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A Comparative Analysis of Familialist Modernisation and Gender Inequality: Turkey and Japan

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Abstract

Turkey and Japan are among the lowest-ranked countries in various gender gap indexes despite their economic achievement. To understand the phenomena, this study explores a question how the experiences of Turkey and Japan converge and diverge in the early struggles for modernisation and a new gender order through an interpretive comparative historical analysis. This study shows that notwithstanding geographical distance, cultural variances and different courses of industrialisation, Turkey and Japan have a number of common historical backgrounds which makes a comparative study interesting. Both countries played a leading role in its region in terms of modernisation, industrialisation and women's emancipation between the late 19th century and the early 20th century. Yet in both countries women were emancipated but unliberated; they gained civil rights but their empowerment was controlled judicially and ideologically. The two countries also share a socio-demographically similar experience of "semi-compressed modernity" which made them opt for familialism as a welfare model today. This familialism is both part of their neoliberalisation programme of social policy and their self-Orientalist response to global capitalist economy. This study argues that it is questionable if familialism secures the family. It is also questionable if women's labour force participation in flexible employment contributes gender equality. Apart from the similarities in state policies, Turkey's experience diverts from that of Japan. One of the most significant variances is that more women in Turkey tend to postpone labour force participation rather than childbirth while it is the opposite in case of Japan. In face of neoliberalising global economy, both Turkey and Japan have carried out drastic reforms since the 1980s yet again without liberating women.

Keywords: *women's status, modernisation, familialism, Turkey, Japan.*

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Aile Temelli Modernleşme ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Eşitsizliği Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Analiz: Türkiye ve Japonya Örneği

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Öz

Türkiye ve Japonya, ekonomik başarılarına rağmen, çeşitli cinsiyet ayrımı endekslerinde oldukça düşük sıralarda yer almaktadır. Bu meseleyi anlamak üzere bu çalışma yorumlayıcı karşılaştırmalı tarihsel analizlerle birlikte şu soru üzerine yoğunlaşır: Türkiye ve Japonya'nın erken modernleşme ve yeni bir cinsiyet rejimi inşa etme maceraları ne ölçüde örtüşmüş ve farklılaşmıştır? Türkiye ve Japonya'nın coğrafi uzaklıkları, kültürel farklılıkları ve farklı sanayileşme biçimlerine rağmen iki ülkenin karşılaştırmalı bir çalışmasını ilgi çekici kılan ortak bir takım tarihsel arka planları paylaştıkları söylenebilir. Her iki ülke de 19. ve 20. yüzyıllarda modernleşme, sanayileşme ve kadın özgürleşmesi anlamında geçirdikleri dönüşümlerle bulundukları bölgelerin öncüsü olmuşlardır. Her iki ülkede de modernleşme sürecinde kadınların kurtarılmasından ama özgürleşememesinden bahsedilmektedir; kadınlar buralarda bir takım sivil haklara kavuşmuş olsalar da güçlenmeleri yargı ve ideolojiler yoluyla kontrol altında tutulmuştur. Aynı zamanda bu iki ülke bugün onları aile temelli bir refah modeline uygun kılan sosyo-demografik açıdan yarı-sıkıştırılmış modernite deneyimi yaşamışlardır. Bu aile temelli yaklaşım hem sosyal politikaların neoliberalleşmesine dair programın bir parçası hem de bu ülkelerin küresel kapitalist ekonomiye kendi oryantalist cevaplarının bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu çalışma aile temelli yaklaşımın aileyi güvenceye aldığı düşüncesinin sorgulanabilir olduğunu iddia etmekte. Aynı zamanda kadının emek gücünün esnek piyasalarda istihdam edilmesinin cinsiyet eşitliğine katkısını sorgulamakta. Devlet politikalarındaki benzerlikler olsa da Japonya ve Türkiye deneyimi belli noktalarda ayrışır. Bu farklılıkların en önemlilerinden biri Türkiye'de daha fazla kadın iş gücüne katılımını çocuk doğurmak adına ertelemeye meyilliyken Japonya'da durumun bunun tam tersi olmasında tezahür eder. Neoliberal küresel iktisadi politikalar karşısında hem Türkiye hem Japonya 1980'lerden bu yana birçok reformu yine kadın özgürleşmesini dikkate almayarak yürürlüğe koymuştur.

***Anahtar Kelimeler**: kadın statüsü, modernleşme, ailecilik, Türkiye, Japonya*

Introduction

Notwithstanding geographical distance, cultural differences and different courses of industrialisation, Turkey and Japan have some common historical backgrounds which could make a comparative study of women's social positions quite interesting. Firstly, both were among the few countries which were never colonised and initiated their modernisation projects in response to the pressures of the Western powers. Secondly, women's emancipation was an integral part of early modernisation projects in both countries. Thirdly, both played a leading role in each region, the Middle East and East Asia, in terms of modernisation, industrialisation and women's emancipation between the late 19th century and the early 20th century. Fourthly, both opted a familialist welfare model as they were intensely integrated into global capitalist economy. Lastly, each country is one of the lowest-ranked countries in gender equality indexes today. In other words, Turkey and Japan are among the countries where gender inequality persists in a considerable way in spite of their successful attempt for early modernisation, women's emancipation as well as economic development.

This paper examines how the experiences of Turkey and Japan converge and diverge in their struggles for a new gender order in modern society from a feminist political-economic perspective. Currently, they are among the low ranked countries in various gender equality indexes. For example, Turkey and Japan ranked 130th and 110th respectively out of 149 countries in the 2018 gender gap report of the World Economic Forum, regressing from their rankings a decade ago (WEF, 2018: 139, 277). Shapes of radar area of gender-gap measurements are almost identical for two countries. Turkey made remarkable progresses in health and education in the last decades. Japan has no or negligible gender gaps in those areas. Yet they perform poorly against women in the areas of economic participation and political empowerment.

