causation," *Philosophical Review* 101 (1992): 245-80.

Kitaplar:

Samuel Scheffler, *Human Morality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 25-30.

Kitap içinde makale:

John W. Houck, "Stories and Culture in Business Life," *A Virtuous Life in Business: Stories of Courage and Integrity in the Corporate World*, der. Oliver F. Williams ve John W. Houck (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), 129-38.

Not:

Tekrarlayan referanslar için 'op. cit.' kullanılmamalı, bunun yerine kısa isim kullanılmalı (örneğin, Yablo, "Mental Causation"). Eğer aynı kaynağa birçok kez atıfta bulunuyorsanız bibliyografik bilgileri ilk sefer bir notta verdikten sonra ayrıca içinde sayfa numaralarını ana metnin içinde vermeniz tavsiye edilir. Araç içindeki sıra şöyle olmalıdır: yazar(lar)ın soyadı, kaynağın yılı, sayfa numaraları. Karşılaşılabilecek farklı durumlar şöyle örneklenebilir: (Yablo 1992, 248-52). Eğer yazarın ismi açık bir şekilde geçiyorsa metnin içinde yazarın ismi yazılmayabilir. Burada dikkat edilmesi gereken nokta 'Yablo 1992' (bir esere referans verir) ve 'Yablo (1992)' (bir yazara ve parantez içinde onun bir eserine referans verir) arasındaki farktır.

Kısaltmalar. Kısaltmalar ilk açık halleriyle yazılmalıdır.

Vurgu. İtalik kullanılmalı.

Tırnak İşareti. Alıntı ironi ve diğer edebi amaçlar için çift tırnak işareti kullanılmalı. Tek tırnak işareti alıntının içinde alıntı varsa ve dilbilimsel terminoloji için gerekiyorsa kullanılmalı.

Detaylı bilgi için bkz.: <http://jcs.emu.edu.tr>

Correction for Issue 31

On the Contents page the names of the authors of the article “Avrupa Birliđi Çevre Hukuku ve KKTC” should read, as on page 93, Birol Ertan/Kıvılcım Akkoyunlu Ertan. We regret this error and apologize to the authors.

Sayı 31 için Düzeltme

“Avrupa Birliđi Çevre Hukuku ve KKTC” makalesinin yazarları İçindekiler bölümünde, 93üncü sayfada belirtildiđi gibi, Birol Ertan/Kıvılcım Akkoyunlu Ertan olması gerekmektedir. Bu önemli yanlıştan dolayı yazarlardan özür dileriz.

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