THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE DEADLOCK SOLUTIONS IN FUNCTIONAL FEDERALISM: THE CASES OF BELGIUM AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Abstract

Federal systems are compelled to establish a delicate equilibrium between preserving the autonomy of constituent units and ensuring the functionality of centralized decision-making processes, while institutionalizing the political will of diverse communities to coexist. Functional federations or multinational non-territorial federations are characterized as multilayered structures in which ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences are recognized as foundational elements, with autonomies defined not territorially but functionally. Consequently, the “participation” of these differences in the political system is deemed critical. However, legislative gridlocks may threaten the sustainability of such systems. This study comparatively examines the impacts of political participation mechanisms and legislative gridlock resolution tools on the sustainability of federal systems, utilizing the cases of Belgium and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the guarantees of federalism in the literature are predominantly explained through the arbitral role of high courts, this analysis focuses on the role of additional mechanisms—such as alarm bell procedures, veto powers, mixed commissions, constitutional courts, and interventions by international actors—in federations structured around diversity. Nevertheless, the existence of these tools does not entirely eliminate gridlocks. The 2010–2011 government crisis in Belgium and the fragility of the Dayton framework in Bosnia-Herzegovina exemplify the recurrent nature of political crises despite institutional diversity. Within the context of political guarantee theory, while upper chambers and veto rights are designed to protect communal rights, asymmetric power relations and a lack of political will perpetuate chronic gridlocks. Sustainable federalism appears achievable not solely through legal mechanisms but also via a culture of societal consensus and flexible governance models. The frequency of international interventions in Bosnia and the secessionist rhetoric of regional parties in Belgium underscore the necessity of enhancing the endogenous capacity of political processes. These observations reinforce the argument that a symbiotic relationship between “institutional architecture” and “societal dialogue” is indispensable for sustainable federalism.