Gender inequality is a persistently universal phenomenon yet its form varies by time, place and social group. It is shaped by socioeconomic dynamics and political negotiations. In this recognition, a feminist political-economic approach pays particular attentions to an interconnection of systems of inequality, historical contingencies and personal troubles when it tries to understand women's subordination. This paper attempts to contextualise women's troubles in Turkey and Japan by local history of modernisation, a role of the state, and socioeconomic dynamics of each country. Understanding the roles of macro powers in women's particular hardship provides us with valuable insights while studying women's agency certainly helps a deeper understanding of intricate micro politics of patriarchy. In her Forward to Kumari Jawardena's classic, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, Rafia Zakaria (2016) warns against contemporary feminism critiquing away from state policies and turning to the individual woman and her empowerment in these neoliberal and post-feminist times.

The Second Wave feminism raised powerful feminist consciousness and produced theories which accounted women's subordination as a structural and

political problem. When it comes to women in non-Western countries, however, their oppression was, and is still frequently, deliberated in cultural terms. This current of thought largely derives from neo-modernisation theory. Classic modernisation theory assumed social change as an overall universal historical movement from "traditional" to "modern" (So, 1990). When global political-economic developments, such as NICs' rapid economic growth without a consolidation of democracy and gender equality, challenged its major assumptions, many scholars sought an explanation in Asian cultures, especially religions, as an obstacle to 'true' modernisation (So, 1990). In particular, a cultural approach to women's subordination in non-Western societies was embraced not only by the neo-modernist scholarship but also by the Western liberalists who upheld cultural relativism as well as Asian nationalist scholars who defended distinctiveness of their own cultures (Ertürk, 1991).

A number of leading scholars of women's studies, however, condemned the culturalist approach as "ethnocentric", "essentialist" and "Orientalist" (Kandiyoti, 1987; Ertürk, 1991; Ochiai, 2013a). These scholars demonstrated the variability of gender inequality within a 'cultural' region, such as Islamic countries in the Middle East (Ertürk, 1991; Moghadam, 1996) and East Asian societies with Confucian influence (Ochiai, 2013b); criticised conventional feminist scholarship that hardly included non-Western women's experiences (Kandiyoti, 1987); and contended that women's oppression in Asia and Africa should be also examined as a structural problem of patriarchy, rather than as a particular cultural case or as a case of pre-modernity, from a historically and sociologically sensitive feminist perspective: "gender inequality is a universal phenomenon which varies historically, cross-culturally, and cross-nationally according to the system of production and distribution, the class and social structure, the orientation of political elites, and women's own mobilization" (Moghadam, 1996: 244). This paper is a further attempt to go beyond both the universalism of modernist assumption and the cultural relativism of liberal and nationalist scholarship through a comparative examination of women's positions in two Asian countries. Many cross-national analyses of women's status have been already conducted. Yet a comparative study of Asian countries in different regions of the world is rarely done. It would highlight the significance of historical contingencies in a transformation of women's position in society.

The question this paper explores is how the historical experiences of Turkey and Japan converge and diverge in processes towards today's gender gaps. To seek an answer to that question, an interpretive comparative historical analysis is conducted. To be precise, the purposefully selected statistics and studies on gendered modernisation of two countries are examined employing Emiko Ochiai's socio-demographic approach to family and gender. Studies were selected for their richness in information and perspective to shed light on the genderedness of modernisation and state policies. Ochiai's approach helps to relate a particular form of gender inequality with wider social transformations beyond ahistorical cultural accounts. In the following pages, firstly Ochiai's approach is accounted, secondly the gendered aspects of early modernisation in

Turkey and Japan are reviewed, thirdly contemporary gender inequalities in the two countries are illustrated in relation with their socio-demographic transformations and neoliberal as well as familialist state policies, and lastly it is argued that new familialism as a requisite of neoliberal market economy prevents women's full participation of labour markets and intensifies gender inequality in particular ways. This comparative historical analysis demonstrates a historically contingent development of gender equality.

Demographic Transitions and Social Change

Ochiai (2013a; 2014) argues that the phases of "first modernity" and "second modernity" (Beck, 1992) coincide with the first demographic transition (the period when mortality rate and then fertility rate fall) and the second demographic transition (the period when total fertility rate declines to below the replacement level, or 2.1 children per woman) respectively. Each mode of modernity with a particular demographic composition makes a certain type of family ideologically dominant and statistically prevalent. While industrial revolution modernised production and institutionalised the political, economic and social public spheres (namely, the state, market and civil society), the first demographic transition modernised reproduction and generated 'the modern family.' Although there has been a dispute over a definition of modern family among scholars, in the simplest terms it can be defined as a small-sized (predominantly nuclear) child-centred family characterised with intimacy, privacy and domesticity. Such form of family was possible, and desired, when a fall of mortality rate made life-long monogamous marriage realisable. Falling birth rates made intimate familial relations and child-centred parenting possible. The replacement-level fertility thus indicates a popularisation of 'modern family.'

Ochiai (2013a; 2014) explains that in the countries of Western Europe and North America, the first demographic transition occurred between the 1880s and the 1930s and the demographic stability of low mortality and low fertility continued until the late 1960s. During the time of demographic stability and the popularisation of 'modern family,' their national economies grew and female labour force participation rate (FLFPR) declined as described by J.N. Sinha's U-shape relationship or what feminist scholars' call women's 'housewifesation' (Ochiai, 2013a). Thus, the ideologically dominant and statistically prevalent type of family consisted of the bread-winning father, the stay-at-home mother and two or three children in a period of demographic stability. In the late 1960s, fertility rate declined again in those countries. They went through economic recession in the 1970s and a series of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s. Rates of divorce, cohabitation and birth out of wedlock increased. The institution of marriage weakened as the forms of reproduction and intimate relations diversified. While the neoliberals, who are very often political conservatives, still defend the traditional nuclear family ('the modern family'), those

demographic transformations and economic recession have ended a male-breadwinner family model and instigated women's labour force participation.

According to Ochiai (2013a; 2014), Japan's demographic experience differs not only from Western Europe and North America but also from the other Asian countries. Japan's first demographic transition occurred between the 1950s and the 1960s and the second demographic transition started in the 1990s. While the period of demographic stability was about 50 years on average in the West, it lasted only 20 years in Japan. In many other Asian countries, total fertility rates (TFR) continuously dropped from the replacement level to the below replacement levels. That is, there was no period of demographic stability during which 'the modern family' would be institutionalised (Ochiai, 2013b). Ochiai (2013a; 2014) follows Kyung-Sup Chang's conceptualisation of Asian modernisation as "compressed modernity" and calls Japan's modernisation "semi-compressed modernity." She contends that cross-national differences in women's socioeconomic status can be elucidated by a degree of compression of modernisation process and different responses of states and societies to that process (Ochiai, 2013a; 2014). In line with Ochiai, Turkey's early modernisation, new gender order and gender gaps today are examined through a comparison with the experience of Japan's semi-compressed modernity in the following sections. A historical comparison of socio-demographic developments between two countries is summarised in Table 1 and Table 2 below.

Making of Modern States and Women's Emancipation without Liberation Japan

It was the forcible entrance of four American warships into the Bay of Edo in 1853 that forced Japan to transform itself from the feudal shogunate to a modern state. In the following years, Japan signed a series of unequal treaties with the United States and other Western countries. The Tokugawa Shogunate - a two century-long feudal regime - ended in 1868 when the pro-shogunate forces lost a battle against the nationalist revolutionary forces who were dissatisfied with the Shogun's 'cooperation' with the Western powers. After the Meiji Restoration of 1867 the new ruling class aspired political sovereignty, capitalist development and cultural integration under the Emperor's rule. While the models of various Western countries were adopted for institutional reorganisation (Jansen, 2000), a Japanese nation was imagined as the 'family state' - an equivalent of extended family sanctified by the Emperor as the head of the family (Jayawardena, 1986).

In the 1870s and the 1880s, the Liberty and Civil Rights Movement was mobilised by reformist politicians, broke samurai worriers and prosperous farmers. While Japan's first women activists were part of the Movement, the Enlightenmentalist male reformers actively expressed their liberal views on 'the woman question' in journals and books. They saw low esteem for women as a major cause of Japan's backwardness and advocated the nuclear family in place of the feudal extended household which, they argued, maintained women's

subjugation (Jayawardena, 1986). An outcome of the Movement which was "a step forward in general terms (legislatively) proved to be two steps backwards for women" (Jayawardena, 1986: 232). In 1889 the Meiji Constitution was formulated as the second modern constitution in Asia after the Ottoman constitution of 1876. It granted suffrage yet limited it to the male taxpayer over 25 years old. In 1890 women were banned from participating in political activities. The 1896 Meiji Civil Code formalised the patriarchal family system in accordance with neo-Confucian morality (Jayawardena, 1986).

After the formulation of the Constitution, political disputes were once settled and the country thoroughly concentrated on increasing national prosperity and military power. By the turn of the century, agricultural production rose to the limit and light and then heavy industries grew rapidly (Jansen, 2000). Women's education was promoted because it was considered as indispensable for modernising the nation. In 1872, the Education Ordinance was issued aiming at universal literacy. In 1899, the Girls High School Ordinance made an opening of secondary school for women compulsory in all prefectures. From 1900 onwards, a number of women's universities were founded in different parts of Japan and in the 1910s the existing universities gradually accepted women students. In those years, primary education was almost universalised and gender disparity at this level of schooling was eliminated (Saito, 2012).

Women's increased educational opportunity was also an opportunity for the state to disseminate a new role of women in the modernising country. A motto of 'Good wives, Wise mothers' was introduced to school curriculums and taught women to be productive for the country within a realm of the family. According to Jayawardena (1986: 235), Japan is "an example of how education, while seeming to be a liberating factor for women, actually proved to be opposite." Nonetheless, the expansion of women's education generated a thriving of women writers, women's enfranchisement movement and feminist debates (Jayawardena, 1986). For instance, Raichou Hiratsuka and her friends launched a feminist literary magazine, Bluestocking, which covered a range of issues from women's social and economic participation to abortion and sex work that often developed into fierce public debates. Hiratsuka founded the Association of New Woman with another feminist activist, Fusae Ichikawa, in 1919. Their demand for women's suffrage was fruitless. Yet they lobbied successfully for the amendments of the Police Security Regulations of Peace Preservation Law which banned women's political activities and of the Attorney Law which barred women from practicing law.

Japan, which had regained equal diplomacy in international society by the 1904 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, started expansionist policies. Growing economic inequalities and the oppression of militarist governments gave rise to a large-scale social movement known as 'Taisho democracy.' It achieved universal suffrage in 1925 yet women's enfranchisement was not realised again. It was granted under the Allied Occupation after the surrender of Japan in 1945. At the dawn of WWII, a call for national solidarity pushed the women's rights issue out of the public

concern. The state propagandized women's labour service to the nation by working in industry and giving birth to more subjects of the Emperor (Jayawardena, 1986). Restrictions to women's employment was reduced to fill a loss of male labour force. Actually, women had already consisted of 60 percent of the entire workforce by the 1870s (Jayawardena, 1986: 236). Meiji agricultural reforms had restructured the feudal agrarian economy and a mass of young women from impoverished rural households had been working in the textile sector and others in harsh conditions (Jansen, 2000). Again, Japan is a case in which women's participation in labour markets "did not contribute in any significant way to changes in the role or status of women" (Jayawardena, 1986: 237).

In her comparative study of women's emancipation in Asia, Jayawardena (1986: 253) concludes that Japan was "the most backward where women's rights were concerned" despite its drastic administrative reorganisation, rapid industrial development, smooth capitalist integration, fierce political movements and high feminist consciousness. Women's education and labour force participation were devised to reinforce the patriarchal modern family and the imperial militarist nation while women's movements were "kept well under control through judicial killings" (Jayawardena, 1986: 253).

Turkey

Although Turkey's endeavour for modernisation was initiated as early as the end of the 18th century, it was the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) when the Ottoman Empire was transformed from a Sultanate to a modern-state through a series of edicts by which administration was reorganised in line with European, particularly French, models. The Tanzimat was fundamentally an effort to save the declining Empire under the multiple pressures from the European powers, the non-Turkish population and the Turkish population who demanded modernisation (Jayawardena, 1986). A path for modernisation was controversial from the beginning. The Young Ottomans, a group of critical intellectuals, opposed the Tanzimat reform's 'Westernism' and sought to achieve a synthesis between progressivism and the Turkish Muslim identity (Jayawardena, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1991). They were an advocator of women's emancipation. For the young reformers, social conventions, such as a patriarchal extended household arrangement of 'the Ottoman family', were obstacles for social progress as well as their own ambition (Kandiyoti, 1991). Although some legislative advances for women were made in this period, the new civil code of 1876 was based fundamentally on the Sharia law (Jayawardena, 1986).

Many upper-class girls received serious education at home or foreign schools in the Tanzimat period as future wives suitable for the statesmen of the modernising country (Jayawardena, 1986). Among those women, prominent writers, such as Fatma Aliye and Zeyneb Hanoum, emerged. They advocated women's emancipation and their new social role as mother, wife and Muslim. During the Second Constitutional Era after the 1908 restoration of the Constitution, women's organisations and feminist journals flourished and women

themselves actively expressed dissents against their subordinate position in society (Jayawardena, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1991; Abadan-Unat, 1998). In 1914 the Women's University (İnâs Darülfünunu) was opened in Istanbul. According to Kandiyoti (1991), the state's struggle to create Turkish-Muslim professionals and entrepreneurs created an opportunity for upper-class Ottoman women to access higher education.

'The woman question' was debated from various points of view at the turn of the century. It was discussed mainly in line with three ideological currents: Westernism, Islamism and Turkism (Jayawardena, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1991). The Westernist advocated women's emancipation as a civilizational issue. They saw Islam as responsible for women's subordination as well as for the backwardness of the Ottoman society. For the Islamist, 'the woman question' was a focal point of Western influence. They argued that a thorough application of the Sharia law would revive the Empire. The Turkist considered not only Western influence but also Ottoman culture contaminated ancient Turkish values which were claimed to be egalitarian. Turkish nationalism, of especially Ziya Gökalp, was particularly influential. Gökalp described authentic Turkish family as nuclear in form, monogamous in marriage and intimate in relationship in contrast to 'the Ottoman family.'

A prominent activist for women's rights, Halide Edib, was a supporter of Gökalp. She was one of the main figures in the Sultanahmet demonstrations for a protest against the Greek occupation of Izmir organised by the Women's University and the Association of Modern Women (Kaymaz, 2010). The War of Independence mobilised women in Anatolia, too. The Anatolian Women's Association for Patriotic Defence was founded in Sivas in 1919. The women of the newly emerged Anatolian middle class were the foremost members of the Association (Kandiyoti, 1991). Thus, women's movements were integrated into a Turkist nation-building in the war period of the 1910s (Sancar, 2012). In the meantime, the massive withdrawal of men to the front created a demand for women's labour. In 1915 a law instituted a form of mandatory employment facilitated a growth of female employment beyond white-collar jobs (Kandiyoti, 1991). As the wars intensified, "women's 'patriotic' activities legitimised both their mobility and visibility" in the public sphere (Kandiyoti, 1991: 30).

Mustafa Kemal, the victorious commander of the War of Independence, founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923. His reforms ended the ideological disputes over 'the woman question.' After a long dispute, Mustafa Kemal and his associates decided on an adoption of the Swiss Civil Code (Abadan-Unat, 1998). The new Civil Code banned polygamy and ensured equal rights of men and women in divorce, custody of children and inheritance (Jayawardena, 1986) while it secured men's authority by, for example, defining the head of household as male. Women's enfranchisement in local and national elections were granted in 1930 and 1934 respectively. Eighteen women entered the parliament at the 1935 national election. It amounted to 4.5 percent of the total number of MPs - the highest figure in Europe at that time.

Mustafa Kemal's reforms realised an earlier advancement in women's legal status than many countries in the world. By the 1970s, women consisted of 20 and 17 percent of those who worked in legal profession and in medical profession respectively, which were higher than the equivalent figures in many western countries (Jayawardena, 1986). Nonetheless, a number of Turkish feminist scholars argue that the paternalistic state feminism of republican male reformers limited a development of feminist consciousness and activism (Kandiyoti, 1991; Jayawardena, 1986). Women were endowed legal rights as "an explicit symbol of the break with the past" and their autonomous political movements were "actively discouraged" (Kandiyoti, 1991: 41). It was said that women were emancipated by the legal reform and therefore such activism was no longer necessary (Sancar, 2012). Certainly some women, mostly upper- and middle-class women, benefitted from the educational and occupational opportunities that were created by the drastic reforms in the early Republican period. Yet, "the reforms remained class-bound, barely affected the masses of Turkish women" (Kandiyoti, 1987; Jayawardena, 1986: 42).

Convergence and Divergence

Both Turkey and Japan have a long history of women's emancipation movement. The struggles developed interacting with domestic demands for democratisation, feminist movements abroad and political ambition of male reformers. Growing demands for women's emancipation stalled in the periods of wars when a call for national solidarity impelled women and liberal men to put aside the issue. Consequently, the final legal reforms were made by the hands of male elites of the new regimes. Early feminists in Japan were more radical than those in Turkey. Yet women's educational and economic participation were channelled to the reinforcement of capitalist accumulation, imperial nation-building and the modern family. Their empowerment was controlled judicially and ideologically. On the contrary, women's emancipation was achieved by state feminism in Turkey. Women's political and economic participation was benevolently controlled in a way to reinforce men's authority as fathers, husbands and political leaders through state paternalism. Women's emancipation was a central issue for Turkish and Japanese reformists who saw it as a benchmark of opposition to the old regimes. However, neither of them questioned patriarchy. Instead, they endorsed the patriarchal modern family. In both cases, women were "emancipated but unliberated" as Kandiyoti's (1987) famous phrase says.

Table 1. Women's Status and Socio-Demographic Changes in Turkey and Japan, the 1830s-1940s

TURKEY			JAPAN		
Major events	**Consequences on women**	**Demo-graphic changes**	**Major events**	**Consequences on women**	**Demo-graphic changes**
1839-1876: Tanzimat reforms	**1858**: An extension of women's rights of inheritance; a ban of female slavery; secondary-level education for girls **1869**: The first vocational school for women **1870**: The first teacher-training college for women		**1868** Meiji reforms	**1869:** Women's free pass of checking points. **1872:** Emancipation of indentured geisha and prostitutes. **1872:** Education Ordinance for universal primary school education. **1873:** The first vocational school for women. **1874:** The first teacher-training college for women	
1876: The Ottoman Constitution	Young Ottoman reformers discuss 'the woman question' A rise of women's journals and organisations		**1870s-80s** Liberty and Civil Rights Movement	Male reformers discuss 'the woman question'. First women activists	FLFPR 60%
			1889: Meiji Constitution **1890:** Assembly and political association law **1896:** Meiji Civil Code	**1886**: A distribution of a guideline of 'Good wife, Wise mother' policy to girls' schools. Suffrage to the male taxpayer over 25 years old. A ban of women participating political activities. A protection of the patriarchal modern family	
1908: Young Turk Revolution			**1904:** Anglo-Japanese Alliance	**1899** Girls High School Ordinance. **1900s** Women's universities	
1912: Balkan War **1914-18**: WWI **1917**: Family Code **1919-23:** War of Independence	**1914**: The Women's University; a better access to divorce for women; an integration of women's movements into patriotic activities.		War boom & Industrialisation **1912-26**: 'Taisho democracy' movement	**1910s:** Primary education universalised. **1911:** An introduction of 'Good wife, Wise mother' motto to the elementary schools' curriculum. **1910s:** Acceptance of women by major universities. **1910s**: A rise of women's journals and organisations.	
1924 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey	Equality before the Law; a ban of polygamy; equal rights of men and women in divorce, custody of children and inheritance		**1925**: General election law	Universal suffrage for men	**1925-50** Population growth (High fertility & low mortality)
1926: Turkish Civil Code	**1930:** Women's enfranchisement (local) **1934**: Women's enfranchisement (national).		**1939-45**: WWII	An integration of women's movements into patriotic activities.	

State Familialism and the Costs of Modern Family in the 21st Century

Japan

'The modern family' was conceived during the Meiji reform and popularised as a norm and practice in the mid-20th century in Japan. Ochiai (2013a) highlights a fact that the image of 'Good wives, Wise mothers' was imported from Europe

where the mother's role in children's education was upheld at that time. A woman was considered as a fool in the pre-modern Confucian ethics and hence educational roles were limited to men. The new image of woman as a nurturer, carer and educator of children was however embraced as 'Asian tradition' in contrast with 'the new woman', and later the activists of women's liberation movement who were seen as peculiarly 'Western' in modern Japan.

In the 1980s, a model of 'modern family' was legislatively consolidated. Japan had employed a Bismarckian welfare state model in the early 20th century. A need for more comprehensive welfare system was recognised and 'the first year of welfare' was declared in 1973. Yet the oil crisis broke out in the same year. A plan of expanding welfare benefits was withdrawn in response to a strong concern of business groups despite electoral pressures (Lambert, 2007). Instead the 'Japanese-type welfare society' with "the traditional Japanese virtue of 'mutual assistance by self-help, a family and a community'" was devised (Ochiai, 2013b: 88). Minimal government intervention was thus rationalised in cultural terms (Lambert, 2007). Politicians, government officials and scholars believed in the international acclaim for Japan's 'unique' culture and its contribution to economic success (Ochiai, 2013b). The Nakasone government of the conservative LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) (1982-1987) secured a model of 'modern family' through tax reforms - tax reductions for the employee with a spouse who earns less than one million yen yearly and a pension for 'housewives' (married women whose incomes are less than 1.3 million yen per year) without paying a premium (which is popularly called 'the wall of 1.3 million yen') (Ochiai, 2014).

In the 1950s Japan's FLFPR was higher than that of many Western countries which were in the period of housewifesation (Ochiai, 2014). A rise of FLFPR in urban areas pushed up the national average, which once declined during WWII, to above 50 percent despite rural women's fluctuated yet declining labour force participation (Kamiya and Ikeya, 1994). In the early 1970s, the rate fell to 45 percent (Kamiya and Ikeya, 1994). Withdrawal from labour market was distinct among women in their childbearing age as demonstrated by an M-shaped curve of FLFPRs by age groups (Iwai, 2013). This housewifesation process was consolidated by the Nakasone tax reforms which motivated a mass of married women to move out of regular employment. The familialist welfare regime reinforced Japan's notorious workplace custom of long working hours and legitimised the state's reservation about public supports for childcare services. A widely shared assumption of the dedicated male worker who is married to a housewife as a standard type of employee made very hard for mothers and wives to work full time (Nemoto, 2012).

In the years of a consolidation of 'modern family', Japan was one of the world's largest economies and its working-age population was as high as near 70 percent (Ochiai, 2013b). The single-income family was possible thanks to those economic and demographic advantages. However the period of stability, or 'demographic dividend' in demographic terms, did not last very long. The second demographic transition, long-term economic stagnation and a decline in full-time

jobs began in the 1990s. Ochiai (2014: 219) states that the familialist welfare policy was not only the "traditionalization of modernity" but also part of the neoliberalisation programme of the former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone who was a close ally of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. The Nakasone government implemented the Equal Employment Opportunity Law after the ratification of CEDAW (the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) in 1985. The Law was received with a great anticipation by women. In the next year, however, the government issued the Worker Dispatch Act following a global trend of flexibilisation of labour (Ochiai, 2014).

Japan's FLFPR has increased extremely slowly. Legally provided equal opportunity fails to promote women's advancement in workplace as feminist groups predicted (Ueno, 2007). A notable increase was finally seen in the early 2010s. Yet gender gaps in the rate and form of employment persist: FLFPR is 67 percent while the equivalent figure for men is over 80 percent; the rates of non-regular employment are 56 percent for women and 22 percent for men (Naikakufu, 2018: 33). Hachiro Iwai's (2013) cohort analysis of women' life course indicates the casualisation of female labour since the 1990s. The 1945-1949 cohort was likely to quit a full-time job when they married in their late 20s and return to labour markets as non-regular employees when their children grew older in their mid-30s. For the 1972-1974 cohort a proportion of the non-regular employee begins to increase as early as 23 years old. The rising costs of unemployment (the extending years of education, economic stagnation, falling wages, rising divorce rates etc.) may have contributed the recent rise of women's employment yet an insecure one as the 'temporal' worker. They have aggravated a trend of postponing marriage and childbirth, which is among the major factors for Japan's 'very low fertility' (TFR below 1.6) and population decline, in the context of persistent gender inequality in domestic division of labour (North, 2009; Iwai, 2013; Naikakufu, 2018: 39). PM Shinzo Abe promises 'a nation where women shine.' Abenomics (a nickname for Abe's economic program) includes labour market liberalisation and a promotion of women's labour force participation. It is true that FLFPR has increased since the Abe government came to power in 2012. Yet women's advancement in society is still prevented as the latest gender gap index reveals (WEF, 2018).

Japan's state familialism created its own contradiction. Chizuko Ueno explicates that Japan, which did not permit unskilled foreign workers until 2019, has coped with the accelerating labour shortage due to an expansion of service sectors and aging population by the part-time employment of housewives, or "the housewifesation of labour" (Ueno, 2007: 49). The image of the working mother shifted from the progressive woman to the woman who is obliged to work to contribute to the meagre household budget. As the housewife becomes a position that the majority cannot afford to be, an increasing number of young women dream of being a housewife rather than shouldering the double burden of low paid work and unpaid domestic chores: a "revival of conservatism" among women themselves (Ueno, 2007: 141).

Turkey

Turkey's modernisation was consolidated between 1945 and 1965 which Serpil Sancar (2012: 234) calls "a period of conservative modernisation." She maintains that Turkish society was modernised through a reorganisation of the family. A Turkist reformer, Gökalp's 'national family' was a powerful image of the new family. A woman plays an important yet invisible role in 'the national family' as a nurturer, carer and educator of the children of the nation. She "is active but an exemplar of female sexual morality; sacrifices herself for the nation and the family if necessary but is submissive and reserved" (Sancar, 2012: 194). The image was disseminated through school education. Textbooks taught children the new images of gender roles. In those images, a primary role of woman was always a mother yet it shifted from a working mother (typically a teacher) to a stay-at-home mother in the period of conservative modernisation (Gümüşoğlu, 2013). 'The modern family' consisted of a breadwinning father, a stay-at home mother and two children (ideally one boy and one girl) was gradually popularised among the urban middle class. It was the period when Turkey experienced rapid urbanisation. As the urban middle class faced real proximity with fellow citizens migrated from rural areas, they eagerly separated and protected the family from a 'danger' of the outside world (Sancar, 2012). Thus a foundation of 'modern family' with domesticity, privacy and intimacy was laid.

The period of conservative modernisation corresponds to the country's first demographic transition. TFR has steadily declined between the early 1960s and the end of the 1980s. The new Constitution of 1961 was implemented after a coup d'état. It declared that Turkey was a welfare state (Dedeoğlu, 2013). Yet economic instabilities and political tensions prevented its full materialisation. Turkey eventually developed a Bismarckian welfare system complemented with familialism (Keyder, 2007). After another military coup in 1980, Turkey entered a neoliberal phase. A range of market-oriented reorganisations were however accelerated in the 2000s under the conservative JDP (the Justice and Development Party) governments (2002-today). For example, the new Labour Act enacted in 2003 prepared a legal ground for flexibilisation of labour (Ulusoy, 2014). Neoliberal health sector reforms were augmented in 2003 onwards. TFR, which has been above 2.1 since the late 1980s, fell below the replacement level in 2009 (TÜİK, 2015). The JDP government responded quickly to the coming second demographic transition by replacing the country's forty-year anti-natal population policy with mild pronatalist policies. While the government has gradually withdrawn universalist public services for family planning since the late 2000s (Topgül et al., 2017), the Ministry of Family and Social Policy introduced maternity grant in 2015. The policy shift was often legitimised by anti-imperialist nationalist rhetoric as frequently addressed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the former Prime Minister and current President: "Please have at least three children to preserve young Turkish population, which Western countries try to wipe out" (Ntvmsnbc, 2008).

Meanwhile, Turkey ratified CEDAW in 1986 and a number of reforms for gender equality were undertaken in the 2000s. For example, the new Civil Code of 2001 eliminated a notion of the head of household as male and equalised the status of husband and wife. The Social Security and General Health Insurance Law of 2006 abolished some entitlements of women as family dependent and introduced an equalisation of certain welfare benefits for women and men. However, as Saniye Dedeoğlu (2013) points out, the persistent gender gaps in employment, income and property ownership continue to keep women in a position of family dependent and unable to benefit from the equal status secured in laws. Turkey's FLFPR, which was 72 percent in 1955 (Dedeoğlu, 2013), declined drastically to 23 percent by 2004 (TÜİK, 2014: 79). It recovered to 33 percent in 2018 (TÜIK, 2018), yet it is still considerably low by international standards as well as in comparison with men, whose figure has been over 70 percent for the last decade (TÜİK, 2014: 79). Besides, women's informal work is observed to be increasing. It amounts to 66 percent of female employment while the equivalent figure is 42 percent for men (Toksöz, 2007 cited in Dedeoğlu, 2010). An extending period of women's low labour force participation (40 years) despite the supposedly positive factors for its recovery (increasing female educational attainment and decreasing birth rates) requires an explanation other than the U-shape hypothesis (Erinc, 2017).

Dayıoğlu and Kırdar's cohort analysis (2011) demonstrates the mixed trends of women's participation in labour markets: in rural areas, a constant decline and distinctively young women's withdrawal; in urban areas, the increasing participation rates of primary school graduates, the falling participation rates of educated women and the sharp declines after the age 40 for all the cohorts. The life-course analysis shows a M-curve for primary school graduates and a bump-shaped curve for high school graduates (a fall after the age 40) and higher (a fall after the age 44). Dayıoğlu and Kırdar (2011: 10) construe that on the one hand, many primary school graduate women are forced to leave labour markets during childrearing since they are more likely to work in the informal sector without labour rights like maternity leave and their low wages are not sufficient for childcare services; on the other hand, the educated women in the formal sector benefit from rights which enable them to stay in labour markets while raising children and from "the rather generous pension system" which allows them to retire early. In recent years there seems to be a mismatch between available jobs in labour markets and the jobs that educated women seek in the context of limited employment opportunities in the public sector and the falling wage rates for those women in the private sector.

The JDP government embarked upon an action plan for women's employment in 2016. Simultaneously, the government has shifted family policy from one which idealises an urban type of nuclear household to one which promotes intergenerational mutual assistance without living together necessarily (Özbay, 2014). The new policy enshrines the family in which children and the elderly are cared well by familial network, in which substantial works are mostly done by women. Ulutaş (2014: 86) observes that the government tries to

promote women's flexible employment as "a magic formula" for increasing FLFPR and TFR at the same time. Flexible employment mobilises women for labour markets as cheap labour while contributing to family budgets and being available for reproductive labour to sustain family solidarity as well as the population.

Table 2. Women's Status and Socio-demographic Changes in Turkey-Japan, 1945-18

TURKEY			JAPAN		
Major events	Consequences on women	Demo-graphic changes	Major events	Consequences on women	Demo-graphic changes
1945 Multi-party system	**1945-65** 'Conservative modernisation'	FLFPR 72% (1955) **1950-1985** Population Growth (High fertility & l ow mortality) **1960s-1980s** The First DT	**1946** Constitution of Japan	**1945** Universal suffrage including women; Equality before the Law **1950s** Popularisation of 'modern family'	FLFPR Over 50% (**1950s**)1950s-**1960s** First DT
1960 Military coup **1960s-70s** Political instability			**1960s-70s** Rapid economic growth **1973** Oil crisis	**1970s** Women's liberation movement **1979** Publication of 'Japanese-type welfare society' series by LDP	FLFPR 46% (1975) **1970s-1980s** D. stability (Low fertility & low mortality) 1970- Population ageing
1980 Military coup **1983-89** Özal governments (ANAP)	Beginning of the neoliberal era **1980s** Feminist movements **1986** Ratification of CEDAW		**1982-87** Nakasone governments (LDP) **1986** Worker Dispatch Act	Beginning of the neoliberal era **1985** Ratification of CEDAW, Equal Employment Opportunity Law Flexibilisation of labour force	
1990s Economic crises **2001** Civil Code reform 2004 Penal Code reform **2003** Labour Act Nr.4857 **2000s** Health sector reform **2006** The Social Security and General Health Insurance Law	Equality of spouses in representation and property A shift of sexual crimes from crimes against the family and society to crimes against individuals Flexibilisation of labour force **2008** Pro-natal population policy Some equalisation of welfare benefits for women and men A monthly payment for the family care giver	**1990s-2000s** D.stability (Low fertility & low mortality) FLFPR 24% (2004)Informal sector, female, 66%	**1990s-2000s** Recession 2000 Long-term insurance law	Formalisation of home care services	**1990s**- Second DT (Very low fertility & low mortality) **2000s**- Super-ageing population **2008**- Depopulation **1990s-2000s** FLFPR 50% **2005** Irregular employment, female, over 50% **2012** Population decline
Gender Index Ranking **2018** Economic part Political emp.	**2015** Maternity grant; **2016** Action plan for women's emp. 130th 131st 113th	2010s- Second DT TFR 2.07 (**2017**) FLFPR 30% (**2013**)		**2015** Act on Women's Participation and Promotion in the Workplace 110th 117th 125th	TFR 1.43 (**2017**) FLFPR 66% (**2016**)

Convergence and Divergence

After a series of liberal reforms regarding women's status in marriage, family and society, 'the modern family' and a new gender order were popularised in the mid-twentieth century in Turkey and Japan. Women's liberation movements grew in the 1970s in Japan and in the 1980s in Turkey as an objection to the modern gender order which domesticated women. The two countries ratified CEDAW and made legal amendments for equalising the positions of women and men in workplace, marriage and/or social security. These legal advances for gender equality grant women more autonomy as individual citizen. However, this advancement is channelled to the reinforcement of capitalist accumulation, national identity and the modern family, again. When Japan was in a phase of demographic stability and Turkey was completing the first demographic transition, world economy entered the post-Fordist economic phase. Both countries have adopted neoliberal policies since the 1980s being pressured by the global powers. Paradoxically, they introduced familialism as ideology and a model of welfare system in the guise of tradition. As happened in the early modernisation period, it is their self-Orientalist attempts for 'preserving cultures' against 'Westernisation' (Ochiai, 2014). It is an invention of national tradition in the face of globalisation. This familialism is however neoliberal familialism, which is supposed to be an ingenious scheme which not only reduces the burdens of the states and keeps women's labour cheap but also prevents fertility decline and preserves cultural values. It insidiously liberalises labour and upholds the conventional gender division of labour of 'modern family' simultaneously.

Japan's defence of 'modern family', while restructuring national economies for global capitalism, has not simply failed to prevent the second demographic transition but made it different from the Western experience: lower fertility, faster population aging and lower FLFPR. Turkey's familialism today qualitatively differs from that of Japan, too. The JDP government's new family policy departs from 'the modern family' in the period of conservative modernisation. Its family is domestic and intimate yet the mutual assistance of family members beyond the boundary of nuclear household is revalued and idealised. Although nuclear household is the most prevalent family structure for the past half-century, it is known that close kin relationship beyond nuclear family has been commonly maintained despite urbanisation. Nonetheless, Turkey may experience the even more drastic second demographic transition with a slower recovery of FLFPR than Japan. Turkey's fertility keeps falling despite the pro-natal policy. Its FLFPR remains as low as the other Middle Eastern countries with much lower female educational attainment and higher birth rates although its gender pay gap is noticeably narrow unlike Japan (OECD, 2018). It is estimated that Turkey's population would age even much faster than that of Japan (Arun, 2018).

The governments of Turkey and Japan try to increase FLFPR in response to a (future) decline of working-age population. However, action plans for promoting women's labour force participation in both countries go hand in hand with familialist welfare policies, do not question the patriarchal gender order and

hence impose the double burden of paid and unpaid work on women. In this context, Japanese women tend to postpone reproduction. In Turkey, it appears that falling wages for skilled jobs have many women with higher education suspend participating in labour markets. Perhaps, familial network still affords to support women. For now, it appears that women tend to postpone labour force participation rather than reproduction (Özgören, Ergöçmen and Tansel, 2018), though the age of first marriage is on a constant increase (TÜİK, 2014: 9).

Concluding Remarks

The historical comparison above demonstrates the non-linear development of women's social position in Turkey and Japan. Female labour force was massively mobilised in light industry in the early industrialisation period in Japan; women have occupied the significant shares of professional occupations since the early Republican period in Turkey. Japan's women' emancipation movement was as active and radical as that in Europe and America; Turkey's female enfranchisement was one of the earliest in the world. In the mid-twentieth century, the FLFPRs in Turkey and Japan were higher than those in major Western countries. They declined in the late twentieth century and have not fully recovered during the second demographic transition as it did in West European and North American countries.

It is possible to argue that Turkey is one of the few countries which experienced semi-compressed modernity. Its first demographic transition continued a decade longer than Japan (but still two decades shorter than Western countries) and demographic stability lasted for twenty years as that was in Japan. According to Ochiai (2013a, 2014), a country with semi-compressed modernity has a particular difficulty in adjustments for the second demographic transition. The country has a long enough experience of demographic stability so that it is ill-prepared for new conditions when its end comes quite sudden. What makes the adjustments more complicated is its relation with 'the West.' Self-Orientalism is prevalent among the late comers of industrialisation. They often embrace 'cultures' which represent the contrast with what they saw the 'Western', such as 'a broken family.'

'The modern family' was an outcome of the first demographic transition which initially occurred in Europe. Japan has been insisting the familialist policy of the years of demographic stability claiming for a preservation of its own culture despite the impossibility of 'the Japanese-type welfare society' - very low fertility, falling marriage rates, rising divorce rates, rapid population aging, and economic insecurities. According to Ochiai (2013a, 2014), Japan's problem as a country of semi-compressed modernity is an employment of outmoded social policy. Yet, familialism is an essential requirement of neoliberalism however it may appear paradoxical. In her attempt to dissect neoliberal reason Wendy Brown (2015) argues that neoliberalism turns the individual into human capital which is committed to its own value and responsible for its own conduct. In order for this individual can perform accordingly and move in and out of the

market freely, someone "must be oriented differently toward … "soluble" rather than "separative" selves" and take over reproductive labour (Brown, 2015: 104). Thus, in the neoliberal world, either women follow neoliberal norms and line up with other human capitals, "in which case the world becomes uninhabitable", or stay in their old place to care others and uphold familial and social coherence that its "governing principle cannot hold … together" (Brown, 2015: 104-105). According to Brown (2015), neoliberalism, which normalises self-responsibility and self-sacrifice while privatising public goods and services, penalises women in particular and thus intensifies their subordination. The emancipated but unliberated woman who is a good wife and wise mother or a chaste wife and altruistic mother fits well in the neoliberal reason.

However it is questionable if it is familialism that saves a society which is being individualised into an aggregate of human capitals. A paradox of "strong family and low fertility" is observed in many East Asian and Southern European countries (Dalla Zuanna & Micheli, 2004). In those countries, the conventional gender division of labour of 'the modern family' and marriage institution persist yet TFR went down to very low levels. It is also pointed out that FLFPRs is low in the countries with very low fertility (Saraceno, 2004). Very low fertility in those countries is said to be related to late marriage, late first birth and the low rate of children out of wedlock (Saraceno, 2004; Ochiai, 2013b). In other words, women in the conventionally patriarchal modern family postpone going back to their 'old places' yet once they go back, they cannot re-enter the market as the same human capital as before. Turkey's experience diverts from that of Japan in a number of ways: women's relatively high share in professional occupations, a fall of FLFPR to the extremely low level, and the recent rise of female informal wage-earning activities. The differences derive largely from the dynamics of negotiations in national politics, a scale of industrial development, and an extent of influence of modernisation, urbanisation and market economy over the mass. Despite these variances as well as their geographical, cultural and political differences, the experiences of Turkey and Japan in gender politics converge at vital points. The convergences are related with their responses to the Western powers, global capitalist developments and demographic transitions as the countries with semi-compressed modernity. These findings indicate a significance of historical contingency in gender development: a country's position in world capitalist system or its relation with the Western powers as well as the dynamics of political negotiations among multiple actors at the national level.

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